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1
INTRODUCTION: FROM 
PERFORMANCE TO 
INVENTING THE SOCIAL
Noortje Marres, Michael Guggenheim, Alex Wilkie
across Many different doMains, efforts are underWay to reinvent 
ways of researching social life. Both in established fields of social inquiry, such 
as sociology and anthropology, and in disciplines such as art, design and archi-
tecture, there is an appetite for adventure, for moving beyond the customary 
distinctions between knowledge and art, and for combining the ‘doing’ ‘research-
ing’ and ‘making’ of social life in potentially new ways. Designers, architects 
and artists are now re-framing their practices as novel forms of social research 
(Rosner, forthcoming; Mazé 2013), while social and cultural researchers are 
taking up artistic instruments and techniques to research society by other than 
textual means, such as drawing and installation art (Wakeford and Lury 2012; 
Wilkie 2017). However, while the projects of conjoining sociology and design, 
and more generally of rethinking epistemic and aesthetic engagement with social 
life, are increasingly widespread, they have raised many unanswered questions, 
such as: What are the specific qualities of such endeavours and the entities they 
produce? Can the aims of artistic intervention and social inquiry really be aligned 
in research practices? Is it possible to contribute to both knowledge and art at 
once, and should we even wish to?
To address such questions, we would do well to consider more carefully 
specific examples of the above forms of social research. Thus, the overall aim 
18
inventing the social
of this book is to introduce inventive approaches to social inquiry through 
the presentation of concrete projects and reflections on the contexts in which 
these projects are undertaken. At the outset, however, we want to offer a wider 
discussion of the intellectual background, methodological orientation and 
sensibilities that inform the projects and reflections presented here, and the 
commitment we think they have in common. Why use the term ‘invention’ in 
relation to social research? In what follows, we will describe the logics at work 
in the phrase ‘inventing the social’ and clarify what differentiates invention from 
innovation, and from performance, in relation to social life. We will argue that 
invention, unlike the other two terms, involves an active search for alternative 
ways of combining representation of, and intervention in, social life.
We will start by giving a brief introduction to what we take to be three key 
ingredients of established understandings of how social life is subject to design 
and artistic intervention. These approaches build on an old idea, namely that 
social life is not simply given – in the way that nature was previously assumed to 
be – but is performed, materially conditioned or constrained, and/or reflexive, 
i.e. it is transformable through knowledge, intervention and creativity. This will 
bring us to a discussion of the role of objects, technologies and environments in 
the accomplishment of social life, and of the difference between dominant ideals 
of the designability of social life and more inventive approaches to it. One of the 
main points we wish to make is that bringing together social research with arts 
and design practices makes possible new types of experimental intervention, that 
differ from narrow scientific experimentalism – moving away from from the idea 
that social science is able to engineer social phenomena like communities, col-
lective behaviour and publics. Here, what might be understood as experimental 
procedures take on a very different appearance from their normative significance 
in modern science. Inventive social research finds its starting point in the inherent 
creativity of social life, and advances a particular form of experimental inquiry: 
it attempts to purposefully deploy creative aspects of social life – including per-
formance, materiality, reflexivity – with the aim of rendering social phenomena 
interpretable and knowable. In the last part of this chapter we discuss what we 
view as markers of ‘good’ or pertinent inventions of sociality, namely experimen-
tation as imagination (section four) and material intervention (section five).
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Soc i a l  L i f e  a s  Togetherne s s : 
P e r format i v e ,  R e f l ex i v e ,  and  Mat er i a l
So, what does this rather awkward and counter-intuitive phrase ‘inventing the 
social’ mean? We want to start by considering some background assumptions 
shared by the contributions to this volume. Most important is the well-estab-
lished view in the social sciences that social life is not something that simply 
exists out there, but is made: the very existence of social life depends on specific 
practices of display, representation, accounting and enactment. Society is not 
like nature was long presumed to be, something that exists independently of 
human intervention and needs only to be represented in order to be known. 
Society is not given but done; indeed, it is often difficult to separate the doing 
and the knowing of social life. Take, for example, a wedding celebration. It is 
both a way of practising togetherness and of making visible, and representable, 
the various relations and actors involved. It is also a way of making new relations. 
Importantly, this insight into the role of social practices is nothing new: it has 
long been championed by social theorists, and can be variously traced back to 
the works of Max Weber, Gabriel Tarde, Alfred North Whitehead, John Dewey, 
John Austin, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Alfred Schütz, and Harold Garfinkel (for a 
discussion see Halewood 2014). According to these – in many respects very 
different – authors and the intellectual traditions they represent, social life is 
accomplished through rituals, representations, accounts, and dramatisations of 
togetherness: it is a consequence of our deliberate orientation towards others. 
In this view, then, there is no such thing as a society that exists independently 
of performative acts.1 Perhaps the most pertinent version of such a perspective 
is Garfinkel’s (1967) generous idea of the ‘methodical character’ of social life, 
and his claim that social life is accomplished through everyday practices of 
‘accounting for social life as part of social life’ (Thielmann 2012).
Different intellectual labels have been offered to identify this insight, from 
interpretative sociology to performance studies, but if we accept a looseness of 
terminology, we can say that they invoke the same basic idea: the active or delib-
erate curation, instantiation, representation and dramatisation of social bonds is 
critical to the very existence of the entity called society and the phenomenon of 
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sociability. Thus, it has been argued that social life has a dramaturgy (Goffman 
1959), is reflexive (Woolgar 1988), and is marked by looping effects between 
how people are labelled – say, as foreigners – and how they understand them-
selves (Hacking 1995). This is to say that the basic idea of what we might call 
the artificiality of social life has become fairly well established over the course 
of the twentieth century. However, it has been argued that current proposals to 
‘engineer’ social life, as in ‘smart’ urban laboratories, are raising new challenges 
for the understanding of social life as performed (e.g. Calvillo and Halpern 
2016). Contemporary phenomena like the rise of social media platforms, and 
the digital city, have granted fresh relevance to the idea that social life is artificial, 
as we will discuss in more detail below.
It is important to recognise that not only social research, but also arts and 
design disciplines have, for some time, drawn attention to the special role of 
technology and material entities – such as buildings – in the conduct and 
performance of social life. The idea of the materiality of social life is of crucial 
importance in understanding how invention may be a characteristic of social 
research. Sociologists and anthropologists have long argued that it is not just 
practices, rituals and ideas that inform the ongoing performance of social life, 
but also the settings (such as buildings), infrastructures (such as electricity and 
radio) and environments (mountains, cities, the air) in which it unfolds. In social 
research, this attention to materiality is today mostly associated with Actor-
Network Theory (ANT) (Michael 2016) and with anthropological approaches 
like material culture studies (Miller 1987; Hicks 2010). In social theory, ANT 
is known for introducing the concept of the non-human as an actor (Callon 
1986; Latour 1992). Here, the idea that society is performed or made becomes 
directly associated with material and technological practices of engineering and 
design, such as attempts to design an electric vehicle (Callon 1986) the instal-
lation of ‘sleeping policemen’ in the street (Latour 1992), and the famous ANT 
slogan ‘society is technology made durable’.2 However, as Calvillo reminds us in 
her contribution to this book, the idea that material practices contribute to the 
invention of social life is much older. The long history of architectural utopias 
and attempts to create new forms of society through buildings is testament 
to this idea (see also Guggenheim 2014). This realisation is also critical for 
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understanding why exchanges between social research and arts and design are 
becoming pertinent today. Or, to put it another way, architects and designers 
will not be surprised to hear it said that buildings and artefacts do things. ‘Of 
course they do things’ comes the reply – ‘it’s our job to make them do things!’. 
For designers and architects, the question is how things do things. Still, it is not 
self-evident how what architects and designers do ‘to’ society, relates to how 
sociologists understand it.
It is also increasingly recognised that social research itself, not just social life, is 
constituted by material practices (Lezaun 2007; Wyatt 2008). Drawing on John 
Austin’s philosophy of language, sociologists have argued that material devices 
initially developed by social scientists to represent society – such as focus groups 
or surveys – may actually influence the conduct of social life or even generate 
forms of sociality (Muniesa et al. 2007; Law, Ruppert and Savage 2013). Such 
studies of the performativity of research methods strive to reveal the myriad of 
practical and material interventions that lurk below the surface of the official 
endeavour to represent society. Some of this work has explicitly challenged 
the representational understanding of social research, arguing that knowledge 
objects, such as focus groups and opinion polls, do not just refer to external states 
of affairs, but may actively constitute the very phenomena they purport to repre-
sent, such as opinions and preferences (Osborne and Rose 1999). Performative 
perspectives on social research reveal a troubling circumstance: devices that 
ostensibly serve to report on social life in actual fact influence it. A stock market 
index or opinion poll does not simply re-present the state of the economy or the 
public, but actively enrols audiences in arrangements for knowing and acting on 
the economy and the public. Moreover, the reverse is also true: phenomena that 
ostensibly serve as occasions for the enactment of social and public life – say a 
public debate organised by government or policy actors – at the same time enable 
the production of data, analysis and knowledge about it (Lezaun and Soneryd 
2007). In short, devices that have been designed to represent a phenomenon – 
society, publics – actively work to shape or even create it.
Recent work that combines social research with arts and design practices 
builds on these insights into the performance of social life, but also moves beyond 
them. The implicit claim of performative analysis of social research devices is 
22
inventing the social
that ‘social research is always already an intervention’ but that this is not suffi-
ciently appreciated in representational social science, and public discourse more 
widely (Law 2004). In this view, one needs to adopt a performative perspec-
tive – and its favoured research methodology, ethnography – to appreciate that 
observational social methods, such as survey research, do not simply represent 
social life, but act on and in it. By contrast, the project of inventing the social 
does not begin with a critique of the blind spots of representational [social] 
science, which must learn to acknowledge performativity. Instead, it begins 
with the idea that social life and social research are performed, and seeks to put 
this insight to use in a generative way, in collaboration with disciplines such as 
architecture, arts, computing and design. Here the starting point is not the for-
getting of intervention, which performative approaches can subsequently claim 
to recover, but engagement with the creative competencies of other disciplines, 
and the question of how social research may share in these creative competen-
cies. In our view, the difference between representational and performative 
approaches in social research methodology does not hinge on the question of 
whether research constitutes a form of intervention or not, but on the types of 
connection between representation and intervention that are made, enabled, 
and explored in social research. To acknowledge the performativity of social 
research is but a first step. To rethink social research based on this understand-
ing means to invent the social.
F rom  Analys ing  P e r format i v i t y 
to  Inv ent ing  th e  Soc i a l
Inventive approaches to social research explore different ways of combin-
ing doing, making and knowing social life, of connecting representation and 
intervention. In mixing social research and arts and design practices to this 
end, inventive research takes up a diverse range of techniques and methods, 
from the design of material displays for survey findings, as in the case of Lucy 
Kimbell’s ‘Pindices’ (2005), to the use of design prototypes to facilitate dis-
cussions of a public issue, as in Nold’s chapter (this volume) on the use of 
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participatory design to elicit views of local residents on noise pollution around 
Heathrow. Each of these projects is idiosyncratic, but they share an important 
feature highlighted in Lury and Wakeford’s (2012) introduction to the book 
Inventive Methods, which states that to inquire into a given phenomenon is to 
participate in it. For Lury and Wakeford, inventive methods are the means by 
which ‘the social world is not only investigated, but may also be engaged. […] 
To describe [methods] as inventive is to seek to realise the potential of this 
engagement, whether this is as intervention, interference or refraction’ (Lury 
and Wakeford 2012: 6). From this insight a number of critical questions arise: 
can social research serve as an occasion for inventive engagement with social 
life? If participation is in some sense inevitable, could social research actively 
contribute to generating sociality? Crucially, however, for Lury and Wakeford 
the purpose of inventive methods is not to design new forms of living together 
from scratch but ‘to enable the happening of the social world – its ongoingness, 
relationality, contingency and sensuousness – to be investigated’ (Lury and 
Wakeford 2012: 2). In formulating this proposal, Lury and Wakeford make an 
important move beyond the critique of representational social science, to pose 
the question of how the creative capacities of social research might be purpose-
fully or methodologically deployed.
Importantly, this invitation to combine social research and arts and design 
practices addresses an important contemporary ethical and political challenge 
that faces social research and design disciplines alike. As inventive research 
combines representing and intervening in social life, it offers a different vision 
of what it means to experiment on – or rather with – social life, one that may 
provide an alternative to more limited ideals of scientific experimentalism that 
have recently gained ascendency in voguish fields such as computational social 
science, behavioural governance, and smart city design. Indeed, this is a further 
reason why we must now move beyond the critique of representationalism. It 
seems to us that the performative proposition – the view that social methods 
do not merely describe social reality but actively inform and participate in its 
enactment – has now become a truism, as social research is today expected 
to be interventionist. In the wake of social media and other technologies, the 
idea that social life is somehow artificial, and can be curated, designed or even 
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engineered, has become increasingly prominent. Take for example the recent 
large-scale Facebook experiments, in which the social media platform deliber-
ately modified particular platform settings by introducing an ‘I voted button’ on 
election day, to see if voter turnout could thereby be increased, and more gener-
ally to demonstrate the degree to which ‘social behaviour is amenable to online 
intervention’ (Bond et al. 2012). Such experiments may not, strictly speaking, 
be new – indeed they invoke early twentieth-century experiments in deploy-
ing social network analysis for reform purposes (Mayer 2012; Guggenheim 
2012). They do signal, however, that the ideal of a purely representational social 
science is today less prominent in public discourses themselves and, in turn, 
that accounts – idealised or not – of experimental intervention in social life are 
becoming more so.
In this context, it becomes apparent why the critique of narrow scientific 
representationalism – of the view that social science merely represents phenom-
ena that exist independently out there in external reality – is at the very least 
incomplete. In light of the idealisation of the instrumental deployment of social 
science research (as discussed in Muniesa’s chapter on behaviouralism, this 
volume), what is required in addition is a critique of narrow scientific experi-
mentalism – of the idea that social science is able to engineer social phenomena 
like communities, networks and publics. This, we want to argue, is not a form of 
social research that participates, nor one that invents, insofar as it ignores the 
creativity of social life itself, treating it instead as a passive object of knowledge, 
control and optimisation. Retrospectively, one could say that the performative 
critique of representation – its insistence that social science actively shapes 
the phenomena that it purports to describe – only works insofar as the idea 
of interventionist social science, of social engineering and the malleability of 
society remains discredited. Only in that context could performative under-
standings of social research claim it as their special insight that social science 
does not merely represent but also intervenes in the social world. To be sure, 
performative studies of social research did reflect on the demise of the modern 
ideal of the malleability of society (Law 2004; see also Woolgar et al. 2009), but 
these reflections translated into a cultivated scepticism vis-a-vis purposeful and 
planned societal intervention as such.
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How do inventive approaches to social research address this situation? One 
way is by challenging methodological indifference, the way in which scientific 
methodology risks remaining unresponsive to the phenomenon under study 
(Stengers 2017). In this respect, there is another important difference between 
performative and inventive approaches in social research. Social studies of per-
formativity tend to frame social methods as an object of inquiry – they wish to 
demonstrate how social research, say a census, does not simply represent but 
enacts social reality (Law and Urry 2004). By contrast, inventive approaches 
tend to regard the enactment of social phenomena not as a topic to be exposed or 
described, but as a research task or challenge: can we do it? Can we contribute to 
the creative articulation of social phenomena (Guggenheim et al., this volume)? 
As we have noted, inventive approaches take to task not just representationalism 
but also interventionism: instrumentalist ideals of experimental intervention in 
society, such as the behavioural nudge policy pursued by the UK government, 
are founded on the passivity of social phenomena. It is presumed that social 
phenomena are out there to be known and acted upon. Inventive approaches 
deem this presumption not just ethically but also methodologically unsound: 
conducting research on society always means actively engaging with social set-
tings and actors – with techniques to which the researched are not indifferent. 
The contributions to this book take as their starting point the experimentality 
of social life. That is to say, following Matthias Gross, the authors treat society 
as an experiment: a ‘sociological perspective [that] has got nothing to do 
with the idea of sociologists as experimenters in white coats. It is rather to be 
understood as called forth by the observation that in modern societies, social 
practices increasingly present themselves as experiments via a willingness to 
remain open to new forms of experience’ (Gross and Krohn 2005: 80; see also 
Marres 2012). Inventive research takes this experimentality of social life as the 
occasion to reconfigure social research.
This is also to say that in shifting our attention away from the critique of 
social scientific representationalism as such, we do not move from represen-
tation to intervention as the primary concern. Instead we ask, what kinds of 
passages between representation and intervention are opened up by adopting 
an inventive approach to social life? An alternative experimentalism in social 
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research is still to be invented insofar as to engage in this type of social inquiry 
is to recognise that there are many possible inter-articulations between knowl-
edge and intervention. In making this point, we follow Lury and Wakeford’s 
insistence in Inventive Methods that research constitutes a form of participation. 
But we also differ from their approach. In choosing ‘inventing the social’ as the 
title for this book, we foreground a specific interest in not only the methods, 
but also the objects and objectives of creative forms of social inquiry.3 Many 
of the contributions to this book translate sociological ideas and sensibilities 
into arts and design research practices. Thus, Andre Jaque’s chapter deploys 
the sociological distinction between the backstage and the frontstage of social 
and public life, while Christian Nold draws on insights from social studies of 
science and technology in examining the ‘provocational capacities’ of techno-
logical devices to elicit public debate and issue articulation in a specific setting, 
namely a neighbourhood in the proximity of Heathrow airport affected by sound 
pollution. For others, the primary interest is in the possibility of exchange – of 
collaboration – between arts and design and social research. Our intended audi-
ence for this book is all those engaged in social and cultural research, design, 
computing, art and architecture who are interested in the exchange of capacities, 
knowledges and sensibilities between these fields, to make possible new ways 
of combining knowing, doing and intervening in social life.
In creatively combining representing and intervening, inventive approaches 
to social inquiry actively seek to transform the ongoing practices that constitute 
social life as occasions for social inquiry (Marres 2014). Inventive social research 
assumes the performativity of its methods in the curation of its objects of study 
(Wilkie 2014; Guggenheim 2015), and in doing so it can be seen to follow the 
Marx-inspired dictum that, although social studies have long described the per-
formative effects of social science concepts, methods and measures, the point 
is to deploy them (Marres and Moats 2015; Kimbell, this volume). In other 
words, the difference between performativity and invention is not only a theo-
retical, but also a methodological question to be addressed in specific practices 
of research. Once we consider the possibility that social research may curate, 
provoke, or even generate social formations, we may become curious about 
the creative potential of our own knowledge practices. What are the possible 
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roles that researchers can adopt in the curation of social situations, and how do 
and might they interact with various co-inventors, be they human – in the case 
of research subjects for example – or non-human, in the form of instruments, 
devices and so on? What role can tools and technologies play, from drawing 
pens to audio equipment (e.g. Michael 2004), prototypes and Twitter Bots (e.g. 
Wilkie et al. 2015), and hyperlinks, social media buttons, hashtags and Web 
scrapers (Rogers 2013) in the curation of social formations? And finally, what 
are the criteria of success of inventive social research?
Good  Inv ent ions :  Ex p e r im ent  a s  Imag inat ion
It should now be obvious that, in our view, inventive approaches to social 
research are experimental. Above we have specified this notion in terms of the 
commitment to combine representation and intervention in social research. 
Practically, this means applying the term in two ways. First, the willingness to 
try out new methods, practices and techniques that are different from those 
presumed to define or belong to a home discipline, whether, for example, sur-
veys or fieldwork in social research or modelling and prototyping practices in 
design and architecture. Second, taking an interest in forms of expression and 
knowledge that do not merely seek to represent social reality but seek to ‘make 
visible phenomena in a form in which they could never possibly be lived, never 
otherwise made manifest’ (Brown 2012: 69).4 Experimental social research 
seeks to articulate social phenomena not simply through describing them but by 
deliberately modifying settings and by inducing or provoking actors to behave 
and express themselves in ways they would probably not of their own accord. 
However, it is important to emphasise that the development of experimental 
approaches to social research is not just about adopting experimental methods 
from the natural sciences. As noted, invention entails a departure from methodo-
logical indifference to the object of inquiry – an affirmation that social research 
involves active participation in social life. If to inquire is to participate, and it 
is impossible to avoid intervention, then we may as well try to become good at 
it, i.e. to learn the artful diligence and response-ableness of experimentation. 
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Furthermore, if the imperative of clinical intervention is to improve a medical 
disorder – a definition that, arguably, informs how intervention is commonly 
understood – then what new kinds of intervention does creative experimentation 
make possible: does it ameliorate, add, enhance, provoke, reverse, challenge, 
accommodate?
Among those who have developed an experimental methodology specifically 
for social research, the aforementioned and pioneering ethnomethodologist 
Harold Garfinkel stands out. He famously noted that in order to understand 
society, we need to conduct experiments as ‘aids to our sluggish imagination’ 
(Garfinkel 1967: 38): to render visible what is going on in social situations 
it is not enough to carefully describe what happens, we must also provoke 
accounts. If we want to really grasp social processes we must somehow invite, 
persuade, or (to put it more strongly) provoke actors and situations to gener-
ate accounts, and to produce expressions and articulations of social reality. 
However, and as the sociologist Alvin Gouldner (1970) has pointed out, there 
are remarkable similarities between, on the one hand, Garfinkel’s interven-
tionist approach and, on the other hand, interventions in social and public 
life undertaken under the rubric of performance art and activism. Gouldner 
gives the example of the provocative methods used by the Amsterdam-based 
Provo movement to render visible the true nature of society. Provo mobilised 
a visible and material police force by releasing a small number of chickens on 
the Prinsengracht in Amsterdam one Saturday morning, thereby demonstrat-
ing the fear and anxiety of the Amsterdam authorities (Gouldner 1970; see 
also Marres 2012).
But what is arguably more apparent today than it was in the 1970s is the 
experimentality of social life itself: not just artists and activists, but also every-
day actors themselves continuously engage in experimentation on (with) our 
forms of living, behaviours and habitats – as in living experiments, in mundane 
forms of digital self-presentation (social media), and in a wider turn to what 
Francisca Gromme (2015) refers to as ‘governance by pilot’. In this context, 
the question for social researchers and knowledge practitioners more generally 
becomes: what can we add to experiments already underway (Guggenheim 
et al., this volume; Marres 2012)? Awareness of the experimentality of social 
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life changes what it means to undertake experiments in social research. In this 
context, it makes sense to adopt a minimal definition of experimental social 
inquiry, one that foregrounds the tactical modification of social settings, archi-
tectures and situations in order to render explicit latent social phenomena. As 
such, to experiment, first and foremost, means to intervene in social life, not 
necessarily with an instrumental goal in mind but to highlight social formations 
(Kimbell, this volume). Neither is the aim necessarily to scale the experiment 
up to a population, but rather to make visible, audible and tangible collective 
processes and problems that would otherwise be invisible, remain latent or 
exist as virtual phenomena, or in potentia (Savranksy, this volume; Lezaun et 
al. 2017).
While this definition is in need of further development, this way of fram-
ing the methodology of inventive social inquiry can help to clarify the relation 
between knowledge and creativity in these practices. Crucially, inventive social 
research does not proceed by adding creativity to more traditional, evidence-
based forms of social research. The very idea that social research suffers from 
a creative deficit that needs to be addressed in order to make social research 
more engaging is, in our view, misguided. There are plenty of fictions, visions, 
and fantasies already at work in social research. The notion of a creativity 
deficit wrongly suggests a strict opposition between forms of knowledge and 
intervention grounded in facts and those that are grounded in the imagination. 
As philosophers of science such as Karl Popper, Alfred North Whitehead and 
Isabelle Stengers have long reminded us, imagination is not the opposite of truth; 
fiction is not the opposite of fact. Inquiry (knowledge) requires imagination. As 
Stengers (2002) pointed out in her retelling of Galilei Galileo’s classic physics 
experiments, science always starts with an idea, a fiction, a ‘what if?’ What if 
weight made no difference to the velocity with which things fall?
The deployment of the imagination, and the generation of phenomena that 
are not given in the world, is not something that an inventive approach adds to 
empirical research – it is an approach and material reality that the arts, sciences 
and humanities have long shared. As the design researcher Daniela Rosner 
(forthcoming) points out, design, too, ‘is always asking “what if?’” of the social 
worlds it inhabits: it imagines scenarios, tries out different shapes and ways of 
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doing things. However, Rosner also insists that asking ‘what if ’ – introducing 
new scenarios and prototypes into social life – does not mean losing one’s inter-
est in what is already given in the world: it does not entail a shift from loyalty 
to ‘what is’ to ‘what might be’; and it does not mean exchanging empiricism for 
speculation (Savransky et al. 2017). Instead, as Marsha Rosengarten shows in 
her contribution to this volume, practising inquiry by way of creative interven-
tion is about engaging with what is already ongoing, already happening in the 
world with an explicit view to what might be in the world in a different mode. 
And this project does not belong to any one discipline, but is best understood 
as a shared undertaking across fields. Inventive inquiry may be pursued with 
the aid of social research methods such as participant observation, as well as 
through art and design practice. Its aim is to develop new ways of deploying the 
imagination as a method for knowing and intervening in social life, and to this 
end a variety of methodological traditions can be mobilised.
Good  Inv ent ions : 
Mat er i a l i t i e s  and  T echn ic i t i e s
The role of the imagination covers one aspect of the kinds of experiments that 
distinguish inventive approaches to understanding social life from descriptive, 
performative approaches. Another important feature is that material, aesthetic 
and technical milieus enable distinctive kinds of interactions with users, audi-
ences and institutions of social research. An imaginary that is materialised in 
artefacts, architectures and everyday devices has different qualities than imagi-
nations that are materialised in texts or laboratory set-ups. The ‘what if?’ of a 
tract on socialist utopia or a physics experiment is relatively difficult to engage 
with unless you do not need to wait for your revolution, or are trained in the 
field, but the ‘what if?’ of an app or a sweater can be tested very quickly. To 
create imaginative experiments, we need the right – meaning well-designed – 
devices. Social research now takes account of the materiality of the social in 
many different ways. However, we need to go further than this: the pressing 
question today, in our view, is whether social research can reflexively deploy 
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things, environments and non-humans to make an ostensible difference to our 
forms of life, and to how we live together.
It is now commonplace to point out that non-humans actively participate 
in social life. For example, we typically interact with bots on our phones, we 
find their messages in our inboxes and we are lured into bot-enhanced advertis-
ing, marketing and lobbying in our everyday interactions on social media, and 
many of us reflect on these novel yet mundane circumstances. Remarkably, 
however, even if non-humans are acknowledged as a significant presence in 
social life, this does not mean that society is now widely recognised as being 
hybrid – involving a co-mingling of humans and machines. On the contrary, 
human forms of sociability are, on the whole, firmly upheld and prioritised in the 
world of designed sociability. Examples of this, such as social media platforms, 
tend to materialise distinctively human forms of social organisation (Marres 
& Gerlitz, this volume): the friend network, the community, social behaviour. 
Contemporary forms of designed sociality tend to invoke classic social forms. 
This is another reason why we want to affirm experimentality, and why we need 
to exercise our skills in other than descriptive/observational forms of inquiry. 
It is not enough to empiricise the question of the social (Boltanski 2011), and 
to describe the social theories invoked by the actors themselves to account for 
social life. Now that we have established the generative capacities of devices, 
objects and settings in social life, the question arises: how does their participation 
in social life make a difference to our forms of life; can they inspire alternative 
forms of knowing and doing? This experimentalisation of social life is inherently 
in question (this is part of what makes an experiment): we do not already know 
how to conduct, understand and change contemporary social life, and no one 
knows what forms of inquiry and intervention are the most adequate for this 
purpose (not even the actors themselves).
To adopt an inventive approach to social inquiry, then, is not to jump on the 
technological determinist bandwagon and to believe that it is new technologies 
that have the power to produce new societies. Rather, the aim is to create experi-
ments that can serve to articulate, explicate and elaborate ways of (not) living 
together that are already ongoing. As many of the contributions to this book 
show, the experimental explication of social forms often depends on tactical (as 
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well as literal) operations upon materialities: moving materials from the cellar 
to the exhibition space ( Jaque, this volume), or exchanging bricks with helium 
(Calvillo, this volume), or, for that matter, the re-programming of bots (Wilkie 
& Michael, this volume), or introducing soft toys to a medical measuring tool 
(Guggenheim, Kroell and Kraftner, this volume).
Jaque’s paper offers a fascinating account of the type of experimental rene-
gotiation of social forms that we have in mind. His Barcelona Pavilion experi-
ment produced a form of assembly that went against the organisational forms 
and logics of the social composed and given concrete form by self-appointed 
executors of the ideas of the architect Mies van der Rohe (the ‘Mies Society’): 
their obsession with stabilisation and purification was exposed as limited in 
scope and un-lively. Jaque’s pavilion intervention demonstrates the cost of 
stabilisation, exposing how this commitment rendered particular kinds of 
assembly invisible and impracticable. However, his attempt to address this by 
staging some of these invisible assemblies in the pavilion also comes at a cost, 
as it threatens to render un-doable particular modes of assembly like the Mies 
Society. This is an excellent example of the ‘coming out of things’ (Marres, 
2012): the outing of hybrid collectives and the explication of experimental 
forms of togetherness by way of material intervention. It also demonstrates a 
political truth: that the work of re-assembling the social is likely to generate 
tensions and conflicts; one society’s assembly, to put it somewhat inelegantly, 
is another’s dis-assembly.
Many of the material inventions described in this volume are modest and 
low-key: the experimental practices of social research we are presenting here do 
not aspire to the heroic design of large-scale knowledge infrastructures. Rather, 
ad-hocism, bricolage, hacking, glitching and prototyping are the interventions of 
choice ( Jencks and Silver 1973; Corsín, Jimenez and Estalella 2010). Certainly, 
this is partly due to the financial restrictions researchers are under. The nimble-
ness and playfulness enabled by small-scale interventions also have a deeper 
connection to experimental practices: preferring to be materially and resource 
light, such endeavours do not wish to impose their inventions on the world, 
but rather to operate in the mode of making material suggestions, offerings, and 
attempts at indicating that a different society is possible.
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Conclu s ion
In sum, then, inventive approaches to social research must be distinguished 
both from performative social studies and from attempts to reinstate social 
engineering as a viable paradigm. On the one hand, inventive approaches do not 
seek to describe the performance of social reality, but rather treat performativ-
ity as an effect that may be purposefully deployed in social research. However, 
to move from performance to invention does not require the endorsement of 
the simplistic ideal of the designability of social life. Inventive social inquiry 
precisely seeks to carve out an alternative to the ideal of the designable society. 
The two approaches, or experimental regimes, if you will – designability versus 
invention – are markedly different, in two ways: first, from the standpoint of the 
designable society, experimental capacities are an attribute of technical appa-
ratuses or architectures. It is the online platform, or the smart city architecture 
that is presumed to enable experimental intervention into an external object 
(society) – as for example in recent policy preoccupations where creativity as 
an economic object can be stimulated by urban planning (Farías and Wilkie 
2015: 2). Inventive approaches, by contrast, find their starting point in the 
experimentality of social life and social situations themselves.
From the standpoint of the designability of society, the latter are presumed 
to be largely passive, they are to be acted upon by technology and innova-
tion, and technology is assumed to align itself with this purposeful invention. 
Here the assumption is that the social world will comply with the goals of 
social design (‘and if it won’t we’ll try something else’). By contrast, inventive 
approaches to social inquiry are para-instrumental: they expect social situa-
tions to push back against our social theories, and they deliberately look for 
recalcitrance in materials and situations: the aim is to press societies’ ‘buttons’ 
and in doing so to activate latent social realities. Here, resistance is not noise, 
and neither is it simply anarchic: it has methodological value. The aims and 
goals of experimental social inquiry are here assumed to require situational 
adjustment. This, indeed, is what social research is all about: the adjustment 
of the practices and aims of inquiry during the process of research signals that 
we have learnt something.
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Note s
1 A word of caution is necessary here regarding the performance of social life. For Austin 
(1962), performativity in language – statements that bring into being states of affairs, 
such as marriage or war – require particular ‘felicity conditions’, meaning that certain 
circumstances need to obtain in order for them to work. For example, they may need 
to be pronounced by an appropriate actor (priest, head of state) or in a particular place 
(a church or press conference). If these conditions of felicity are not in place, then such 
statements will not ‘act’ appropriately, i.e. they will not work.
2 Things quickly become complicated, however, when, for instance, actor-network 
theorists such as Bruno Latour disavow the concept of the social. Latour mischievously 
adopted Margaret Thatcher’s phrase that there is no such thing as society (Latour 2005). 
As Marres and Gerlitz suggest in their contribution, ‘inventing the social’ can also be 
framed as a project to recover the specificity of social forms in the face of ANT’s (and 
Thatcherite) indifference.
3 Lury and Wakeford are interested in invention as a property of method. In their 
account, method is what constitutes the interface between social research and art. In 
presenting invention in this light, their approach has the advantage of foregrounding the 
question of how research operates in the world, but it also has the effect of suspending, 
or downplaying, the question of what forms of collaboration and types of exchange are 
possible between social research and creative disciplines in the practice of social research. 
Reinstating the more abstract notion of ‘method’ inevitably distracts from – and at times, 
brackets – the issue of collaboration, the exchanges of competencies that are possible 
between the domains, fields, sites, technologies and genealogies of social research, design, 
art, and architecture.
4 In this regard, inventive social inquiry returns us to a classic maxim of structuralist 
sociology: to gain knowledge of society requires the explication of dynamics that are not 
readily observable.
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INVITING ATMOSPHERES TO 
THE ARCHITECTURE TABLE
Nerea Calvillo
Bu i ld ing  th e  Soc i a l
in sts (science, technology and society) and feMinist studies of 
technoscience there has been much discussion about the ways in which the 
social can be redefined by expanding it to more-than-humans, from an inclu-
sive invitation to a parliament of things (Latour 1993), to messier and more 
entangled modes of co-habitation (Haraway 2003: 1991). In this context, this 
chapter asks if and how other disciplines can contribute to this debate, specifi-
cally by discussing the attempt in the field of architecture to build the social 
from air. Architecture is a discipline that manifests expertise in managing inert 
more-than-humans, while at the same time being deeply intertwined with the 
social, as it builds spaces with materials to be inhabited by humans. The question 
I want to explore here in response to the topic of this issue concerns the ways 
in which architecture articulates this relationship. Can, for example, architec-
ture construct, facilitate or design the social, or is it ‘just’ its container, with no 
agency of its own? More particularly, can architecture, as a practice, design the 
socialities needed for a good life (e.g. Braidotti 2012)?
Architects have long thought about how to invent the social through build-
ings1. There are, however, some problems with this approach. In order to unfold 
them let us take as a reference utopian projects that intended to create socialist 
and communist societies, such as residential communities in the nineteenth 
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century or communal housing at the beginning of the twentieth. These pro-
jects assumed a direct causal relationship between spatial organisation and the 
social, whereby a certain material configuration could enhance a specific human 
behaviour, and even construct complex social organisations such as socialism, 
for instance (e.g. Buchli 1998). Crucially, however, both architecture and the 
social were conceived as static materials: architecture as that which concerned 
buildings as finished and stable entities, and the social as a unified and immu-
table set of social relations.
Studies of architecture have demonstrated that this causal and static way of 
inventing the social through buildings did not succeed, in part because it did 
not take into consideration the fluidity of the social (e.g. Guggenheim 2014; 
Vanderburgh and Russell Ellis 2001) and in part because it had a narrow under-
standing of what architecture is, limiting it to the built environment. One way 
to move away from this framework is to reduce the expectations of architecture 
and shift from constructing the social to facilitating socialities. Another path is to 
gain a more processual and experimental understanding of inventing socialities 
with/through buildings where architectural practice can learn from STS and 
feminist research.
French sociologist of science and philosopher Bruno Latour (2005) devel-
oped the notion of ‘sociotechnical assemblages’ to highlight that things are not 
only a material assemblage, but are also composed of the social entities that 
use, produce, or represent them, as well as institutions, contracts, humans, 
more-than-humans, and so on, distributed in space and time. Thinking about 
the built environment as a sociotechnical assemblage expands the number 
of actors involved in making those buildings what they are to include the 
social entities to which they are already connected, and also the necessar-
ily implied associated temporalities. Recent work in STS, inspired by ANT 
(Actor-Network Theory), provides accounts of material participation (Marres 
2012; Marres and Lezaun 2011) that acknowledge the agency of the built 
environment i.e. what it can ‘do’ in relation to the engagement of actors in 
communities, problems and publics. In this view, things (and therefore build-
ings) acquire their agency and political capacities depending on how they are 
deployed, which implies that the socialities facilitated by buildings cannot 
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be completely predetermined, by architecture design for instance, and are 
necessarily experimental.
In order to assess this shift to the processual, as well as the ability of archi-
tectural practice to design socialities, in this chapter I propose to think and 
work with a dynamic and seemingly intangible material: air. Although air has 
been largely ignored throughout architectural history (Banham 1969), during 
the 1960s and 1970s there was a proliferation of inflatable structures that used 
air to explore the lightness, ephemerality, transparency and transportability of 
new plastics. This took place in the context of an attempt to propose new ways 
of living that were closer to everyday, popular culture and that might thereby 
facilitate political resistance (Dessauce 1999; Topham 2002). The project I dis-
cuss here, although sharing certain aesthetic qualities with these earlier ventures, 
was conceived differently. Firstly, the Polivagina was not conceived as addressing 
air through its structural capacity, but drew on its invisibility and dynamism 
to destabilise architectural practice, requiring a transformation of methods, 
techniques, materials and forms of organisation. Secondly, it acknowledges that 
the social is not simply the result of the inhabitation of inflatable structures: the 
air is already social. German philosopher and cultural theorist Peter Sloterdijk, 
in his work on social foams (2005), proposes that sociality is not only about 
human exchanges of information (Wakeford 2011), but is a foam that includes 
humans, structures, and the air and climate that brings them together. If this is so, 
then taking air into account in architecture shifts attention beyond boundaries, 
such as walls and roofs, to what is in between them, working with humidity, 
pressure, smell, toxicity and breath.
However, when Sloterdijk discusses architecture he makes a direct translation 
of foam to physical enclosures, where architecture becomes a set of containers 
at different scales, from the cell to the urban. In this direct translation three 
potentials of his specific proposal for how humans and more-than-humans can 
be brought together are lost. Firstly, the atmospheres created by these archi-
tectures are hardly described, and so their involvement in the construction of 
socialities cannot be traced. Secondly, Sloterdijk focuses on architectural objects 
as finished and stable entities, and has little appreciation of the production of 
architecture itself as a space where socialities are generated. And lastly, the 
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social effects of buildings are described in generic and representational terms. 
For example, Sloterdijk describes the apartment as a symbol of society’s indi-
vidualism, but he does not specify the relationships between material assem-
blages and particular practices that make him draw this conclusion. In order 
to test the potentials of Sloterdijk’s conceptual proposal this chapter addresses 
these absences by making three moves. Firstly, instead of using Sloterdijk’s 
metaphorical reading of architecture as an enclosure, it uses his notion of ‘air 
design’ (2005: 140) to think about architecture not simply as creating enve-
lopes for climate control, but as involving the actual design of atmospheres 
where the air is not only a conditioner of well-being but also a material for 
the construction of certain modes of sociality. Secondly, it takes the process of 
architectural design and construction as its main site of inquiry into the design 
of socialities. Finally, the chapter proposes a conceptual framework to describe 
(or sense) the after-effects of construction: the socialities that emerge during 
the inhabitation of an atmospheric space, which are spontaneous, fragile and 
in constant transformation.
Two advantages are gained by reconceiving architecture as dealing with 
atmospheres (or atmospheric assemblages), rather than with objects. Firstly, 
such a reappraisal destabilises conventional ways of practising architecture, 
which, just as when an accident happens and infrastructures break, makes 
visible their capacities and controversies (Star 1999). Including air as a con-
struction material and as an object of design transforms design from an attempt 
to control the capacities of a future building and regulate its inhabitants, to 
an experimental set-up that embraces uncertainty. Design, here, is no longer 
about deciding how to create a shape and assemble components, but is rather 
conceived as a practice concerned with how to design the construction process 
as an experiment. The second advantage of this reappraisal is that it opens 
up a space for experimenting with the design of socialities, which do not 
necessarily take place only after the project is finished, but are in permanent 
development and transformation. As such, ‘doing architecture’ is no longer 
a process that ends  with the construction of a building, but a constant reas-
sembly of materials, humans, ideas, and so on (Guggenheim 2009; Yaneva 
2009). In other words, architecture is viewed as a continual three-dimensional 
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material invention of the social. This approach, drawing on STS and Sloterdijk, 
can begin to describe how the social can be (in part) designed with matter 
and atmospheres.
Construct ing  w i th  H e l i um  and  A i r
This speculative proposal is part of an ongoing practice-based research project 
that will be illustrated in narrative and visual means through the installa-
tion ‘The Polivagina of Fan Riots’ (Polivagina).2 The project was designed by 
C+arquitectos – the office directed by the author of this article – for the art 
event Fan Riots curated by Ivan Lopez Munuera for the SOS4.8 music festival, 
in Murcia3. The Polivagina became an exploration of how to take seriously the 
application of (atmospheric) more-than-humans to architecture, taking in this 
case air and helium as the main materials for construction. This decision was 
made as an intellectual challenge, but also because it helped to respond to many 
of the demands of the curator, the existing building, the building regulations and 
the climate. Examples include the need to completely transform a seven-hundred 
m2 space that could not be touched4; to host art installations, performances and 
round-tables; to ‘attract’ party-goers whose main interest in a festival may not 
be art; to deal with a limited budget; and to work within the time constraints of 
two days to set up the project and five hours to dismantle it. These conditions, 
seeming almost contradictory, could only be brought together by means of a 
light structure or some sort of inflatable, but this would have driven the project 
over budget. We therefore asked ourselves the following questions: Does air 
design necessarily imply the creation of a controlled envelope (such as those 
referred to by Sloterdijk)? What are the limits of atmospheres? Do they need 
continuous physical boundaries?
Due to all these constraints we invited helium, a common atmospheric 
element renowned for its lightness, as our main guest, and contained it in 
an ordinary object: a polyamide balloon. This invitation was not a peaceful 
one, as the helium was brought in gas bottles and forced with pressure into 
the balloons. This was necessary, however, as it was only when thus enclosed 
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that it could perform its structural function. Even when enclosed, compared 
with bricks, stone or concrete, gases – in this case helium – have very dif-
ferent properties: they have fluidity and can move, change and react. Gases 
are, by nature, volatile, and for that reason difficult to control. Architects, 
typically trained in mechanics rather than in thermodynamics, are in most 
cases not prepared or equipped to deal with their properties. This, of course, 
does not mean that there are no previous references or existing centres of 
expertise: as the abovementioned inflatable projects in architecture, arts and 
industry show, architects have developed techniques to keep large mem-
branes inflated. Polivagina, however, was a permeable membrane composed 
of micro inflated units, rather than a capsule filled with structural condi-
tioned air. The balloons-as-containers used in Polivagina therefore added 
an extra dimension of complexity and technical difficulty. As balloons are 
not used in architectural construction, manufacturers do not provide the 
required technical specifications stating how they perform (how much they 
Fig. 2.1  Helium bottles used to inflate the balloons (photo: Nerea Calvillo)
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lift, for example), there are no building codes or regulations covering their 
usage, and there is little or no expertise in how to assemble balloons in 
such circumstances.
Pushed by these uncertainties we framed the project as a ‘cosmopolitical 
experiment’ (Hinchliffe et al. 2003), in order to explore other ways of know-
ing that may enable a different composition of the world. For this purpose, 
we wondered how we could bring those invisible agents to the project, in the 
same way as Hinchliffe et al. had to decide how to encourage water voles – the 
elusive animals they were trying to detect – to inhabit their urban site. We did 
so by taking helium’s agency into account in material terms, learning about 
its material performance by engaging with the small differences between the 
gas’ properties and attributes, because ‘this openness to difference, which is 
borne out of a looser kind of sense, a knowing around rather than a knowledge 
of, is a vital means to allow for nonhuman knowledgeabilities’ (Hinchliffe et 
al. 2003: 653). Given this, we collected stories, experiences, and expertise 
about helium from domains outside architectural construction, making use 
of experts in corporate conference design and decoration, or drawing on our 
own experiences of childhood birthday parties or wedding catalogues. Having 
collated this knowledge, we then tested a number of small prototypes at home, 
counting weights, lifting times, trying out ways of sticking, attaching, gluing 
or tying them together; while beginning to understand how to attune three 
interrelated and processual aspects of aerostatic things: envelopment, infla-
tion and buoyancy (McCormack 2009). Attunement was gradually achieved 
as the architects became more sensitive to very small changes in the quantity 
of helium injected when feeling the tension of the stretching polyamide, or to 
the unexpected choreography that the balloons initiated in response to subtle 
currents of breeze through, for example, an open door.
Instead of trying to limit the balloons’ capacities, we aimed to explore and 
exploit them: to create more entanglements and more means of addressing this 
gas by multiplying the agents involved to include not only humans – such as the 
many festival volunteers who joined the construction – but also other gases. Once 
on site we had to invite naturally occurring air to fill the balloons. Because air is 
heavier than helium, it could counteract the unpredictably strong lifting capacity 
48
inventing the social
of helium, in a dialogue where we, humans, became only mediators. The question 
now is whether these encounters with non-humans gave rise to new relations 
and modes of becoming between humans and more-than-humans. By observing 
what occurred in the design and construction process it could be argued that vari-
ous changes occurred in how architecture is practised. Furthermore, the design 
process also gave rise to outcomes, or desired socialities, that were imagined 
and anticipated by the architects, whilst other socialites emerged unexpectedly.
E f f ect s  i n  th e  Mak ing  o f  Arch i t ectur e
The first effect of taking atmospheric more-than-human agency into account is 
that it requires a conceptual and practical change in what architectural design 
means. Instead of being a process that defines how things are assembled prior 
to construction (or even during construction), taking air into account forces the 
whole process to become experimental. The object of design is the experiment 
itself and no longer a formal configuration. Instead of having to define every 
construction detail (which is the tendency towards which architectural practice 
keeps moving), what has to be defined are the conditions of experimentation, 
moving from drawings to protocols, a similar shift to that made in music in the 
1970s by John Cage and his contemporaries. In the Polivagina the design of 
the experimental setting implied the definition of fixed elements (a number 
of balloon arches) that meant random filling, distribution of time, labour and 
learning processes for the students with whom we built the installation, and the 
acceptance of failure, even though stressful and painful, as part of the process. 
This move towards the design of an experimental setting demands a redefinition 
of what control means in design, and pushes to deal with uncertainty, making 
design a performative and emergent practice that blurs the boundaries between 
design and construction by substituting embodied movements in space for 
drawings and models.
New socialities between humans emerged during the construction process. 
While we were designing the experimental setting, helium’s unexpectedly strong 
lifting capacity destroyed our dome-like assemblages every night. Due to time 
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constraints and our inability to govern the balloons, the social organisation of 
the team had to be adjusted and a redistribution of power and decision-making 
took place. Architects were no longer the ones explaining what and how to 
build, and they did not even coordinate tasks. The group dissolved into small, 
self-organised and ever changing experimentation groups that would make 
decisions and share their findings on their own.
And yet, although it may resonate with practices of collaborative design, 
participatory design or co-design, this architectural engagement was a dif-
ferent process: there was neither a shared understanding among the various 
stakeholders of what was taking place (e.g. Kvan 2000), nor an awareness of the 
organisational contexts in which this form of cooperative design (e.g. Suchman 
et al. 2003) was enacted. Furthermore, unlike in co-design or participatory 
design (e.g. Sanders and Stappers 2008; Wilkie 2011), we were not designing 
with future users in mind. In this cosmopolitical experiment decisions were not 
Fig. 2.2  Celebration of the construction of the first arch of the structure (photo: 
Nerea Calvillo)
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negotiated or agreed upon. Instead it became a distributed, untraceable deci-
sion making process, with no time for agreements or discussions, and which 
included aggressive moments, tears and a lot of stress. The division of labour 
hierarchies between designers and producers dissolved, since there were no 
experts; those involved acquired the appropriate knowledge, skills and experi-
ence through the process. Arguably, and if we think of this project in terms 
of involvement-in-design and human/more-than-human participation, we in 
fact co-designed with helium and air, by letting them speak as ‘we’ collectively 
adapted to one another.
The fact that the team became a group of ‘makers’ as well as mediators with 
the air affected not only the social structure of construction but also the construc-
tion technique itself. Instead of hitting, breaking and assembling materials with 
tools, the (human) body became the main instrument to build with through 
embodied practices of touching, holding, catching, lifting, hugging and so on, 
with the help of domestic implements such as scissors, tape and string. If ‘the 
Fig. 2.3  Assembling the different domes (photo: Nerea Calvillo)
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materiality of things becoming lighter than air is generative of distinctive modes 
of experiencing’ – or sensing – aerostatic space (McCormack 2009: 27), and 
relates to movement and a privileged point of view (Adey 2010; McCormack 
2009), the sensing experience of being with air was a more intimate, non-
representational and an embodied one. Echoing the specific movements that 
early twentieth century skyscraper construction workers developed in order to 
construct when hanging in the air (McCormack 2015a), we developed our own 
movements, not for being in the air, but for being with the air: holding it with 
our arms, pushing it with our knees, displacing it with our chest. Practices of 
material assemblage were replaced by practices of soft material care.
In this context, human bodies, as Hinchliffe et al. (2003) propose in their 
cosmopolitical experiment, have to learn to be affected (Latour 2004) by gases 
in order to become experimental instruments trained to measure, for instance, 
how much a 45 cm balloon lifts depending on its shape, in a similar fashion as 
the bodies of nineteenth-century chemists became epistemic instruments that 
Fig. 2.4  Balloon assembling process (photo: Nerea Calvillo)
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provided specific types of knowledge (Roberts 1995). Indeed, since the strength 
or agility normally needed in other types of construction were not required, 
other types of bodies could participate in the assemblage of the installation, 
thus redefining who can participate in a construction process.
The cosmopolitical experiment also had other effects, such as expanding 
the number of agents involved and redistributing agencies and power relations, 
creating new socialities through this expansion. Again, the elevating force of 
helium, its resistance to being confined and its overall recalcitrance (Tironi 
and Calvillo 2016), caused the biggest conflicts and controversies. Very slowly, 
the 90 cm balloons pulled the whole structure up, until the highest parts of 
the domes reached a point where they triggered a laser detector in the ceiling, 
activating the fire alarm. This incident, three hours before opening, initiated 
a whole institutional conflict, bringing together the building security guards, 
institutional representatives of the cultural complex, the 90 cm balloons, the 
festival promoters and ourselves. The city council technicians proposed technical 
Fig. 2.5  Practices of embodied material care (photo: Nerea Calvillo)
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solutions to lower the structure, but the balloons had achieved equilibrium and 
we had lost control over them, so there was no way of bringing them down 
without dismantling the overall structure. Another option, bursting the bigger 
balloons, although acceptable from our side, was rejected by the promoters of 
the festival, who prioritised the aesthetics and decided to push for an adminis-
trative solution. So after two hours of phone calls and meetings the issue was 
handed over to the municipal and regional authorities, confronting security, 
aesthetics, budget and time.
The solution adopted was to replace the laser smoke detector with a whole 
crew of fire-fighters, who became the main supervisors of the building, the event 
and the installation. Interestingly enough, this not only redistributed power 
relations – as now the fire-fighters could decide what would or would not take 
place – but also transformed the newly-invested representatives of control and 
power into the public themselves, since the fire-fighters now took selfies, listened 
to the round-tables and watched the video art pieces themselves. So conflict can 
Fig. 2.6  Firefighters who replaced the smoke detectors, and who, in the process, took 
on the role of supervising the exhibition as well as taking selfies (photo: Nerea Calvillo)
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cause other forms of temporary sociality to emerge, expanding the number of 
agents involved by making people from different contexts come together and 
discuss issues such as public events regulations, institutional security protocols, 
fire-fighter budgets and so on. Throughout this process redistributions may take 
place and temporary publics be constituted.
The  A f t e r - E f f ect s :  Atmos ph er i c  Attunement s
In the above, we have discussed how the mediation between humans and more-
than-humans through atmospheric elements in architecture turns the design 
and construction process into a cosmopolitical experiment, which affects how 
design is practised, and facilitates the design or emergence of certain socialities 
between humans and more-than-humans. Nevertheless, the design of socialities 
does not end in the production process, as the ‘inhabitation’ of the project also 
included the production of sociality. We now turn to an assessment of how the 
installation, once built and installed, was capable of stimulating and facilitating 
these socialities. To do this we will look at the installation as an experimental 
device in itself, ‘because experimental devices are not instruments for norma-
tive intervention, they have important moral and political capacities in and of 
themselves’ (Marres 2012: 3).
To detect these capacities, and following anthropologist Kathleen Stewart 
(2011), we can consider the socialities produced by Polivagina as ‘atmospheric 
attunements’. Kathleen Stewart’s concept is useful because it accounts for 
temporary, sometimes conscious and sometimes unconscious adaptations and 
transmissions of effects, not only between humans, but also with non-humans: 
‘an intimate compositional process of dwelling in spaces that bears gestures, 
gestates, worlds. Here, things matter not because how they are represented, but 
because they have qualities, rhythms, forces, relations and movements’ (idem: 
445). Stewart’s concept is also interesting because not only does it account for 
the production of effects, but it is also a kind of mattering or world-making 
that involves the air, the space, humans and others, and could be interpreted as 
producing socialities in a spatial foam.
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Within the Polivagina, due to the unstable equilibrium between air and 
helium, the skin moved, crashed and became unstitched; it was alive, producing 
strangeness and fragility, constructing an atmosphere of attention and a collective 
sensation of participating in something ephemeral or not fully finished, a space 
in transition, holding the tension of a structure just about to self-disassemble in 
front of the eyes of the spectators. Yet this collective and indeterminate attune-
ment (Anderson 2009) with gases is precisely why ‘proliferating little worlds 
of all kinds that form up around conditions, practices, manias, pacings, scenes 
of absorption, styles of living, forms of attachment (or detachment), identities, 
and imaginaries’ (ibid: 446) could be sensed.
My attention to the liveliness and world-making capacity of the air has, until 
now, left another materiality unattended: the balloon as a ‘device for making 
Fig. 2.7  Atmospheric attunements inside the Polivagina during a performance 
(photo: Nerea Calvillo)
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atmospheric things’ (McCormack 2015b), and more specifically, its polyamide. 
Here I want to argue that an attunement to this light film, with its mechanical 
strength, barrier properties and reflective silver finish, facilitated the constitu-
tion of publics around specific issues. Evoking Kathleen Stewart’s account of the 
different ways in which the colour red played a role in the material, affective and 
symbolic New England (Stewart 2015), the reflectivity of the silver-coloured 
material multiplied like a kaleidoscope throughout the space. It diffused its 
limits, reflected light, hid furtive hugs and distorted smiling faces; it multiplied 
Michael Jackson’s fans to infinity, reminded someone of Warhol’s Factory and 
made us desire Warhol’s Silver Clouds – such were the unexpected effects of 
this silver-coloured material. People who attend music festivals mostly go to 
listen to concerts, and yet this colour itself seemed to attract the music fans. 
The installation was identified as a ‘cool’ selfie location for self-representation 
and collectiveness, spreading by word of mouth and bringing people in. Visitors 
took pictures of themselves in different locations, identifying preferred spots 
depending on the intensity and colour of the light, the openness of the mesh 
or the ease with which they could photograph each other. This effect was 
designed and planned, as a sort of practical aesthetics, ‘engaged in thinking 
about and devising modes of sensory and affective apprehensions of the world’ 
(McCormack 2015b: 105), and as demarking ‘possible sites for experimenting 
with experience’ (ibid: 106). The intention was that, once inside, visitors would 
engage with the art pieces and join round-tables and performances, and this is 
indeed what happened. Visitors who had never been exposed to such contexts 
not only listened, but also engaged in the debates. The strangeness of the space 
and the fact that they inhabited it in their own ways empowered them, as one of 
the visitors mentioned, to ask, question and speak their minds. So the visitors, 
including festival-goers as well as cleaners, firemen, technicians and guards, 
thanks to some extent to the polyamide, engaged with various issues including, 
but not limited to fan emancipation and queer politics, producing ‘new col-
laborative spacetimes of experimental togetherness, new forms of association’ 
(ibid: 105). However, and importantly, this did not result in the constitution of 
a new parliament. This attunement took place at specific moments and through 
temporary and fragile engagements, beyond any possible control.
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And yet other than human publics participated in Fan Riots. It can be 
argued that part of the success of this emergence of publics was due to the 
opening up of architecture to the ordinary and the banal. This was primarily 
effected by the presence of the balloons (see Topham 2002), but playfulness 
also entered with people’s transitions through the space, transforming the way 
in which art is usually engaged with: dancing in front of art pieces or kissing 
while watching videos about transgender experiences. Playful practices became 
recontextualised, hybridising institutionalised formats of cultural exchange. 
These hybridisation practices also took place the other way around: the dis-
placement of the installation to the main scenarios produced the emergence 
of creative practices. While the installation was being dismantled, the balloons 
recovered their usual condition and were taken outside tied to a string and 
given out to the passionate fans dancing at the main stage. Unexpected (for 
an architectural installation) atmospheric attunements emerged here: people 
feeling the joy of a surprise gift, sharing the balloons as a collective treat among 
Fig. 2.8  Visitors attuning to the balloons and art installations (photo: Nerea Calvillo)
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their friends, and creatively transforming them into hats, t-shirts or masks. 
Some people even took them home, expanding the physical network of the 
festival to domestic spaces.
Conclu s ions
Working with air is an exercise in empirical speculation where STS is put to 
work in architectural practice and which involves developing a more processual 
way of understanding how socialities can be designed with buildings. By focus-
ing on the material, technical and symbolic properties of gases, the design and 
construction process of the Polivagina and the socialities that emerged during its 
use, we have been able to identify how architecture is not only about buildings, 
but about all the various processes that constitute sociotechnical assemblages 
in permanent transformation, as well as what the installation could do in rela-
tion to the social. The movement, instability and flow of the air distributed 
Fig. 2.9  Music fan posing with balloons repurposed as a dress (photo: Nerea Calvillo)
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hierarchical roles and created a collective affect of attention. The lightness of air 
enabled other bodies and practices to participate in the construction. The lack 
of history or technical specifications of balloons transformed the design process 
into a laboratory. It also enabled other publics to participate through a collec-
tive affect of celebration, introducing banality and the everyday into artistic and 
academic contexts.5 Last, but not least, helium’s resistance to being confined or 
domesticated brought about a controversy that increased the number of actors 
involved in the process, and transformed the process itself from a design and 
production context to an institutional and political one.
These socialities were not facilitated by a specific shape or spatial organi-
sation, as other architectural projects have attempted, but by working with 
atmospheric materials. Even though in accounts of material participation it 
has been demonstrated that more-than-humans do not have inherent political 
and social agency, and that they can only acquire it in specific settings (Marres 
2012), the case of the Polivagina shows that the agency of these gases became 
very active precisely because they were a dynamic, rare and unexpected guest.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the advantage of shifting from architecture 
as an object to dynamic atmospheres is twofold. The first is that it destabilises 
architectural practices, transforming them into cosmopolitical experiments. For 
some time, scholars interested in ANT have taken an experimental approach to 
buildings (Guggenheim 2009; Marres 2012). This chapter, however, demon-
strates that atmospheric approaches to experimentation should take buildings-
in-the-making into consideration and acknowledge the lack of order in which 
ideas, materials and actors are assembled. In the case of Polivagina the agency of 
air demands not only different recombinations of matter, humans and ideas, but 
different practices to do so. Thus, it is not about changing the order of materials 
(as in other accounts of architecture), or the order in which humans participate 
(as in practices of co-design, where users also participate in the initial design 
phases), but about finding new practices of construction and inhabitation, such 
as horizontal and self-organised construction teams or playful spectatorship. 
And yet this experimentation does not acquire its political capacities through 
variation, as Marres proposes for demonstrational devices (2012), but by 
embracing uncertainty, which has strong effects in architectural practice where 
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the project cannot be predicted or previously defined, but is performative and 
non-representational.
The second advantage of shifting to dynamic atmospheres is that it opens up 
spaces for designing socialities (e.g. in the design and construction phases), and 
other types of affects with material entities (such as atmospheric attunements). 
But most importantly, it offers the possibility of designing desirable socialities 
with political and/or transformative capacities. Building with air calls for feminist 
or queer construction practices to which anybody can contribute and in which 
practices of assembly are replaced by practices of care. To better understand this 
relationship between more-than-humans and socialities I would like to propose 
one last speculation: that the cosmopolitical experiment may be better read as a 
process of conviviality, as a temporary co-habitation with more-than-humans. 
What if through Haraway’s Companion Species manifesto (2003), we imagine 
that helium and air became our companion species?
Gases are not dogs or any other conventional companion species, but 
thinking about them using Haraway’s framework may help us engage with 
two propositions. The first one is to think of our relationship with the air – a 
composition of gases and particles (and any other material, for that matter) – 
not as something out there to be managed, but as material with which we have 
intimate bodily and affective attunements (Choy 2010; Shapiro 2015). The 
second proposition is to see how in architecture there can be ways of engaging 
with more-than-humans other than by control and domestication, but instead 
through processes of mutual training and learning to be affected, where the 
value of the interaction does not depend on an economy of affection. Because 
as Haraway claims in her dog-human co-habitation, ‘dog’s value and life does 
not depend on the human’s perception that the dogs love them. Rather, the 
dog has to do his or her job’ (2003: 38), which is precisely what the helium 
balloons did. Even though we established some sort of physical and chemical 
affect, some sort of ‘animacy’ (Chen 2012) with helium balloons, they did 
not respond to our care, but carried on rising, destroying the installation. And 
yet temporary, fragile and instant moments of equilibrium can be achieved by 
constantly looking at what emerges from the relationship, which can challenge 
modes of sociality precisely because we are not used to them. Everyone needs 
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to learn how to engage, and in this process new relationships can emerge. The 
question, paraphrasing Haraway, is ‘how might an ethics and politics commit-
ted to the flourishing of significant otherness be learned from taking air-human 
relationship seriously?’6 (Haraway 2003: 3).
So, inviting atmospheric more-than-humans to architecture’s table may be 
a means to propose a different view of how socialities can be facilitated with 
atmospheres. It can also contribute to STS by showing how working with air 
can invent the social in ways not possible without intervening with specific 
materials, and how socialities can be designed not through discourse or human-
only interactions, but through human and more-than-human atmospheres. The 
level of design and control of this process is still uncertain, and requires more 
experimentation.
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Note s
1 Architects’ conceptions of how to invent the social have shifted throughout history. 
For instance, in the Baroque period, architecture was a tool to represent power. With the 
advent of the new state and changes in society of the late nineteenth century and beginning 
of the twentieth, architecture had to accompany and represent societal changes such as 
modernisation and industrialisation, as Le Corbusier extensively discussed. In the 1970s 
a more modest wave in Europe focused on small scale architecture, exploring through 
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design how small design decisions affect how people inhabit spaces (such as the work of 
Herzberger in the Netherlands or the Smithsons in the United Kingdom).
2 The name Polivagina was chosen as an allusion to Pussy Riot, but also in reference to 
the reformulation of the idea of the vagina as a contested space developed by feminists 
in the 1970s (see Munuera, 2014).
3 It was designed at C+arquitectos by Nerea Calvillo with Marina Fernandez, and built 
with a group of students from Alicante University architecture school at a workshop 
directed by Miguel Mesa del Castillo.
4 This is how ‘flexible’ buildings were conceived and built in the 1990s.
5 Which will demand, in fact, other ethical and aesthetic modes of evaluating architecture.
6 ‘Dog-human’ in the original.
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INCUBATIONS:  INVENTING 
PREVENTIVE ASSEMBLAGES
Michael Guggenheim, Bernd Kräftner, Judith Kröll
In remembrance of Stefan Beck
I ncubat ions :  A  M ethods  P r im er
this chapter introduces, in a prograMMatic forM, our oWn take 
on inventing the social. Incubations take off from current attempts in the social 
sciences to create ‘inventive methods’ (Lury and Wakeford 2011), speculative 
methods (Wilkie et al. 2016) and design experiments (Binder et al. 2015), or to 
expand the methods and devices of social science beyond texts (Becker 2007). 
But incubations are not so much a specific method as an attempt to reorient 
the basic assumptions of social science towards a strong notion of inventing 
the social. What follows is programmatic account followed up by one example. 
But this account is also skewed, as it rationalises a messy process. Rather than 
create a blueprint, a recipe or a toolbox, we began with a variety of projects 
(Guggenheim et al. 2006; Kräftner and Xperiment! 2005; Kräftner et al. 2010; 
Guggenheim et al. 2016; Guggenheim 2011) that finally prompted us to think 
about what holds these projects together. Incubations, as should become obvi-
ous, are not rule-bound practices, but attempts to invent the social under specific 
circumstances. The following account merely suggests, based on experience, 
what to pay attention to when embarking on your own incubation.
To begin with, here is a definition: An incubation is a socio-technical device 
that uses situational, social and time-based pressure to invent the social and 
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represent it with a wide variety of media. This idea draws conceptually on three 
historical meanings of incubation that appear to be unrelated to the problems 
of social research, yet which contribute in important ways to our definition of 
incubation as an approach to inventing the social. First, in Classical antiquity, 
an incubation is a healing process that is attempted when usual forms of healing 
do not work (Meier 1949). A patient is brought to a temple and sleeps there, 
where she experiences dreams. If she has the ‘right’ dream, she is healed. From 
this first meaning, we can learn two things: incubations are experimental forms 
that replace other, more standard forms of practice. More specifically, they 
experimentalise lay-expert co-operation: Rather than an expert applying external 
knowledge and medication to the lay person, in an incubation the expert helps 
the lay person to have new kinds of experiences.
Second, an incubator is a pressure cooker, a device invented in the labora-
tory of Robert Boyle by his assistant Denis Papin (Papin 1681). The pressure 
cooker uses pressure to fuse ingredients in novel ways. It speeds up chemical 
processes and softens ingredients. From this second meaning we can learn that 
incubations bring actors and actants together, applying to them a kind of pres-
sure that reconnects them in novel ways. Incubations re-order social situations 
by intervening in them.
Third, the term ‘incubator’ became applied, around 1880, to a new device 
that creates a safe environment for premature babies. These early incuba-
tors, however, being made from non-transparent materials, created a barrier 
between mother and child that in some cases led mothers to stop caring 
about their babies. Pierre Constant Budin thus invented a version made from 
glass, which preserved the delicate atmosphere needed for the care of the 
infant without creating an opaque barrier between mother and child (Baker 
2000: 323). The incubator thus became a device that shielded a precious 
being from the world, while at the same time allowing primary care. Later, 
incubators became complex and expensive technical devices with ventila-
tion and heating. To finance them, they were exhibited, which in time led to 
ubiquitous incubator shows at trade fairs, zoos, fairgrounds such as Coney 
Island, and other unlikely places (Silverman 1979). For our purposes then, 
an incubator is also, based on this third definition, a device for carefully 
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creating unusual and unlikely consumption contexts for delicate objects of 
social scientific knowledge.1
From this description it also follows what an incubation is not. Firstly, an 
incubation cannot, and should not, be defined in terms of the media it uses 
(such as ‘documentary photography’, ‘art installation’ or ‘ethnography’). An 
incubation can be any of these, but incubations do not start with such media 
in mind. Secondly, an incubation is not an ‘intervention’, as opposed to a 
scientific research project or an art project. An incubation is all of these, and 
can result in any of them, but at its heart it cannot be reduced to any of them 
exclusively. Third, an incubation is not a project in which artists and social sci-
entists collaborate in an inter- or trans-disciplinary way in the sense that social 
scientists do science and artists do art and then these two things are combined. 
An incubation includes strategies, elements, material and epistemic practices 
from both of these fields, but it does not neatly separate them into art and 
social science. To start with separate media, technologies, professions, spheres 
and skills, and to ponder how these can be brought together, is the opposite of 
the logic of an incubation. It is an artefact of organisational specialisation, but 
to begin with an incubation this specialisation has to be resolved first, rather 
than becoming the problem of the project itself. An incubation needs to draw 
on whatever technologies, logics and skills seem necessary, rather than being 
defined by them from the outset.
We begin the article by explaining how incubations are a particular form 
of inventing the social. We then discuss a particular project, ‘Straight from 
the Heart: Prevention Indices and Divinations of Researchers’ with regard to 
the three main characteristics of incubations given above: the creation of an 
experimental situation, the application of pressure and the design of a careful 
presentation context.
I ncubat ions  a s  I nv ent ing  th e  Soc i a l
Before we present our example, it will be helpful to clarify how incubations are a 
form of inventing the social. The phrase ‘inventing the social’ can be understood 
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in multiple ways. First, by inventing the social we can understand what Hans Joas 
has termed ‘the creativity of action’ ( Joas 1996). Such a notion of inventing the 
social refers to a sociological conception of agency, specified in different ways 
in the writings of classical social theorists influenced by pragmatism, such as 
G. H. Mead, Alfred Schütz, Herbert Blumer, Berger and Luckmann, and Harold 
Garfinkel, which foregrounds the creativity, contingency, inventiveness and 
production of novel forms of sociality in all forms of action. This first view of 
inventing the social opposes structuralist and rationalist accounts of action by 
stressing that even in the most humble interactions, novel forms of the social 
constantly emerge, and that the role of the social scientist is to observe how 
this emergence takes place.
We can adopt this view for the practice of social science. If any kind of 
interaction invents the social, then any practice of a social scientist invents the 
social too. This is the second version of inventing the social. As Law and Urry 
put it, ‘theories and methods are protocols for modes of questioning or interact-
ing which also produce realities’ (Law & Urry 2004: 395). Thus every text on 
a social practice not only describes it, but also adds a new version of it to the 
world. Methods are inherently inventive (Lury & Wakeford 2011).
A third version of inventing the social adds what Ian Hacking has called 
‘looping effects’ to the picture (Hacking 1995). Re-descriptions of the social 
offer actors new ways of understanding themselves, and produce new forms 
of action by adapting or resisting these descriptions. Take as an example the 
way that the term ‘performativity’ has been used in social studies of finance 
(MacKenzie & Millo 2003). Economists, when they describe the world as 
being run by efficient markets, do not merely describe this world, but equip the 
actors with concepts and devices that then perform the very things the econo-
mists purport to describe. This kind of argument is primarily directed against 
a traditional sociological critique of economics which claims that economists 
do not adequately describe social realities. In a different theoretical register, 
Pierre Bourdieu has observed very similar things in the case of opinion surveys. 
Bourdieu demonstrates that questionnaires make people express ‘opinions’ 
on topics they would not have opinions about were they not participating in 
a survey (Bourdieu 1984:.412 ff.; Law 2009). According to this view, efficient 
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markets and opinion surveys do perform what they do, but this is at least in part 
because social scientists equip actors with the means of enacting these things. 
Inventing the social would then mean that social scientists equip the world with 
the means to create new worlds.
These three versions are descriptive and do not presume that the actors they 
refer to actively seek to invent the social. The invention of the social is here a 
by-product of ordinary or social scientific actions. In particular, in the case of 
performativity, it is an important part of the analysis that it claims to reveal the 
performative elements of what economists or survey researchers conceive of 
as description. All these three versions, then, describe features of (particular 
kinds) of actions, not differences between kinds of actions. They ignore the 
possibility of actions or forms of social science that do not invent the social.2 
All three notions are part of a theoretical debate about the concept of action or 
what it means to do social science, rather than a debate about different kinds 
of actions or social science.
A fourth form of inventing the social can be seen in lay practices that experi-
mentalise the social in formats that are similar to social science, in ‘experiments 
in living’ (Marres 2012). This fourth form, it could be argued, is a systematic 
transport of the breaching experiment (Garfinkel 1967) into practices of the 
self. It is a form of creating the social by lay people through the means of effect-
ing systematic breaches and changes in their own conditions of living (also see 
Whatmore 2009). It is here that incubation as ‘inventing the social’ comes into 
its own, where it specifies a particular practice rather than a re-description of 
generic practices.
But such experimentalisations of the social have rarely been taken up by 
social scientists, because to do so would be to break with a number of assump-
tions about how to conduct social science. To understand this break, it will 
help to look at some typical descriptions of such experimentalisations. For 
example, Law and Urry, in the article cited above, argue for a move from 
re-describing social research to re-designing it: ‘If social investigation makes 
worlds, then it can, in some measure, think about the worlds it wants to help 
to make’ (Law & Urry 2004: 391). For Law and Urry, what follows are differ-
ent assumptions about what we could call the form of the world. For them, 
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social worlds should be invented as ‘multiple’ and ‘complex’ (Law & Urry 
2004: 397–404).
Yet multiplicity (Mol 2003) and complexity (Law & Mol 2002) have been 
used in this research tradition primarily as descriptions. If we are to understand 
them as inventionist terms, we can perhaps best conceptualise them as differing 
from the tradition of action research (Fals Borda 2001). In most action research, 
the world is imagined not as multiple and complex, but as shot through with 
power relations, and the goal of the researcher is not so much to allow other 
forms of complexity and multiplicities, but to change the world in ways that are 
conceived of as more just by the social scientists. To understand multiplicity 
and complexity as elements of a form of inventing the social implies that any 
attempt to invent the social aims at complicating things and opening up possible 
actions for any participant, rather than closing them down.
For Law and Urry, the problem of complexity and multiplicity is interwoven 
with the different forms that social science takes. When they write that they want 
to ‘imagine … fluid and decentred modes for knowing the world allegorically, 
indirectly, perhaps pictorially, sensuously, poetically, a social science of partial 
connections’ (Law & Urry 2004: 400), these suggestions echo the criteria 
for what Luciana Parisi calls ‘speculative methods’ (Parisi 2012). For Parisi, a 
speculative method ‘demands of thought to become felt, fact to become poten-
tial, imagination to supersede observation, object to affect method, method to 
become transformative of the object’ (Parisi 2012: 241). Such a method ‘may 
contribute to push social research towards the designing of unknown objects by 
exposing their particular perspectives about the importance of an event’ (Parisi 
2012: 242).
In their different ways, these accounts of social science converge in a move 
from purely textual accounts of the social, to different pictorial, sensual and 
objectual accounts of inventing the social. This expansion of the media of 
social science is surely welcome (see Guggenheim 2015). The traditional 
scepticism within social science against other than textual media is unfounded, 
and given the practice of the natural sciences, rather hinders than enables 
better translations of the world. Elsewhere we have explained that social 
scientists often assume a media determinism for visual media. As expressed 
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in the statements above, they believe that visual representations are in them-
selves more or less objective, or more or less capable of inventing the social 
(Guggenheim 2015).
But we suggest reading this shift to the visual, objectual and so on as indicative 
of an underlying problem: If ‘theories and methods are protocols for modes of 
questioning or interacting which also produce realities’, as Law and Urry claim 
in the quote above, then the focus of research shifts from an end result to the 
practice of doing it. Instead of focusing on the research articles as accounts of 
what has been done during a research project, incubations as a particular kind 
of inventing the social imply a focus on the ‘modes of questioning or interacting 
which produces realities’.
This is where the three characteristics of incubations mentioned in the intro-
duction become relevant. To question and interact in order to produce realities 
suggests first of all suitable setups; second, it suggests some form of pressure to 
soften established situations; and third, it suggests carefully designed products 
in adequate consumption contexts.
In our view, such a shift implies moving away from taking methods as pre-
existing tools that can be used for all kinds of realities. It certainly asks us to 
refrain from identifying a researcher with particular theories and methods. To 
say, ‘I am an ethnomethodologist’ or ‘I do ANT’ would imply a strange way of 
inventing the social. Rather than questioning and interacting, to identify with a 
theory or method in such a way would assume a machinic idea of theories and 
methods. Moreover, such an idea would make theories and methods part of the 
identities of researchers. It would assume a world with which a researcher always 
interacts in the same way. This is highly unlikely to invent relevant forms of the 
social, if we imagine the social world to be complex and multiple.
Instead, an incubation asks us to understand research problems as requiring 
adequate ways to question and interact with them. Rather than beginning with a 
particular method, or particular media, an incubation begins with a problem, and 
the call to question and interact with it in ways such that the social is invented 
in novel and adequate ways.
The reason why incubations often move away from purely textual forms 
of research can be found in the three dimensions of incubations given above.
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In many cases, the search for adequate experimental situations and adequate 
forms of pressure and consumption contexts does lead away from purely textual 
modes of doing research, but not for the sake of non-textual approaches as such, 
but because purely textual approaches are often inadequate to incubate a given 
problem. As can be seen from the example that follows, one main problem 
here is that incubation often requires working together and interacting with 
a multiplicity of actors. For many of these actors, what is a normal mode of 
data production and presentation for a social scientist is a highly unusual way 
to interact with the world. Such a radically asymmetric protocol for inventing 
the social is, however, rather unlikely to work. The reason why scholars such as 
Law and Urry ask for the visual and the poetic lies probably here: it aims for a 
format in which the asymmetry between the production of social science and 
other actors is flattened.
This, however, should not be read – as it far too often is in defences of visual 
sociology (see for example Leavy 2008: 344) – as an attempt at popularising 
social science with other media. The logic behind such ideas of popularisation 
suggests that images are easier to understand than texts. Social scientists do their 
difficult job, and once they have finished, they use images to make it easier for 
lay audiences to understand it. This, however, leaves the asymmetries between 
different media and between social scientists and their audiences intact, and 
merely serves to dumb down social science.
In contrast, incubations aim to invent the social by challenging the practices 
of social science as much as those of the other actors involved in a particular 
incubation. An incubation is not based on the fiction that the power differentials 
between researcher and researched can easily be flattened. Rather, it takes the 
power differentials seriously by creating challenges for the researcher and the 
researched. By denying the idea that the researcher can simply enter a situation 
with theories and methods that she masters, symmetry is achieved by loosening 
the researcher’s grip on what she thinks she knows what to do, and how to do 
it. This is why the organisation founded by two of the present authors (BK and 
JK) is called ‘Research Centre for Shared Incompetence’. How is it possible, 
then, to invent the social?
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Creat e  an  Ex p e r im enta l  S e tu p
Incubation in antiquity was an experimental setup that was only used once other 
methods had failed. It was a form of hope in experimental methods: ‘Therapeutic 
optimism is unlimited and never punished’ remarks Meier in his standard book 
on incubations in antiquity (Meier 1949: 59). The patient sleeps on the steps 
of the temple and dreams. What matters is the right dream, and the right dream 
cannot be planned for. Whether it was the right dream is only known after the 
fact, when the patient wakes up. Incubations cannot be repeated, planned or 
standardised. In incubations the expert does not so much apply her superior 
knowledge, but rather accompanies a lay person on an experimental path. The 
same is true for incubations in social science.
This means that great care is needed in deciding where and how incuba-
tions in social science should be housed. Social science departments may not 
be the most suitable places to do so. The organisational background that we 
have found to be the most enabling for our project work is a mixture of direct 
funding for specific projects, combined with either specialised departments 
devoted to non-disciplinary research, or a (loose) attachment to STS, sociology 
or anthropology departments. Since funding explicitly for incubations does not 
exist, we depend on funding possibilities that at least encourage projects at the 
border of social science and the arts.
Incubations need materials, some of them costly, others simply unusual 
at social science departments. Working with materials requires machines and 
studios (Farias & Wilkie 2015). The offices and seminar rooms in social science 
departments are often not very convenient for the multiple affordances of an 
incubation. Work with humans necessitates spaces that are comfortable and 
that do not implicitly replicate the affect and organisational structure of offices. 
Universities are also not strictly suitable for incubations, because they tend to 
formalise acceptable forms of research, both by specifying discipline-specific 
standards and by increasingly restricting ethical review procedures, which are 
formulated according a very particular kind of research that depends, for example, 
on anonymisation (Clark 2012).
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S t ra ight  f rom  the  H eart :  P r e v ent ion  Ind ic e s 
and  D i v inat ions  o f  R e s earcher s  (2008 )
The project on which we report had its beginnings in unusual circumstances. As 
a group, we already had extensive experience of conducting incubations. Our 
collaboration began three years previously when we were directors of the exhibi-
tions ‘die wahr/falsch inc.’, a ten-module exhibition in Vienna (Guggenheim et 
al. 2006). Already for that collaboration we began working in a mode in which 
there was no clear-cut division of labour, and in which all the team members 
carried out the conceptual and practical work together. For that exhibition, BK 
and MG had already collaborated with the late Stefan Beck at the Institute for 
European Anthropology at Humboldt University Berlin for a module titled 
‘Who With Whom. Heredity in Action’ on Thalassemia in Cyprus.
The beginning of ‘Straight from the Heart’ lay in another project of Stefan 
Beck and his research group, entitled ‘Preventive Selves – Interdisciplinary 
Investigations into an Emergent Form of Life’. This was a collaboration with the 
department for general practitioners at the Charité (the university hospital). 
‘Preventive Selves’ sought to understand why people, although they are aware 
of various truths about how to prevent cardiovascular diseases (such as the 
fact that unhealthy eating habits or smoking increases the risk) do not adhere 
to this knowledge. They researched the lived realities of particular groups at 
risk (migrants) (Niewöhner et al. 2011), but also the interaction between GPs 
and patients in consulting sessions (Heintze et al. 2010). The project members 
themselves identified its key shortcoming: observing and interviewing ‘preven-
tive selves’ did not really give a full picture of these selves.
The project leaders asked us whether we could contribute to the project by 
exploring new methods of thinking about what they called ‘preventive assem-
blages’ (Niewöhner et al. 2011). From the very start, we decided not to focus 
again on patients and their role in the assemblage, as we felt that their role was 
already overdetermined by the research of the project itself, as well as by the 
many other research projects that either sought to improve prevention or were 
critical of the governmental logics of state-led prevention projects. Instead, we 
decided that we would turn the logic of experts and patients around and create 
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preventive assemblages with the project members themselves. We would inter-
vene in the making of preventive assemblages at the level of those who develop 
these concepts, which includes ourselves.
How would it be possible for us to collaborate with anthropologists and 
doctors to think about and invent professional preventive selves, rather than 
produce prevention as a solution to which the population should adhere? What 
could be a suitable setup for doing so? Our basic idea was to build a laboratory 
that would allow us to explore a number of methods to produce various ver-
sions of preventive selves.
First we needed to create an organisational setting that would allow us to oper-
ate such methods. We knew from the beginning that, for practical reasons, our 
laboratory would best be set up at the respective institutes. We needed to create a 
space not within the control of these institutes – a liminal space that would clearly 
indicate that this was not part of the ongoing practices of these departments. In 
the case of the Department of European Anthropology, we could use a corridor 
that connected two parts of the department. It had a balcony that was often used 
by smokers. It also had a sink. It was neither an office nor a classroom, and it 
contained some ragged furniture that we could make use of. On the same floor 
as the Department of Medicine was a former dental clinic, now abandoned. We 
set up our laboratory there, in a bright, empty, tiled space (Fig. 3.1).
A room does not determine an organisational environment. Research envi-
ronments are not only spatially, but also organisationally and practically tightly 
controlled through disciplinary practices, organisational rules and ethical 
reviews, and these prescribe what kinds of the social can be invented. Our project 
took place in a complex organisational space: our research participants were also 
our research funders, and they owned the spaces in which our experiments took 
place. At the same time, the research project did not need to undergo ethical 
review, as, at least at that time, sociological and anthropological research in 
Germany did not need to undergo ethical review, and also the project took place 
below the radar of any overseeing body. But we were crucially aware of the fact 
that the project took part within an organisational environment in which ethi-
cal issues are seen as crucial, and further, in which ethical and methodological 
standards are very different for the two groups.
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Th e logic of ethical review aims at preventing too much invention of the social. 
Ethical review is by its very nature conservative. It is geared towards preserving 
the social world as it is. It assumes that research participants have a right not to 
be bothered by researchers and that researchers need to guarantee demonstra-
ble benefi ts to society if they want to bother other people. Particularly in the 
social sciences researchers are assigned the position of documenting the ethical 
review without being able to infl uence, control or even change social situations.
But incubations work against this logic by aiming to provoke, change, infl u-
ence and ultimately invent new forms of the social. Th e methods used in ‘Straight 
From the Heart’ could potentially be challenging to the research participants, 
who were themselves researchers. We thought that we would need to establish 
a space that would set out its own rules, but at the same time make the research 
participants aware of this unusual situation and create the possibility of discuss-
ing it with them. To accomplish this, we developed an informed consent sheet 
 Fig. 3.1  The prevention laboratory at the Department of General Practice, Charité, 
Humboldt University (photo: Bernd Kräftner)
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that notified participants of their rights to object and disagree with the research 
altogether, to provide alternatives to it, to stop us from continuing, to intervene 
in the procedures, and to obtain the material produced.
This model for informed consent became a device for creating a research 
environment of our own definition, rather than simply copying an existing logic 
of negotiating the relationship between researcher and researched. The model 
functions by openly contesting existing definitions of informed consent, but it 
also invites the test persons to contest our notion of informed consent.
Our project also highlighted a crucial problem with the consent forms 
themselves: even when they are considered as a basis for discussion, rather 
than simply a form that is signed, they focus on abstract options of action to 
be taken in particular situations that are yet unknown to the participants. It 
is only in, and more often after exposure to particular situations that research 
participants can form an opinion, an emotion or a (dis)agreement. This is pre-
cisely what happened. No participant challenged our review form, and signed 
it without further ado, some of them slightly bemused at the wording that gave 
them more power than other forms. Yet during the sessions, the participants did 
not exercise this power to challenge what we did. They would be interested in 
our research, they would ask us about particular steps, but no one considered 
different courses of action. Some of them would be rather confused, and even 
felt misled afterwards.
The experimental space was not only set by discursive means, but at the 
very beginning of each session was enacted by two events. First, when enter-
ing the space, we presented the participants with a variety of things they could 
consume (Fig. 3.2).
We offered them ostensibly healthy food such as apples, but also ostensi-
bly unhealthy foods such as cheap cakes and chocolate. We also offered them 
cigarettes, wine and schnapps. The gesture of offering such a variety of con-
sumables was on the surface a gesture of hospitality. But it also gestured at the 
organisational space in which this was taking place. Smoking in the buildings of 
the university is forbidden, as is drinking alcohol at work. As our experiments 
took place immediately before, during, or after the participants’ work, these 
were also offers to break written and unwritten codes of the organisation. When 
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asked, we explicitly claimed to take responsibility for breaking these rules, yet 
obviously, we could not guarantee what would happen. Our gesture of hospi-
tality was at the same time an invitation to a performative negotiation of the 
nexus of the logics of prevention, a challenge to how these are built into the 
rules of workspaces and an exploration of the desire of groups and individuals 
to transgress these rules. Smokers happily accepted our off ers to smoke, and 
some drank wine.
At the same time, our off ers of food created a liminal space in the very 
organisations in which the experiments were conducted, and produced data on 
how to negotiate such a space. On a basic level it gave us data about how many 
people consumed which kinds of goods. On a more sophisticated level, it gave 
us recordings of conversations about how the research participants created and 
negotiated this space.
Second, aft er discussing informed consent, the next step was to ask the 
participants whether we could take a drop of blood from them (Fig. 3.3).
 Fig. 3.2  Consumption off ers at the Department of European Anthropology, 
Humboldt University (photo: Bernd Kräftner)
79
incubations: inventing preventive asseMblages
We made it clear that there was no medical justifi cation for this procedure 
(we used the blood later as a central element of the posters for the exhibition: 
see the discussion in section 4 below). Th e blood-taking became a prompt 
to create a social situation in which the relationship between researcher and 
researched was put to test (and which would result in a visible product of this 
test: a drop of blood). Th is opened up the issue of why people allow their 
bodily integrity to be challenged, and for what reasons such a transgression 
can occur.
We off ered that we would take the blood, or that they could do it themselves 
(many of the participants were doctors, and thus used to doing it). We would 
also point out that the person who would take the blood, Bernd Kräft ner, was 
originally a trained doctor, and thus technically allowed to do so, yet that he had 
not practiced for more than twenty years. Rather than putt ing the blood away 
in a capillary tube, we would drop it onto a piece of paper. Th us the blood did 
not disappear, but remained visible for the participants.
 Fig. 3.3  Kit for blood taking (photo: Bernd Kräftner)
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Asking for a drop of blood had a similar effect to offering food. It questioned 
and created a space that is usually taken for granted in research. It pointed to the 
fact that breaking boundaries of the skin and taking bodily fluid is a procedure 
we are used to under specific conditions. Giving a non-medical justification 
opened a space to discuss the logics of violating bodily boundaries. At the 
same time, the offer that they do it themselves and the explanation of our own 
(lack of) qualifications to do it, questioned the expert-lay divide ingrained in 
research practices. The offer, after all, was not merely a choice, but also opened 
up the unspoken assumption that researchers are better qualified to do what 
they do than their research subjects. Our offer explicitly acknowledged that at 
least the doctors among the participants were probably better qualified to do 
it than we were.
Ap p ly ing  P r e s sur e : 
N ew Forms  o f  P rovocat i v e  Conta inment
The other two characteristics of an incubation both refer to the uses of controlled 
environments. The first, the pressure cooker, is historically a precedent of the 
second, the baby incubator. Both are spaces that control atmospheres (also see 
Calvillo, this volume). But while the baby incubator tries to care for particularly 
vulnerable beings, the pressure cooker transforms and softens objects.
As John Evelyn reported at the first demonstration of a pressure cooker by 
Denis Papin at the Royal Society in 1682, it is a procedure ‘by which the hard-
est bones of beef itself, and mutton, were made as soft as cheese’ (Evelyn 2009: 
393). Such a softening of the materials is exactly what is intended in a research 
incubation. Hardened positions, worldviews and bodily practices stabilised by 
habitus are softened and opened up to collective transformation.
Incubations do not produce pressure on the participants because we oppose 
their views, even if they may be politically opposed to ours. For an incubation 
to work, it needs to apply pressure to all of those involved, including the incu-
bators, to produce new situations and new solutions to commonly perceived 
problems.
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A common version of pressure in incubations resembles what Lezaun, 
Muniesa and Vikkelso call ‘provocative containment’, a term they use to 
describe the experiments in social psychology of Lewin, Moreno and Milgram. 
Provocative containment is the idea that researchers can create a space in which 
they ‘choreograph situations of induced spontaneity’ (Lezaun et al. 2013: 279; 
also see Brown 2012). While Lezaun et al. situate ‘provocative containment’ 
as a research practice in a specific epoch, and see its remnants in artistic, thera-
peutic and managerial practices, incubations reinvent it as social research, but 
with a twist.
What distinguishes the pressure of incubations from those earlier experi-
ments is that the latter aim to solve social problems, as defined in social psy-
chology, while the former try to open up and change how we look at certain 
issues. While the social psychologists usually ‘realised’ something they knew 
and intended, but which did not exist in its pure form outside the laboratory 
(democracy, authority etc.) (Lezaun et al. 2013: 289), incubations instead aim 
to explore an issue and create new worlds. In the words of Vinciane Despret, 
it is a matter of ‘genesis’, ‘of raising more interesting questions that enable 
more articulated answers, and therefore more articulated identities’ (Despret 
2004: 125).
What emerges in the incubation is not simply ‘data’ that we then use to test a 
hypothesis, but rather, the ‘choreography’ or performance is a central outcome 
itself, a pressure-induced invention of the social. For this reason, it is part and 
parcel of the incubation to be open for interruption and interrogation by the 
participants before, during and after. Also, the props and the control exercised 
over the participants have no hidden meaning or plot. There may be surprise, in 
the sense that the incubators know what is coming next while the participants 
do not, but nothing is hidden from their view.
The laboratory for testing ideas of prevention implied pressure of this kind 
from the beginning. The set-up was explicitly informed by the organisational 
logics of provocative containments. It was an artificial space, governed by an 
artificial logic that had no equivalence in the world outside our experiment. It 
was a laboratory space in the narrow sense of the word: it was a controlled space 
that aimed for ‘placeless’ and ‘inconsequential’ intervention (Guggenheim 2012). 
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The laboratory did not aim to produce a knowledge that is specific to a time or 
place, or that would change the world outside the laboratory. Rather, we sought 
to produce a knowledge that could only be produced by the specific laboratory. 
As a pressure-inducing mechanism the laboratory was specifically targeted to 
what we assumed to be a research problem: that doctors and anthropologists, 
precisely because they work on the topic of prevention, are very difficult research 
participants when it comes to their own ideas and behaviours of prevention. 
Their habitus – as is ours, as incubators – is geared towards turning questions 
regarding their own ideas and lives towards ‘problems’, that are considered to be 
off-topic, too personal, too complex and irrelevant to explore (see the ‘unclas-
sifiable professor’ in Bourdieu 1984: 418).
Pressure induced in the laboratory has two sources. First, the strange 
organisational space, which explicitly suspends normal interaction proto-
cols, as outlined in the previous section. Second, more specifically, pressure 
is induced by prompts for the research participants to do certain tasks, such 
as the offer of food, or the request for a drop of blood. In the latter example 
it is also obvious that the pressure induced does not only affect the research 
participants but also us: the task is a task that mediates the relationship between 
the researcher and researched. Other than in the cases of provocative contain-
ment, incubators do not control the situation behind the backs of the research 
participants. Instead, we create and open up a situation that has to be negoti-
ated by us and them together. The researchers are not observers, and neither 
are they puppet-masters that create a spectacle, but they are implicated in the 
negotiation of the social.
Other such tasks consisted, for example, in an adapted version of SEIQoL, 
an established test for assessing the quality of life (Hickey et al. 1996). In 
SEIQoL, a participant freely names five elements central to her life (such as, 
for example, family, work, playing volleyball, going to the pub, attending the 
opera), and rates these relative to each other with the help of a five-segment 
colour wheel. The advantage of this method with regard to other quality of 
life measurements is that the results are quantifiable and comparable, yet are 
based on individual choices for those elements of life, rather than on predefined 
ones. For the participants, this was a well-known and unsurprising device. 
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But then we added a surprise element. Aft er they had completed the task, we 
asked them to pair a soft -toy animal to each of their elements and explain the 
selection (Fig. 3.4).
Further, the participants were asked to answer a number of questions regard-
ing their ideas about prevention, and specifi cally about the implied futures of 
prevention, culminating in the question ‘When you have grown older, will you 
have thought enough about whether you did enough to live longer?’ 3 Such ques-
tions are not usual in surveys, because they do not assume that the respondents 
will have an opinion about what is asked. Even though the participants deal 
professionally with the subject-matt er of the questions, it seems likely that the 
questions will actually instigate new thoughts because of their complexity. But 
these questions are also atypical of expert interviews, because they address, in 
the modus of prevention, the future of the experts’ bodies themselves, and not 
their views about the world. Th ey ask the respondent to transport herself into 
the future, to invent a situation in which she thinks back on her own life and 
 Fig. 3.4  SEIQoL with soft toys (photo: Bernd Kräftner)
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answer in the present about this future situation. They help the respondent to 
invent her own future.
Pressure in an incubation is theatrical, similar to the examples of Lezaun et 
al. (2013). It is a prompt to act in new ways. But it is also different, because it 
is not about staging unwitting participants, but about making them reflect on 
and explore their relation to the world.
Creat ing  Car e fu l  Consumpt ion 
Context s  for  D e l i cat e  Ob j ect s
The third incubator, the baby incubator, was developed as a very unusual tech-
nical object. It was first and foremost an incredibly complex technical step to 
create an atmosphere for babies. But the design of the incubator also had to 
mediate between the needs of mothers and doctors. Incubators had to allow 
two groups to care for babies: mothers, and experts such as doctors and nurses. 
The invention of glass incubators allowed the needs of these two main groups 
to be calibrated: it allowed the experts to control the environment, while at the 
same time it allowed communication by mothers with their infants. Incubators, 
then, are devices that balance and mediate between closeness and distance, 
between impermeable boundaries and bodily closeness, between sight and touch, 
between professionals and lay users. In a later phase, this mediation included 
a third element, namely audiences that did not have an obvious connection 
to the babies. The reasons were historically specific: to finance the expensive 
technology, some doctors decided to show them to the general public at a cost. 
This was so successful that soon there were incubator shows in zoos, on Coney 
Island and in other such places.
Similarly, incubations in social science need to balance and mediate between 
the researchers, the research participants and wider audiences. The balance 
is similar to that of a baby incubator. What is the right distance between the 
researchers, the research participants and other audiences? What are adequate 
means to create such a balance? How can the delicate interactions during the 
research process be preserved and made public?
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A particular problem of incubations is that the route of translations from the 
world to the research result is not fixed. The research article is but one among 
many options in which an incubation can be presented to the public. As incu-
bations are very often local and situational inventions, specific for particular 
constituencies and audiences, they very often profit from installations, perfor-
mances, and exhibitions and other place-specific presentation forms. These 
allow for different forms of translating the originating research materials into 
materially inventive forms. If incubations can be said to invent the social, then 
a central element of these new forms of the social is their adequate translation 
into materialisations.
When carrying out incubations, we never have a predefined idea of what 
the end result will be in terms of the media used. Terms such as ‘exhibition’ are 
merely convenient placeholders for locally specific forms of presentation. They 
are convenient precisely because ‘exhibitions’ are not media specific, but allow 
for a suitable combination of drawings, photographs, performances, texts and 
audio material. The guiding question then is always which presentation format 
translates the originating material in a way that is both true to the originating 
research problem and adds the right kind of surprise.
For the project on prevention, we initially intended to stage an exhibition. 
Given that the exhibition had to take place at the Department of European 
Anthropology, we were confined to a corridor with two opposing walls and no 
usable floor-space. To mitigate these space restrictions we decided to create a 
series of posters. The posters would refer back to scientific posters that often 
hang on these walls and those of the Department of General Medicine.
The first poster was deliberately designed to resemble one that doctors might 
present at a conference (Fig. 3.5).
It was planned according to the same rules that govern the design of such 
posters: it contained a layout that would give an overview of the research ques-
tion, the methods, and the research participants.
The other sixteen posters were based on two materials gained during the 
experiment, namely the drops of blood we took at the beginning and the soft 
toys used in the quality of life tests. We used both of these as backgrounds to 
contain the other forms of data gathered (Fig. 3.6, Fig. 3.7).
 Fig. 3.5  Introductory Poster (image: the authors)
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Einleitung
Präventionsforschung erfolgt meistens an Risikopopulationen mit niedrigem sozialen Status. Zudem erfolgt Prä-
ventionsforschung meistens in medizinischen oder sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschungszusammenhängen. Wenig 
ist hingegen bekannt über Präventionsforscher selbst und methodologische Innovation in der Präventionsfor-
schung sind rar. Die vorliegende Studie weitet deshalb die Untersuchungspopulation auf die Präventionsforscher 
selbst aus und erweitert explorativ das Methodenspektrum.
Theoretischer Hintergrund
Die vorliegende Arbeit möchte einen Beitrag zur Gesundheitsforschung leisten. 
Unzählige Definitionen von Gesundheit deuten auf den Umstand hin, dass es bis 
heute keine umfassende Theorie der Gesundheit gibt. Antonovsky ist der Ver-
dienst zuzuschreiben, mit der Schöpfung des Begriffs der „Salutogenese“ unser 
Bewußtsein für dieses Defizit geschärft zu haben. Jegliche Art der Präventions-
forschung muss sich mit diesem Theoriedefizit auseinandersetzen.
Unsere Hypothese ist, dass eine Theorie der Gesundheit und der Prävention eng 
mit Fragen einer Theorie der Zukunft verknüpft sind. Fragen nach dem Wesen 
der Zukunft spielen in modernen Gesellschaften immer eine wesentliche Rolle. 
Unser Verhältnis zu einer persönlichen Zukunft ist von der Frage durchdrungen, 
ob sich mit der Erkenntnis über eine jeweilige Zukunft die Gegenwart beein-
flussen lässt, oder ob vielmehr die Gegenwart durch eine entsprechende Praxis 
Einfluss auf die Zukunft nimmt. Aus diesem Grund liegt es nahe, Modelle und 
Praktiken der (Selbst-)Divination zu explorieren und diese für die Präventionsforschung fruchtbar zu machen, 
da sich diese seit jeher mit der Paradoxie ihrer Anwendung konfrontiert sahen: Um voraussagen zu können, 
müssen die Ereignisse vorherbestimmt sein; wenn die Voraussage nützlich sein soll, dürfen die Ereignisse nicht 
vorherbestimmt sein. 
Die Divination hat dieses Paradoxon gelöst, indem sie speziellen Personengruppen (Heilern, Orakellesern, Ha-
ruspizes oder Auguren) exklusiv die Fähigkeit zugesprochen hat Voraussagen zu treffen. In einer Zeit radikaler 
divinatorischer Demokratisierung ist diese Auflösung nicht mehr haltbar. Stattdessen sind wir mit einer Multi-
plizität divinatorischer Ordnungen konfrontiert, bei der die Frage divinatorischer Expertise nicht mehr eindeu-
tig spezifischen Personengruppen und ihren spezifischen divinatorischen Me-
thoden zugesprochen werden kann. Stattdessen konkurrieren eine Vielzahl von 
Berufsgruppen (Ärzte, Epidemiologen, Heiler, Astrologen, Magier, Tarotkarten-
leser) ohne eindeutige Definitionsmacht mit einer Vielzahl von Methoden um 
unsere Zukünfte. Wie wirkt sich dieses Paradoxon auf eine mögliche Praxis der 
(Selbst-)Divination aus, also auf eine Verlagerung einer informierten Divination 
in uns selbst („informed divination“)? Die vorliegende Arbeit will dazu skizzen-
haft methodische Ansätze explorieren.
Fragestellung
Das Projekt untersucht das Verhältnis von Präventionsverhalten und Präven-
tionsdefinition bei Mitarbeitern von Präventionsforschungsorganisationen. Der 
Präventionsbegriff (lat. Praevenire: zuvorkommen, verhüten) beruht auf der An-
nahme, dass Gesundheitsexperten oder Patienten Wissen über statistische Kor-
relationen – wenn nicht gar kausale Wirkungsketten – über den Zusammenhang heutigen Verhaltens mit zukünf-
tigen Zuständen ihrer körperlichen und geistigen Gesundheit verfügen. Prävention ist dann die Handlung, die 
beruhend auf diesem Wissen Verhalten in der Gegenwart stabilisiert oder Verhaltensänderungen bewirkt, um 
nachteilige Wirkungen für zukünftige Gesundheitszustände zu verhindern. 
Zwei Probleme verhindern jedoch Präventionserfolg: Erstens ist das verfügbare wissenschaftliche Wissen über den 
Zusammenhang von gesundem Verhalten und zukünftigem Gesund-
heitszustand widersprüchlich und wechselnd, was zu einem Vertrau-
ensverlust in eben dieses Wissen führt, zweitens ist auch bei Annahme 
bekannter Kausalzusammenhänge der Grad an präventivem Verhalten 
für spezifische Personen daraus a) nicht wissenschaftlich abzuleiten 
b) aus Ego-Sicht der Prävenienden nicht ableitbar und c) konkurriert 
er mit einer Vielzahl anderer lebensweltlicher Anreize. „Prävention“ 
ist aus Ego-Sicht deshalb ein Verhalten, das statt anderen Handlungen 
in hypostasierter Salutogenese resultiert. Daraus folgt die Frage, wer 
mit welchen Begründungen in welchen Zusammenhängen präveniert 
oder nicht, was folgende Unterfragen impliziert: 
1. Wann ist ein Verhalten für einen bestimmten Probanden salutogen oder nicht? 
2. Wann ruft ein Proband verfügbares (wissenschaftliches) Wissen ab um sein Verhalten als salutogen oder risi-
kobehaftet zu beschreiben? 
3. Mit welchen Gründen werden eigene Verhaltensweisen als salutogen oder risikobehaftet beschrieben?
4. Wie korrelieren diese Fragestellungen mit Vorstellungen über eine persönliche Zukunft und die Verfügbarkeit 
und Verlängerbarkeit des eigenen Lebens? 
5. Wie verhalten sich die Antworten auf diese Fragen zur 
eigenen Position zum Gesundheitssystem?
Methode:
Das Sample besteht aus 24 Probanden: 13 Personen aus 
dem Institut für europäische Ethnologie, 11 Personen aus 
dem Institut für allgemeine Medizin an der Charité; 8 Pro-
banden sind männlich, 16 weiblich. Die Probanden wurden 
durch einen Aufruf und direkte Anfrage von Probanden an 
den beiden Instituten rekrutiert und absolvierten einmalig 
den Improvidential-12©-Test. 
Der Improvidential-12©-Test ist ein Testpaket, das spezi-
fisch zur Untersuchung der Selbstprävention entwickelt 
wurde. Der Test enthält eine Reihe von Fragepaketen und 
Übungen, die in vorgegebener Reihenfolge durchgeführt 
werden. Die Probanden werden bei der Absolvierung der 
Übungen fotografiert, teilweise gefilmt und der Ton wird 
aufgezeichnet. Im konkreten Falle wurde das Testlabor in 
Nebenräumen der beteiligten Institute eingerichtet und 
bestand aus einem Tisch für das Ausfüllen der Datenblät-
ter, einer mechanischen Schreibmaschine zur Erfassung der 
Daten, sowie einer Reihe von Objekten, die für die einzel-
nen Übungen gebraucht wurden (Abb. 1-2).
Der Improvidential-12©-Test umfasst folgende Schritte:
1. Consummatio: Die Probanden wurden mit einem Buffett 
von assortierten Konsumationsmöglichkeiten (Wasser, Wein, 
Schnaps, Essen, Salami, Brot, Kuchen, Apfel, Schokoriegel, Zi-
garetten) konfrontiert und aufgefordert, nach Belieben davon 
zu konsumieren, mit der Versicherung, im Rahmen des Tests 
seien auch Übertretungen geltender organisatorischer Re-
geln erlaubt (Rauchverbot in den Gebäuden, Alkoholverbot 
am Arbeitsplatz). Damit wurde getestet, ob eine temptatio 
subitum mit Präventionsvorstellungen und/oder dem eigenen 
Rechtsbewusstsein gegenüber organisatorischen Leitlininien kollidiert (Abb. 3)
2. Lesen, kommentieren und unterschreiben des informed consent (siehe Abb.4). Der informed consent be-
ruht auf der Annahme, dass die Testsituation auf Gegenseitig-
keit beruht. Das Ausfüllen des informed consent führte des-
halb zu Diskussionen über die gegenseitigen Vorannahmen 
und die Wahrnehmung des Settings. (Abb. 4)
3. Blut nehmen: Den Probanden wurde ein Tropfen Blut ent-
nommen und direkt vom Finger auf ein Blatt Papier aufge-
tragen. Den Probanden wurde freigestellt, ob sie sich selbst 
stechen wollen oder ob dies die Experimentatoren durchfüh-
ren sollen. Die Blutentnahme wurde begründet, sie geschehe 
„für die Kunst“. Das Blut nehmen diente zur Stimulation einer 
Diskussion über professionelle Zuständigkeiten in Bezug auf 
körperliche Eingriffe und zur Diskussion über Autorität und 
Legitimation von Handlungen im Namen von Kunst. (Abb. 5)
4. Abfragen des Datenblatts: Erfassung einer Rei-
he standardisierter und halb-standardisierter Daten 
über das Alltagsleben, das salutogene Verhalten der Pro-
banden und das Verhalten zu ihrer eigenen Zukunft 
(siehe Abb. 6). 
5. Der Accip-praeter-Seilspring-Test: Die Probanden wur-
den aufgefordert, Lebensmittel, Medikamente, Drogen und 
Getränke aufzuzählen, die sie innerhalb der letzen drei Tage 
zu sich nahmen, und während dieser Tätigkeit zu springseilen. Die Zeit des Seilspringenss richtete sich nach der 
Länge der Aufzählung. Den Probanden wurde vor und nach dem Seilspringen der Puls gemessen.
6. Lacrimatio: Die Probanden wurden gefragt, wann sie das letzte Mal weinten. 
7. Soft-Toy-extended-SEIQuoL-DW (STe-SEIQuoL-DW): Die Probanden führten zuerst den standardisierten 
SeiQuoL-DW test durch. Der Seiquol-DW ist eine Messung der Lebensqualität aus subjektiver Sicht. Er besteht 
aus folgenden 3 Schritten:
a) Der Proband nennt frei 5 Lebensbereiche, die für sein Leben am wichtigsten sind (Bsp: Arbeit, Squash, Familie, 
Ferien, Katze).
b) Der Proband gibt auf einer Skala von 0-100 die momentane Lebensqualität 
pro Bereich an.
c) Der Proband gibt mittels einer Scheibe, die fünf beliebig gegeneinander ver-
schiebbare Kreissegmente enthält, die relative Bedeutung der Lebensbereiche 
zueinander an. (Abb. 7)
Der hier erstmal angewendete STe-SEIQuoL-DW erweitert den Test durch 
Schritt 4:
e) Der Proband ordnet jedem Lebensbereich ein Stofftier zu (aus einer Kollek-
tion von 30 verschiedenen Exemplaren) und begründet seine Auswahl. 
8. Speculatio: Dem Proband wird ein Spiegel in die Hand gegeben und gefragt: 
Wenn sie in den Spiegel schauen, sehen sie eine Person: Was mögen sie an die-
ser Person? Was mögen sie an dieser Person nicht?
9. Circ-Am-Test: Der Proband hat 30 sec. Zeit um die Vornamen so vieler Freunde wie möglich aufzuzählen.
10. Futurum Exactum: Der Proband wählt aus einer Kartei mit 24 Fragen drei Karten nach seiner Wahl aus und 
beantwortet die Fragen frei und handschriftlich (Abb. 8).
11. End-of-Life-Prevention Questionnaire (EoLPQ): Der EoLPQ ist ein semi-standardisiertes Instrument zur 
Erhebung des Verhältnisses von subjektiver Lebenserwar-
tung und salutogenem Verhalten. Er umfasst folgende 5 
Fragen, die frei beantwortet werden:
a) Woran werden sie sterben?
b) Wann werden sie sterben?
c) Was tun sie, damit sie länger leben?
d) Was tun sie nicht, damit sie länger leben?
e) Wenn sie älter sein werden, werden sie dann gedacht 
haben, dass sie genug getan haben, damit sie länger le-
ben?
12. DrawHealth: DrawHealth ist ein explorativer Test zur 
Erfassung des subjektiven Verhältnisses des Probanden 
zum Gesundheitssystem. Der Proband erhält ein Blatt Pa-
pier (Recyclingpapier, A4) und einen Stift (Kugelschreiber, blau) und wird aufgefordert frei eine Zeichnung seines 
Verhältnisses zum Gesundheitssystem zu zeichnen. Anschliessend wird der Proband aufgefordert, die Zeichnung 
zu kommentieren.
 
Die Ergebnisse der Studie sind auf den folgenden 15 Postern wiederge-
geben.
Die stygma-syblings danken folgenden Personen und Institutionen: allen anonymen Probanden, sowie Falk Blask für die Schreibmaschine, Jörg Pott-
hast für die Hantel, Florian Japp für Hilfe, Michi Knecht und Ev Prett für das Seil, dem Institut für Konservierung und Restaurierung der Universität 
für Angewandte Kunst, Wien, insbesondere Gerhard Ramsebner für Reprotechnik und fotografischen Support; Sonja Palfner für die Waage, dem Zür-
cher Brockenhaus für Stofftiere, sowie Stefan Beck, Jörg Niewöhner , Christoph Heintze und Frauke Dohle für organisatorische Hilfe.
Die Studie wurde von den stygma-syblings im Auftrag des Forschungsschwerpunkts „Präventives Selbst“ des Instituts für europäische Ethnologie der 
Humboldt Universität zu Berlin erarbeitet und in Kooperation mit dem Institut für allgemeine Medizin an der Charité Berlin durchgeführt.
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Fig. 3.6  Example poster based on flying animals (image: Bernd Kräftner)
Fig. 3.7  Example poster based on blood (image: Bernd Kräftner)
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Both posters refer back to ancient forms of prevention and of forecasting, 
namely those of haruspicy (divination by entrails) and augury (divination by 
the patterns made by birds in flight) (Cicero 1923). Forecasting the future of 
our bodies, exhorting ourselves to live longer and better, is now framed in a 
normative terminology of modern facts. We can analyse this terminology and 
critique it as a form of governmentality. As an incubation, we chose to transform 
it and bring it back, so highlighting parallels with earlier ways of dealing with the 
problem of forecasting bodily futures. We returned to the idea that the future 
of our bodies can be found in our blood. Yet in our version, this future is not 
found in a blood test, but in the appearance of blood itself.
Onto these two kinds of divination we plotted the various kinds of data 
gathered by our experiments, namely the qualitative answers given to various 
questionnaires, the outcomes of SEIQoL, and the drawings the participants 
were asked to do to explain the relationship between them and the medical 
system. The data then invent the social in yet another way: rather than fol-
lowing established routes of either aggregating data and losing the individual, 
or focusing on individuals at the expense of aggregation, new social bodies 
were presented, in which numbers and qualitative data emerged as collective 
divinations.
Conclu s ion :  When  Not  to  Do  Incubat ions
As with other powerful technologies, there are risks and side effects inherent 
in the use of incubations. There are also many conditions for which the use of 
an incubation is at best pointless and at worst dangerous. It may seem from the 
above that incubations can be used to invent the social anywhere and at any 
time. But incubations are fraught with problems, and these should not be omit-
ted. Also, inventing the social is not a goal in itself. Invention is not better per se 
than non-invention. The idea of inventing the social runs the risk of following 
a modernist logic of celebrating invention for itself.
But apart from the organisational, reputational and practical difficulties, 
as related throughout this text, there are also a number of occasions when 
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incubations are not very helpful. Incubations are needed when situations 
appear to be stuck in routines, and when ‘more of the same’ would not help 
to produce particular outcomes. Here, incubations are the perfect means 
of translating a situation and coming up with new forms of describing and 
representing such situations. However, if a phenomenon is new, unknown, 
or of such a large scale as to require an overview, then an incubation is of 
little help.
Incubations work best when applied to stable and continuous situations, 
involving persons who know what they want, and to organisations that 
function smoothly, but are in danger of becoming stuck in routines. Here, 
incubations can create new translations and transformations that allow for 
enlightenment and serendipity. If a situation, an organisation or the persons 
involved are highly unstable, an incubation is of little help. If we are confronted 
with a social dispute and one side needs help in the form of arguments 
(textual, visual or otherwise), an incubation operates as a detour and may 
merely exacerbate the situation. If a situation is very fraught with internal 
and unresolved difficulties, unless all participants agree to it, an incubation 
may similarly make matters worse. Also, an incubation is not a mediation or 
a form of therapy, and the people doing them are not mediators or arbiters 
for conflicts. The use of incubations happens at your own risk. But do not 
be scared of it.
Note s
1 Today, business incubators are a conceptual legacy of baby incubators: instead of a 
machine, these are organisations to stabilise and nurture a fragile object.
2 For example, ethnographers of professions, such as doctors or economists, give 
professionals the tools to understand themselves as professionals, who then may use 
these descriptions for their own purposes.
3 The questions are influenced by the famous questionnaire of Max Frisch (Frisch 1974). 
It contains questions such as ‘Would you prefer to have died, or live on as an animal? 
Which one?’
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4
TURNING CONTROVERSIES 
INTO QUESTIONS OF 
DESIGN:  PROTOTYPING 
ALTERNATIVE METRICS FOR 
HEATHROW AIRPORT
Christian Nold
It is difficult for a measure to command public confidence when it effectively tells people 
living in places like Barnes, Fulham, Putney, Ealing, Chelsea, Stockwell and Windsor 
that they are not affected by noise because they live outside the Heathrow contour
Airportwatch 2013
I n troduct ion
public controversies about techno-scientific issues such as food 
safety and environmental pollution have been extensively studied by scholars 
of science, technology and society. Classic work in this field has highlighted 
the political and epistemic aspects of such controversies, focusing on the ways 
in which knowledge becomes political when disagreements about seemingly 
technical issues like the above are made public through media reporting, activist 
mobilisation, court hearings, government consultations and so on (Nelkin 1997; 
Wynne 1992). More recently, authors such as Braun & Whatmore (2010) and 
Marres (2012) have insisted on the important role that materials and technolo-
gies play in the enactment of controversies about techno-scientific issues in social 
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and public life. Building upon this literature, this chapter offers methodological 
and theoretical reflections on the project of turning public controversies into 
occasions for and questions of design. These reflections are the outcome of a 
three-year-long research project that investigated and engaged with a controversy 
over aircraft noise at Heathrow airport in London (Nold 2017). I describe the 
process of coming to understand the infrastructures that were at stake in the 
Heathrow controversy, and of designing prototypes to support the formation 
of new socio-technical collectives around the issues. I argue that such design-
led approaches have the potential not only to help us understand but also to 
intervene in public controversies about science and technology.
Heathrow a s  a  Controver s y
Heathrow is the world’s third largest airport, with 73.4 million passengers pass-
ing through it every year (Heathrow Airport 2015), making London the city 
with the highest aircraft noise exposure in Europe (Mayor of London 2013). 
Yet there have been many calls to expand the air travel capacity in the south 
east of England, and in 2013 the Airports Commission was set up to establish 
which of the three London airports should be expanded. In 2015 the commis-
sion recommended the expansion of Heathrow with a third runway, and this 
was expected to generate £147 billion in additional Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) over the next sixty years (Airports Commission 2015). Yet expansion 
would bring more flights and road traffic, and more people would be affected 
by aircraft noise. The issue of the airport’s impacts is highly emotive, and it 
was and is being kept in the public eye by, among other means, ongoing media 
reporting of studies on air quality, health impacts and economic benefits. In 
many of these studies, the issue of Heathrow’s expansion is framed in terms of a 
trade-off between addressing the ‘annoyance and disturbance suffered by some 
local residents as a result of aircraft noise, while at the same time continuing to 
maximise the social and economic benefits that the airport delivers to the local 
community and the country as a whole’ (Heathrow Airport Limited 2013: 7). 
While the Airports Commission has recommended the expansion of Heathrow, 
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the government has repeatedly postponed its final decision, since it is seen as 
a ‘toxic dilemma’ (Kuenssberg 2015) that is likely to alienate large parts of the 
national electorate.
My own involvement with the Heathrow controversy started in 2012 in the 
context of an EU-funded engineering research project. This project distributed 
cheap environmental sensors to members of the public, who were encouraged 
to collect noise pollution data in response to the European Noise Directive 
(European Parliament 2002), which requires the production of EU-wide noise 
maps. Heathrow airport was one of the case study sites, and my role in the project 
was to facilitate the use of a smartphone app for gathering noise data with local 
residents, and to manage interactions with local groups. During the project both 
the participants and the researchers were frustrated by the usage-protocol of 
the smartphone application, which was not suited to capturing aircraft noise, 
and by the fact that the device was not sophisticated enough to generate results 
that would be comparable with the official noise data. When the project came 
to an end, I spent two years working in the area and, having become engaged 
by the issue of Heathrow expansion, I wanted to continue working with the 
controversy. During the EU-funded project, some of the stakeholders, such as 
the airport authorities, local councils and residents had requested static noise 
monitors that could be widely deployed across the area to track changes in flight 
patterns and produce data that could be compared with the official dataset. This 
request was not considered to be part of the EU project’s goals, and was not 
fulfilled. However, it gave me a concrete starting point for my own research, as 
well as raising a number of challenging questions: who should I be designing 
noise monitors for? What exactly should the devices do, and what contribution 
should they make in relation to the noise controversy?
I n f ra s tructur ing  Controver s i e s
Engaging with the Heathrow controversy through monitoring devices required 
a way of understanding it as a site for design. I therefore start this section by 
discussing work in participatory design that engages with social studies of 
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science and technology and public controversies. Participatory design in the 
Scandinavian tradition defines itself as a shift away from designers as experts 
towards the wider participation of users in the design process (Ehn 1988). 
In this tradition, designers have sought inspiration from the STS concept of 
‘infrastructure’ (Star and Ruhleder 1996), which moves away from mechanistic 
visions of technology as tubes and pipes, towards infrastructure as a connec-
tive resource that links people, organisations, standards and ‘object worlds’. 
In this vision ‘infrastructure is fundamentally and always a relation, never a 
thing’ (Star and Ruhleder 1994: 253; emphasis in original). From this vantage 
point, building new infrastructures involves coordinating and facilitating the 
‘demands of multiple groups and making connections between them possible’ 
(Neumann and Star 1996: 234). Infrastructure allows different practices to 
coexist: ‘the cook considers the water system a piece of working infrastruc-
ture integral to making dinner; for the city planner, it becomes a variable in a 
complex equation’ (Star and Ruhleder 1996: 113). Once built, infrastructure 
fades into the background, and it becomes the researcher’s role to carry out 
an ‘infrastructural inversion’, to bring it back into the foreground, in order for 
it to become investigable.
Participatory designers have adapted this concept of infrastructure into 
an active method of ‘infrastructuring’ (Karasti and Syrjänen 2004; Ehn 2008; 
Björgvinsson et al. 2010; Hillgren et al. 2011; Björgvinsson et al. 2012; Le Dantec 
2012; DiSalvo et al. 2014). This method embeds designers within a community 
in order to actively support this community over an extended period of time 
(Karasti 2014). Instead of the more clearly defined infrastructures of workplaces 
on which Star and Ruhleder’s work focuses, the design method of infrastruc-
turing targets social and political collectives assembling around issues, a focus 
inspired by Actor-Network Theory (Latour and Weibel 2005; Marres 2007). 
For example, Ehn (2008) talks about designing in order to target an object of 
concern, which would bring together a group of participants around an issue. 
Moreover, Disalvo et al. argue that design artefacts can ‘expose and re-imagine 
constraints and parameters surrounding issues’ (2014: 205), as well as function 
as ‘scaffolds’ for the ‘affective bonds that are necessary for the construction of 
publics’ (Le Dantec and DiSalvo 2013: 260). So, while Star and Ruhleder’s 
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notion of infrastructure is attuned to organisational and professional contacts, 
participatory designers are especially interested in infrastructure defined as a 
public and political affair. Yet I argue that participatory design has placed too 
much emphasis on the way infrastructures create connections between humans, 
and not enough on the way these infrastructures constrain and reinforce prac-
tices. For example, when creating a mobile phone communication system for 
a homeless shelter, the designers conceived the staff and residents as separate 
publics with different issues of concern (Le Dantec et al. 2011). At the end of 
the project, the designers discovered that their system had created two differ-
ent issue outcomes. It had highlighted an issue of accountability for the staff, 
whilst for the residents it had organised their household chores. By choosing 
to situate the infrastructuring design process within an existing institution, it 
became difficult to transcend the underlying dynamics of the homeless shelter. 
In fact, the asymmetrical system the designers built seems to have reinforced 
the existing relations and distinctions between staff and residents. In order to 
turn controversies into questions of design, one needs to engage critically with 
the existing elements that comprise a controversy, and not only to build new 
relations.
In order to expand the notion of infrastructuring to address the composition 
of controversies, I turn to a concept of ‘scaling’ taken from early Actor-Network 
Theory (Callon and Latour 1981). This concept offers an alternative approach 
to the structure-agency distinction that assumes a hierarchy between a macro-
actor such as the state and a micro-actor such as an individual. Callon and Latour 
argue that macro-actors are not innately large and important, but that their 
‘size’ is the result of processes of enrolling many human and non-human actors 
in order to increase their size. In their words: ‘we cannot distinguish between 
macro-actors (institutions, organisations, social classes, parties, states) and 
micro-actors (individuals, groups, families) on the basis of their dimensions, 
since they are all, we might say, the “same size”, or rather since size is what is 
primarily at stake in their struggles it is also, therefore, their most important 
result’ (Callon and Latour 1981: 279; emphasis in original). I argue that this 
concept of re-scaling actors through association adds three important points 
to the concept of infrastructuring social and political collectives.
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First, it suggests that the size of an existing institution might be unrelated 
to its importance within a specific controversy. This means that participatory 
designers do not necessarily have to engage with existing institutions as gate-
keepers for defining the scope or boundary of an issue. Second, it suggests that 
by assembling human and nonhuman actors into infrastructures, participatory 
designers are involved in a constitutive process of scaling that creates new onto-
logical entities and realities in the world. Finally, the implication is that such 
an ontological approach changes the role of the designer, thus requiring them 
to make new kinds of choices. The role becomes one of ‘immersing oneself in 
the networks described and searching for what is or can be achieved by new 
interlockings of artefacts and human work’ (Berg 1998: 482). This brings with it 
what the anthropologist Mol calls an ‘ontological politics’ (1999) that involves 
identifying whether it is possible to build alternatives and develop ways to live 
with the infrastructures that cannot be changed. Designing thus involves political 
and ethical choices that will result in the inclusion and displacement of actors 
within the composition of new infrastructures.
The  I n f ra s tructur e  o f  th e 
H eathrow Controver s y
How are these approaches and the concept of infrastructuring social and 
political collectives applicable to the Heathrow controversy? If one looks at this 
controversy through the lens of a ‘material’ definition of infrastructure, one sees 
only aircraft, acoustic pressure and measurement devices. If one looks through 
a purely ‘political’ lens, one sees politicians, industries and residents. By apply-
ing the concept of relational infrastructure, however, one sees new connections 
across the material and political registers, such as techniques and metrics that 
mediate between the aircraft, local residents and the legislative authorities by 
measuring and governing the impact of the airport. A discussion of the issue of 
Heathrow noise pollution can help to make this clear.
Aircraft noise emerged as an issue at Heathrow with the introduction of 
turbo-jet aircraft in 1958, and it occasioned a survey of the impact of aircraft 
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sound on humans (MIL Research Limited 1961). This was the first of three 
significant UK-based studies in which standardised interviews of residents 
were carried out and compared with the measurements of acoustic energy. 
Residents were asked how much the aircraft noise bothered them: ‘very much, 
moderately, a little, not at all’, and the responses were compared against local 
acoustic energy measurements. The data were used to create a dose-response 
relationship that was intended to predict community annoyance at increasing 
noise levels. While it is acknowledged that these metrics are poor predictors 
of individual or group annoyance, their goal is equity and a consistent noise 
policy for the ‘general population’ (Miedema and Oudshoorn 2001). The 
result of the 1961 study was the creation of the Noise and Number Index 
(NNI), a metric that has three threshold points denoting high, moderate and 
low community annoyance (Civil Aviation Authority 1981). Using models 
of sound dispersion, these threshold levels were then plotted on maps as 
exposure contour bands radiating out from the runways, effectively defining 
the people living within each contour as experiencing a set level of annoy-
ance. The NNI metric was designed for ‘estimating the total disturbance at 
the time of the surveys and a way of estimating the disturbance resulting 
from a change in the scale or pattern of airport operations’ (Brooker et al. 
1985: 1; emphasis in original). Its goal was thus as a policy instrument for 
forecasting annoyance, and for the last fifty years, the metric and its succes-
sor, LAeq, have been used as a calculative infrastructure to determine how 
many people are affected by the noise of Heathrow. People living within the 
modelled noise contour bands are defined as differently affected by noise in 
order to provide them with commensurate levels of financial compensation 
and subsidised sound insulation, while those living outside the bands are not 
compensated. Crucially, the number of affected people is also used as the 
basis for future decisions about the airport. The 2015 Airports Commission 
report (Airports Commission 2015) used the number of people within the 
57 LAeq contour as the key indicator of local impact when comparing the 
different airport options and when it recommended building the third runway 
at Heathrow. This diagram describes the way noise metrics are assembled 
and function:
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survey responses + acoustic MeasureMents =  
annoyance contours > nuMber of people affected  
> governance decisions
One way to understand the construction and function of community annoyance 
in scalar terms is by using the metaphor of the Leviathan as taken up by Callon 
and Latour (1981). The authors use this metaphor to describe the way collec-
tive capacities comes to be consolidated within a single entity. The Leviathan 
represents the power of a king, and is visually represented as a crowned giant 
that is physically assembled from the bodies of all his subjects. Callon and 
Latour proposed that this visual image of the Leviathan can be interpreted as 
an allegory for the constitutive power of macro-actors. In their words: ‘The 
construction of this artificial body is calculated in such a way that the absolute 
sovereign is nothing other than the sum of the multitude’s wishes’ (Callon and 
Latour 1981: 278). However, while Callon and Latour use the metaphor to 
understand the capacities of social actors (such as scientists and engineers) 
I argue that community annoyance can be conceived as a Leviathan figure 
insofar as it acts as ‘spokesman, mask-bearer and amplifier’ for the collective of 
humans living under the flight path at Heathrow. Crucially, the local residents 
are extremely frustrated with the way community annoyance speaks on their 
behalf. Here is one resident’s response to the Airports Commission: ‘Heathrow 
are exploiting the 57dB noise threshold to make it look like there is a reduction 
in noise with an expanded airport. The reality of course is that noise continues 
to be hugely disturbing to many people considerably below that threshold, me 
included. Where I currently live, whilst better than Kew (hence I moved here) 
and just outside the 57dB contour is still disturbing enough to wake my children 
regularly’ (Airports Commission 2013: 2).
We could say of this contested quality of the annoyance metric that it 
functions as an ‘infrastructure’ of the Heathrow controversy, since it connects 
aircraft, residents and politicians, and plays a key role in decision-making. Yet 
this connection is asymmetrical, since this annoyance spokesperson is used to 
dismiss individual resident’s claims of affectedness and to disqualify them from 
being personally consulted. The 57dB threshold figures as an important actor in 
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the narratives of the opponents to expansion, yet the metric is largely invisible 
within the broader public debate about the controversy. There was only a brief 
period in which the metric became a publically visible actor, and this was as a 
result of a controversy around a particular noise impact study. In 2007, the major, 
Government-sponsored ANASE study (cost £2,000,000) found that commu-
nity annoyance started at much lower noise levels than identified in the 1985 
study (Le Masurier et al. 2007). These findings suggested that the Heathrow 
annoyance contours should extend much further and envelop a much larger 
number of people. This was seized on by the media and opponents of the airport 
who argued that the ‘true number affected by Heathrow operations is around 
1m[illion] – four times the figure implied by the 57dB contour’ (Airportwatch 
2013: 3). The outcry increased when the ANASE study was officially dismissed 
for methodological discrepancies. Despite the fact that many high-profile politi-
cians, local councils and pressure groups argued strongly against this dismissal, 
and pointed to the problems of the 57dB contour, the official legislative standard 
has remained at the level of the older 1985 study.
How is it possible that, despite the loss of public confidence in it, the metric 
has remained in place? The technical acoustics literature, from which this and 
related metrics are derived, is actually ambivalent about them, arguing that 
the variations among noise metrics are ‘more a matter of convenience than 
any reflection on the strength of any assumed underlying dose-effect relation-
ships’ (Flindell 2003: 36). This quote suggests that these metrics are not simple 
empirical facts in or about the world, but pragmatic, or ‘interested’ tools that 
enable convenient management of the controversy. In the case of Heathrow, 
large amounts of data have been accumulated using a single metric, making 
comparisons between different operational proposals simple and convenient. 
While the above controversy around the ANASE study allowed the 57dB 
annoyance contour to briefly come to the foreground, the media’s main focus 
is on the political choices that are presented as either ideological or pragmatic 
trade-offs between economic benefits and alienating certain voters. I suggest 
that the airport opponents’ lack of success in challenging the metric may be due 
to the fact that they have been unable to politicise the lack of care involved in 
the way community annoyance has been measured.
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Yet there are some interesting aspects to the dismissal of the ANASE study 
that point to an alternative method for intervening in the controversy. The official 
reason given for the rejection of the study cited specific procedures conducted 
during the interviews. The reviewers of the study discussed a number of meth-
odological issues but focused on the interview process that took place in people’s 
homes and included portable audio speakers. They argued that, ‘the act of setting 
up and calibrating equipment would almost certainly have enabled respondents 
to deduce that the study was about attitudes to noise. Furthermore, the fact that 
the social survey sites selected were located away from other sources of noise 
may have enabled some respondents to conclude that the study pertained to 
aircraft noise’ (Civil Aviation Authority and Bureau Vertias 2007: 16). The 
reviewers thus concluded that, ‘there is a risk that the social survey results may 
have been contaminated by respondent bias. That is, respondents may have used 
the opportunity to voice their opinion on the Government’s aviation policy 
and may have either deliberately or sub-consciously exaggerated their reaction 
to aircraft noise in the way they answered the question’ (ibid.). The reviewers’ 
argument is that the presence of the audio speakers triggered the respondents 
into thinking the study was about aircraft noise and aviation policy and that, 
because of this, the residents exaggerated their responses.
The ANASE authors published a report refuting these points. In regards 
to the loudspeakers they suggest these ‘were not in fact used until after the 
key annoyance questions had been dealt with’ (Ian Flindell & Associates and 
MVA Consultancy 2013: 12). Yet more broadly, they argue that the issue of the 
speakers is part of a broader disagreement with the reviewers about the reality 
of annoyance and how it should be staged. They argue that the ‘review group’s 
comments suggest a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of noise 
annoyance, that it is somehow some kind of underlying and fixed physiological or 
neurological response to noise which is always the same regardless of any changes 
in attitudes and opinions in the people concerned’ (ibid.). The authors suggest 
that it is impossible to isolate annoyance from the politics of aviation policy and 
that it would be ‘impossible to ever find a “good” time to be able to carry out a 
supposedly unbiased aircraft noise questionnaire survey’ (ibid. 11; emphasis in 
original). What is at stake is an ontological disagreement about different ways 
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of staging community annoyance, as neurological and disembodied, on the 
one hand, or as pragmatically embodied with sound equipment and situated 
within political arguments, on the other. The controversy around the ANASE 
study reminds us that there are many practical choices to be taken when curat-
ing situations in which people can provide evidence of their experience. These 
include choices about the context in which residents are asked questions and 
the physical props that are present during the interview, as well as the manner in 
which the questions are asked. If we go along with the idea that the respondents 
were strongly affected by the mere presence of the speakers, then this suggests 
that the articulation of annoyance may be approached as a creative occasion for 
public experimentation, one in which a multiplicity of different elements might 
be introduced to generate new articulations of annoyance. The end effect would 
be that, rather than having a single way of defining and measuring annoyance, 
there would be multiple competing compositions.
This episode shows that there is not one but several controversies around 
noise at Heathrow: a media controversy focused on economic trade-offs, a 
failed political controversy about the number of people affected by noise, and 
an ontological controversy surrounding how to articulate annoyance as a matter 
of concern. Targeting the ontological controversy raises the question of how a 
more suitable annoyance metric could be created, what elements it should consist 
of, and how such a design process could be publicly legitimated. Interestingly, 
a number of acousticians who have worked with social survey methods for 
decades are now proposing a shift towards spontaneous self-reporting of com-
plaints by residents as a way of bringing back transparency and legitimacy into 
noise governance. Fidell argues that noise complaints were abandoned in the 
1970s because they ‘were difficult to process and systematically compare, largely 
inaccessible to researchers, and generally awkward to interpret’ (Fidell 2003: 
3012). He argues that the growing use of distributed, networked computing 
devices is making it possible for geographically tagged noise complaints to 
function as a new metric. Adopting such a system would shift annoyance from 
a given neurological concept-measure into an active process of resident par-
ticipation. The key aspect of this shift in register is that it turns annoyance into 
a phenomenon partly dependent on curation processes, and hence involving 
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questions of design, which invariably raises a multitude of practical questions 
around how to stage annoyance.
I n f ra s tructur ing  H eathrow
My investigation of how to turn the Heathrow controversy into a site for partici-
patory design has, then, yielded an answer to the question of who to design for. 
Instead of setting out to create a project for a particular group of residents or an 
institution handling the issue, my aim was to carry out participatory design with 
the infrastructure of the controversy itself. Rather than being accountable to a 
human client, my task was to become responsive to the issue itself. My research 
also provided me with a design target in the form of the annoyance metric, as 
well as a methodology, namely that of infrastructuring social-political collec-
tives by using ‘micro/macro prototyping’ techniques (Nold 2015). My goal 
was to build an alternative Leviathan, one that differed in crucial respects from 
how the annoyance metric composed the public. My alternative ‘body politic’ 
would be composed of new entities and would ideally be able to compete with 
the existing metric in a kind of robot battle over who has the right to wield the 
authority of collective experience. To begin this process of re-composition, I 
decided to create a series of design prototypes consisting of custom hardware 
and software to test with the interested parties.
My prototypes were intended as material-semiotic devices that are simul-
taneously things as well as concepts in order to set up new propositions about 
the relationship between aircraft, residents and governance. Each prototype 
was a composition that proposed different ways in which the noise issue might 
be handled by inserting or removing material, symbolic or computational ele-
ments. The prototypes have names that identify the specific propositions they 
present, and this reinforces the notion that each prototype is a unique actor 
with its own distinct voice. The aim of the prototypes was not to seek approval 
for the designs but to allow the participants to experience and articulate new 
infrastructural compositions and to build alternative networks of human and 
nonhuman actors that might challenge the existing annoyance metric. I took 
106
inventing the social
the four initial prototypes to potential partners who might want to join the 
process, such as the airport administration, local councils and residents. During 
the meetings and workshops, the prototypes were used as props and demon-
stration devices. The following vignette describes one of these workshops at a 
community centre located under the Heathrow flight path, with nine residents 
who did not know each other beforehand. During the workshop, planes could 
be heard overhead at regular intervals.
P rototyp e  1 :  ‘ I  S p e ak  Your  F e e l i ng s ’
The first prototype (Fig. 4.1) samples the voltage sensed by a microphone 
and translates this into a phrase displayed on a LCD screen. Instead of decibel 
numbers, the screen displays sound level using a scale of emotive words: quiet, 
audible, loud, very loud, extremely loud, and painful. The words on the screen 
Fig. 4.1  Photograph of the ‘I speak your feelings’ prototype (photo: Christian Nold)
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change continuously in response to sudden sounds. The prototype uses the 
dose-response logic implied by the community annoyance metric and turns 
it into a tangible object that can be placed on a coffee table. The machine 
experiences sound pressure on behalf of humans, which is transformed into an 
emotive language without people being involved. The prototype is designed to 
performatively highlight the simplistic relationship between measured acoustic 
pressure and annoyance level that the current metric relies on. This diagram 
represents the composition and function of the prototype:
sound sensor > translation into annoyance Words  
> lcd display
When the device was presented to the workshop group it acted as a catalyst for 
the participants to talk about the way noise affects them in their daily lives, such 
as, ‘I don’t want to cut myself off, which is really what noise is about, it is cutting 
you off ’. They identified elements that the current LAeq metric does not capture, 
such as the interval between flights and the harmonics of noise, with someone 
arguing that ‘it’s not just decibels, there is something else in there as well’. The 
participants discussed ‘a more complex device which will analyse the sound 
and tell you about the interesting element of the sound harmonics and different 
pitches’. In addition, some suggested alternative ways of providing evidence of 
their experience, such as by measuring their physiological responses to noise. 
Yet two of the participants seemed frustrated: ‘I think it would be completely 
chaotic if you just had people’s feelings about it. What would you do with that 
data? You have got to have an objective reference’. Their argument was that ‘for 
the purposes of any kind of campaign it’s got to be objective. So, its amounts of 
particles per million, it’s got to be measurable rather than […] smelling’. At this 
point another participant interjected that social policy uses anecdotal stories as 
evidence in conjunction with statistical data.
During the workshop, the reductive emotive words displayed by the proto-
type seemed to spur the participants into describing the limitations of the cur-
rent noise metrics when it comes to their ability to encompass their experience 
of noise. This triggered a process of reflection on different ways of evidencing 
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the impacts of noise. While it was widely agreed that evidence was needed, 
there was disagreement as to which method or technology would provide the 
greatest political legitimacy for campaigning. Yet the participant who was most 
vocal about the need for an objective reference said, ‘is it really worth debating 
this? I mean people have different opinions, why don’t people contribute what 
they contribute from their perspectives’. He followed this with an enthusiastic 
exclamation of ‘take it all’. The main observation I took from this prototype 
interaction was the pragmatic suggestion of combining different evidential 
methods in order to build a cohesive collective around the issue.
P rototyp e  2 :  ‘ I  D i s p lay  No i s e  Pub l i c ly ’
The second prototype (Fig. 4.2) consists of a mock-up of a large noise meter 
display mounted on the exterior walls of a building. The device illuminates 
when a specified noise level is exceeded. The prototype investigates where the 
issue of noise should be located and whom it should address. It is based on the 
observation that the geographical area around Heathrow looks like many other 
suburban areas in Britain, with the built environment not providing any visual 
reference to the noise overhead. Many of the residents I had been in contact with 
talked about aircraft noise in the context of their private homes, and described 
its effects in a solitary and personal way. As a provocation, this prototype locates 
the issue of noise outdoors within public space. In the workshop, I introduced 
the prototype as something that could be mounted on the participants’ houses as 
a way of engaging their neighbours, and I described a scenario in which a plane 
coming in to land at night would see the ground light up as it flew overhead. 
The composition and logic of the device is as follows:
sound sensor > outdoor Warning display  
> addressing a proxiMate public
During the workshop, it quickly emerged that the participants were excited by the 
device, yet no-one wanted to fix it onto their own home. Instead they suggested 
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that it should become a ‘norm’ to have it installed on public buildings such as 
offices and schools. One of the participants suggested that mounting it on one’s 
own house could have negative consequences: ‘I don’t want to be a downer on 
this, but we do have to bear in mind that people think that campaigning and 
emphasising the noise problem is giving them a problem. Because it affects the 
value of their house and they might want to sell their house and they don’t want 
to be labelled as a problem area. And we have found that schools have quite 
remarkably low levels of interest because they get money out of the airport for 
various activities and they don’t want to be seen as the wrong school to send 
your child to’ (Others nodded and voiced agreement). This interaction clearly 
identified an aspect of the prototype that I had not considered. Placing the 
device on one’s own home would characterise the immediate area as affected 
by noise and would make the resident personally identifiable as a campaigner, 
which could have direct negative effects for that person.
Fig. 4.2  Image mock-up of the ‘I display noise publicly’ prototype (photo: Christian Nold)
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The prototype identified a tendency to privatise the issue of noise pollution, 
namely, to locate noise within individual people’s homes and to not define it as 
a collective problem. This atomisation of the issue is reinforced by the remedial 
measures that the airport offers, which focus on noise insulation for individual 
homes rather than public spaces. This effect can also be seen in the telephone 
hotline infrastructure the airport has set up to allow individuals to make com-
plaints. What is absent are public platforms that allow local residents to engage 
with the noise controversy collectively. Taking into account the participants’ 
responses highlighting the dangers of public campaigning; this prototype 
interaction suggested to me a need for a sound-monitoring network that could 
discreetly connect individuals’ homes and institutions.
P rototyp e  3 :  ‘ I  Mak e  Someone  R e s pons i b l e ’
The third prototype (Fig. 4.3) is programmed to send an SMS text message to a 
mobile phone whenever a peak decibel level of 90dB is exceeded. The prototype 
is based on conversations with residents in which I felt there was a lack of clarity 
as to who or what is responsible for noise pollution. Whole ranges of entities 
were identified, including local and national government and its agencies, the 
airport, individual airlines, and capitalism. The provocation of the prototype 
is to choose a single entity that might be held directly responsible. The logic of 
the device is as follows:
sound sensor > sMs alert > target an individual entity
When I introduced the prototype, I showed the workshop participants the 
source code of the micro-controller, and mentioned that the mobile number 
could be changed to anybody’s phone number. Suddenly a dramatic change of 
atmosphere occurred, with all the participants laughing loudly, as they under-
stood the implication of inserting somebody else’s number into the source-code. 
The participants excitedly discussed a range of potential entities that could have 
their number inserted, including airport complaint phone-lines, institutional 
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bodies, politicians in favour of airport expansion, and the Prime Minister. Whilst 
a range of entities was discussed, there was no consensus about who should 
be held accountable. During the workshop, whenever voices were raised or a 
plane flew overhead, the prototype would send an SMS message that would 
be received with loud bleeps, and the group would respond with laughter. It 
was interesting to observe the way the prototype held the participants’ visual 
attention and tightly focused the discussion on technical interventions. Some 
participants were highly engaged by the confrontational approach of the pro-
totype, and extended its logic by talking about an event when loudspeakers 
had been installed outside a politician’s house to wake them up with the noise 
Fig. 4.3  Photograph of the ‘I make someone responsible’ prototype (photo: 
Christian Nold)
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of the early morning flights. Others in the group felt that the targeting logic of 
the prototype was too personal: they wanted to make the SMS messages more 
‘public’ by redirecting them to a Twitter stream or automated hotlines, ‘I think 
tweeting may well be a more acceptable way of doing that and it’s in the public 
domain so you can see there have been 80 tweets at that time in the morning 
and it’s not going to a direct person’.
From my perspective, the prototype allowed the group to experience a new 
relational infrastructure that created a direct connection between a noise event 
and an actor who is regarded as responsible for it. This bypassed the technical 
mediators who currently deal with noise data. Instead of the sanctioned infra-
structure of the annoyance metric that traces long-term patterns, the prototype 
is a technical hack that uses the decibel data to act like a shouted complaint at 
a politician in the street. The prototype triggered a group discussion about the 
strategies and tactics that a noise-monitoring network should adopt. Should it 
force new political connections by holding individuals accountable, or should it 
focus on building a data repository that is more acceptable to the current logic 
of the airport’s data practices? At stake were different ways of staging annoyance. 
Yet the diversity of reactions among the workshop participants made it clear 
that any infrastructure designed for this collective could not adopt a single way 
of staging annoyance, but would have to support a multiplicity of approaches.
P rototyp e  4 :  ‘ I  Turn  No i s e  i nto  Number s ’
This prototype (Fig. 4.4) uploads sound pressure measurements at regular 
intervals to an online repository, where it is presented as a time series. The noise 
of passing aircraft can be identified as visual spikes on the online graph. The 
prototype directly addresses the requests by residents for a static monitoring 
device that can be placed in their own home to provide evidence of their noise 
exposure. The composition and function of the device is as follows:
sound sensor > decibel data > online data archive
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During the workshop, this prototype triggered the least discussion and provoked 
no disagreement among the group. The residents asked practical questions about 
where it could be located in their home and whether future versions could be 
made more accurate. Compared with the previous prototypes, this one is the 
most similar in function to existing, official noise meters, which produce decibel 
numbers as their output. The innovation of the device is that its low cost would 
allow the participants to carry out their own data gathering by choosing where 
and how they monitored noise, whilst still allowing a connection to the existing 
data infrastructure of the airport. Yet at a conceptual level, the prototype was 
not challenging and seemed to be largely familiar to the participants. Despite 
the fact that it was not clear exactly what data would be collected, or what would 
be done with it, the prototype was treated as a tool that could be used, rather 
than a provocation that needed to be discussed. At the end of the workshop I 
asked the participants if they wanted to borrow any of the prototypes, and half 
of the group excitedly asked to take this prototype home with them.
Fig. 4.4  Photograph of the ‘I turn noise into numbers’ prototype (photo: Christian 
Nold)
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Infrastructur ing a Noi se  Monitor ing Collect ive
The main results from the workshop were that a number of people were now 
enthusiastic about participating in a noise-monitoring network, and I learnt a 
huge amount about the way noise and noise metrics function in the local area. 
I had identified a prototype that people wanted to use, and gathered insights for 
future prototypes. I installed the ‘I turn noise into numbers’ prototype in one 
of the participant’s homes, where it was in operation for three months. During 
this time, one of the other workshop participants informed me when the device 
temporarily stopped sending data, so I knew that at least some people were 
paying attention to the data feed. This encouraged me to continue the process 
and build a new device that would incorporate the insights from the workshop. 
I tried to enrol additional actors to put together a loose team to develop and 
test the prototypes as well as gather financial support for the hardware. Over a 
period of a year, I assembled a network that included a charitable foundation 
that funded the hardware, a local council that agreed to co-locate a prototype 
alongside their noise monitors, a noise pressure group who provided strategic 
advice as well as individual local residents, and sound artists and academics 
working on noise and biodiversity. The hardware and software were created 
as a loose collaboration with the sound artists, an academic and a Heathrow 
resident who is a programmer. It was not only the issue of Heathrow noise that 
encouraged people to join the network, but also the practical development of 
the device, which became a tangible focal point for the gathering of this network. 
During a follow-up workshop at which the group met to work on the program-
ming, one of the members spoke about their surprise at the mix of collaborators 
involved with the prototype, which included personal friends, family members 
and local residents, as well as institutions and pressure groups.
P rototyp e  5 :  ‘ I  Quant i f y  AND  Broadcast ’
This final prototype (Fig. 4.5) uses a Raspberry Pi computer and a calibrated 
measurement microphone, which were chosen for their measurement accuracy, 
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low unit cost and availability for the foreseeable future. The key feature of the 
device is that it sets up two parallel infrastructures and ways of dealing with 
sound. The first treats voltage changes at the microphone as acoustic pressure, 
which is converted into the LAeq official noise metrics of the airport. A script 
on the Raspberry Pi samples, filters and uploads the data to an online reposi-
tory where it is viewable as a time-series graph and historical data. The second 
approach treats the voltage changes at the microphone as a soundscape, and 
creates a sound stream that is available as a real-time internet radio station. A 
computer program continuously encodes the microphone data and posts it 
to a public server where listeners can experience the soundscape. These two 
infrastructures are intended to materialise the diversity of actors involved in 
the assembly of the monitoring prototype and the opinions articulated during 
Fig. 4.5  Photo of the ‘I quantify AND broadcast’ prototype (photo: Christian Nold)
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the workshops. The device relies on an ontology of noise as decibel measure-
ment in order to enrol existing institutional actors such as the airport, but also 
adds an ontology of sound as audio broadcast that is alien within the context of 
Heathrow noise pollution monitoring. While at a conceptual level this doubling 
up seems contradictory, at a material and technical level it is perfectly normal 
to run multiple software scripts simultaneously. In fact, virtually all computer 
systems run hundreds of scripts as part of their operating system. Using a 
design approach to deal with the ontological controversy about how to stage 
annoyance allows an additive methodology: devices can stack multiple ontolo-
gies on top of each other rather than having to replace one logic with another. 
The aim of the two infrastructures is not just to represent diversity but also to 
enable a multiplicity of sound practices that support each other. During the 
EU-funded research project, our sound-monitoring activities had received the 
criticism that residents were measuring spikes caused by other noise sources 
and not just aircraft. By synchronising the sound and data feeds, this prototype 
can verify the source of a spike, as well as allow people to visually identify and 
listen to particularly loud or quiet parts of the soundscape. In this way, the two 
ontologies of the prototype start to overlap and mutually support each other.
Fig. 4.6  Windsor prototype data being used to make a noise complaint about an 
off-track aircraft
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At the time of writing, in November 2016, three prototypes have been 
installed, with the oldest, in Windsor, having collected more than a year’s worth 
of data. The Windsor device is 6.5 km west of the Heathrow runways; another 
is in Hanwell, 9.5 km east of the runways; and the last is in Camberwell, 24 km 
from the runways. Based on these installations, it has been possible to make 
some observations about the sound practices they have enabled. The Windsor 
device is hosted in the garden of a member of the development team who is 
skilled in data analysis. He has used the data to identify particularly disruptive 
flights by correlating noise peaks with third party aircraft data as evidence for 
making complaints to the airport (Fig. 4.6). In his complaint he writes, ‘on Fri 
4th Nov at 13:20, BAW17 directly overflew, my house at 73.8db LAeq2s. It 
was off track and should have been 1km further north. The usual noise level of 
outbound flights going north is around 60–65db. Please discipline the pilot. 
Please contact me to confirm this complaint. I attach screen clips of noise level 
and track’. The prototype functioned like this:
sound sensor > decibel data archive > disruptive sound event > 
evidenced coMplaint to authorities
The host of the Windsor device also used the prototype to try and determine 
whether ‘Heathrow [is] getting better or worse and how fast’. He built custom 
software to track noise exposure episodes at different decibel levels to identify 
long-term trends in the airport’s operation. What is interesting about this 
approach is that it steps beyond the logic of individual complaints to focus on 
the creation of longitudinal data models that until now had been the reserve of 
the airport. In its public literature, the airport continually makes the claim that 
‘Heathrow is getting quieter’ (Heathrow Airport Limited 2013: 14) based on 
graphs showing shrinkage in the annoyance contour. Yet based on a visualisation 
of thirteen months of data from the Windsor prototype, it has been possible 
to demonstrate that at this site and over this duration, the noise has remained 
remarkably constant (Fig. 4.7). This visualisation thus presents situated evidence 
that can interrogate the claims of the airport. What is key about this long-term 
visualisation is that it starts to rescale the prototype into a spokesperson that 
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can stand alongside the official noise metrics and begin to challenge the airport’s 
Leviathan. I suggest that this approach points the way towards a model for staging 
annoyance based on situated empirical data collected by residents rather than 
aggregated social surveys. The dataset has also been shared with the Aviation 
Forum and the environmental officers of the local council, and presents a new 
way for residents to collaborate with the local authorities in holding the airport 
to account. The prototype thus enacts the following infrastructure:
sound sensor > decibel data archive > long terM Metric to 
Monitor changes in airport operation
The internet radio station part of the prototype has also enabled two public 
art installations that were attended by over 1200 people. These installations 
allowed visitors to see the data feeds, read an account by one of the prototype 
hosts and listen to the live soundscapes at Windsor and Camberwell in order 
to compare them (Fig. 4.8). The hosts of the prototypes were present to talk 
to members of the public about their own experience with noise, as well as the 
wider issue of Heathrow. While the visitors expected aircraft noise in Windsor, 
Fig. 4.7  Visualisation of thirteen months of data from the Windsor prototype. 
Each day is represented by a vertical line with yellow indicating many loud episodes 
above 50dB LAeq2s. The red line indicates the noise trend
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the frequent and loud aircraft in Camberwell, which was 24 km from the run-
ways and outside the annoyance contours, shocked them. This was the first 
time that many visitors had paid active attention to aircraft noise and noted 
the different sonic qualities of the aircraft and their effects on wildlife. When I 
was present, I would draw people’s attention to the way birds seemed to screech 
in shock from the aircraft. Even after a jet passed, it was possible to hear the 
lingering effect on the birds as they continued to squawk. Despite the fact that 
the visitors were listening remotely, the sound installation created a tangible 
experiential connection to Heathrow. In this deployment, the prototype had 
the following infrastructure:
sound sensor > online radio station > public sound installa-
tion > visitors experience heathroW noise
These multiple functions of the prototype as noise complaint, monitoring 
device and sound installation have 
demonstrated the versatility of the 
device. The proto type has enabled 
a variety of different infrastructures 
that engage existing participants in the 
controversy, such as the local councils 
and airport authorities, but has also 
made a connection to a broader audi-
ence of people who did not have any 
specific personal relation to the issue of 
Heathrow. The project is ongoing and 
growing, as there are other Heathrow 
residents waiting to install prototypes 
at their homes. The plan for this loose 
prototype collective is to support the 
deployment of a dozen devices and 
continue developing functionality that 
could enable programmatic sound 
Fig. 4.8  Detail of the ‘Prototyping a 
new Heathrow Airport’ sound installation
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identification of birds in order to demonstrate the broad impact of aircraft noise 
on living entities at Heathrow.
D i scu s s ion
This chapter has added to the existing literature on controversies by out-
lining an approach to turning controversies into questions of design, and by 
presenting preliminary results of my project to prototype the Heathrow noise 
pollution controversy. Key to my approach are the metaphors and methods 
of infrastructure and infrastructuring. My project sought to extend these 
using a method of scaling in order to identify and challenge the existing 
infrastructure of the Heathrow controversy. The combination of these two 
metaphors – infrastructure and scale – has highlighted the importance of 
the community annoyance metric as a key socio-technical device that con-
nects aircraft, residents and governance, and one that has the capacity to 
structure decision making on the third runway. The metric functions as a 
spokesperson that speaks on behalf of residents about their experience of 
noise, yet acts against their wishes. The issue of Heathrow pollution actually 
consists of three different controversies: a media controversy around eco-
nomic trade-offs, a failed political controversy about the number of people 
affected by noise, and an ontological controversy about how to stage annoy-
ance. Yet the opponents to the airport extension have so far not made use 
of this ontological controversy. This case study presents a way of turning the 
ontological controversy of Heathrow into a space for participatory prototyp-
ing. The prototype devices explored different ways of staging annoyance, and 
identified a need for multiple ways of providing evidence for the impact of 
noise. The prototyping process also resulted in the gathering of a loose col-
lective focused on building a sound-monitoring network that could use the 
logic of sound measurement to allow targeted complaints and to develop a 
new metric that could challenge the airport’s claims, as well as allow a new 
public to experience and discuss the impact of Heathrow by listening remotely. 
This object-centred design approach made it possible to stack multiple ways 
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of staging annoyance within a single device and collective. The device points 
the way towards building alternative spokespeople that can act on behalf of 
local residents and speak about the impact of noise in multiple ways. This case 
study has demonstrated the unique qualities of a design approach that not 
only analyses a socio-technical controversy but also allows experimentation 
and intervention in it. It is worth speculating how many other controversies 
might benefit by being turned into questions of design.
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5
DESIGNING AND DOING: 
ENACTING ENERGY-AND-
COMMUNITY
Alex Wilkie, Mike Michael
I n troduct ion
in this chapter, We report on an interdisciplinary proJect – coM-
bining expertise in science and technology studies (STS) and design – that 
explored, amongst other things, the ways in which community can be ‘made’ 
through energy. Thinking of energy as a heterogeneous assemblage that entailed, 
in this instance, energy policy, funding opportunities, social and technological 
innovations, and information flows, as well as the ‘stuff ’ of energy (e.g. pho-
tons, electrons, ground heat, wind-power), we begin to trace the emergence 
of distinct ‘communities’ and their interrelations. However, we do not see 
this as a simple representational project in which we charted this emergence. 
Rather, the research we conducted self-consciously contributed to this pro-
cess of emergence. Indeed, we designed a technological device – the Energy 
Babble – to fold into this emergence, to interject a certain playfulness that, 
hopefully, affords this process of emergence new or unexpected avenues and 
openings. On this score, we see our methodology as performative. However, 
the performativity in which we have engaged is one that, rather than close 
down the enactment of the social (the community) aspires to open up, or 
invent that ‘social’.
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In what follows, we provide a brief review of the project and its empirical 
backdrop. We go on to note that this project was performative, and specify 
our particular version of performativity: in particular, we suggest that many 
methods can be regarded as probabilistic in that they close down the empiri-
cal by reinforcing particular frameworks of analysis, that is, of re-producing 
existing problems. By comparison, we stress that our project aspired to be 
possibilistic insofar as it aimed to open up – to reframe – the issues at stake, 
specifically how to understand the interconnections between community 
and energy. We illustrate this possibilistic dimension of making the social 
through an examination of the design of the Babble. We follow this with an 
extended reflection on the ironies of the project and the Babble – how its 
possibilistic intent was, in multiple ways, not always realised. The chapter ends 
with a discussion of some of the more general implications of possibilistic 
research.
En ergy  Commun i t i e s
Between 2011 and 2012 the UK Departments of Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC), and Enterprise, Trade and Investment (DETI), the Welsh Government 
and Sciencewise-ERC (an organisation promoting public dialogue between 
policy, science and technology) provided £10 million to fund the exploration 
of twenty-two low carbon ‘test-bed’ communities through the Low Carbon 
Communities Challenge (LCCC). The objective of the project was to fund 
and learn from local community-based approaches to the implementation of 
low carbon technologies and measures in achieving energy demand reduc-
tion, and to explore sociological models of behaviour (notably the notion of 
‘nudge’) to trigger so-called ‘behaviour change’ amongst the communities. 
According to the evaluation report (DECC 2012), the LCCC project saw 
the delivery of 8206 low carbon measures, including but not limited to the 
installation of low energy light bulbs, boiler jackets, biomass district heating 
systems, solar photovoltaic (PV) installations, air source heat pumps, wind 
turbines, triple glazing and smart energy monitors, as well as community 
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evaluation and infrastructure projects including low carbon vehicles and car 
clubs, home visits and energy assessments, community hub buildings, advice 
sessions, open days and conferences. The initiatives and measures deployed 
as part of the LCCC implicated a wide range of ‘stakeholders’ as constituents 
of energy communities. Accordingly, (energy) community, in this sense, can 
be seen as an object and instrument of UK government policy with which to 
cut across and include a diverse range of local actors and settings involved in 
energy demand reduction, such as local authorities, third sector organisations, 
local enterprises, households, individuals, energy companies, social interest 
groups, resident associations, transition groups and so on. The overall ambi-
tion of the LCCC was to inform and contribute to the UK government target 
(DECC 2009) of delivering a 34% reduction in carbon emissions by 2020, 
as well as an energy supply target of 15% sourced from renewables (30% of 
electricity), also by 2020.
In the direct aftermath of the LCCC, and as a means to further build 
on and sustain the many concrete initiatives that emerged as part of the 
programme, the Research Councils UK (RCUK) led a further programme 
of research into energy communities as part of its Energy Programme.1 This 
initiative, led by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and 
the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), funded 
seven projects that aimed to assess, evaluate and report on the communi-
ties that participated in the LCCC, as well as explore further developments 
with community-based carbon reduction and environmental action. One 
project within this initiative, and the focus of this chapter, was the project 
‘Sustainability Invention and Energy Demand Reduction: Co-designing 
Communities and Practice’ (ECDC). Here, ECDC specifically responded 
to the call for projects to ‘work directly with communities to examine how 
individuals and communities use, and manage energy, and help them find 
ways to reduce energy demand’.2 Furthermore, and (with some circumspec-
tion) drawing on Wenger (1998), the project aimed to address communities 
of energy demand reduction practice and how such practices raised issues 
about the nature of social and technical practices, notably demand reduction 
and resource management – a key objective of UK energy policy through 
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measures such as the replacement of fifty-three million domestic gas and 
electricity meters with so-called smart energy monitors and In-Home Displays 
(IHDs) by 2020 (DECC 2013: 6).
If this formed the backdrop to the project, it soon became apparent that the 
efficacy of feedback and monitoring technologies, as well as the very premise 
of behaviour change (Dietz et al. 2009), was subject to considerable dispute, 
not least in the following ways. First, the introduction of smart monitors in the 
home is part of a broader UK environmental policy objective to effect behav-
iour change in the home, where a benign informational nudge is considered 
an effective intervention into routine energy consumption practices (Burgess 
and Nye 2008; Darby 2006). Through empirical evidence, however, recent 
scholarship has begun to refute the effectiveness of behavioural intervention. 
Feedback technologies, and energy-saving technologies more broadly, have 
been seen to give rise to the ‘boomerang effect’ (Schultz et al. 2007), where 
perceived savings lead to an actual increase in energy use or little or no change 
(Buchanan, Russo, and Anderson 2015). Second, the preoccupation with 
behavioural intervention as a means to address energy consumption side-lines, 
or simply ignores, the sociotechnical settings of energy consumption practices 
(Shove 2003; Hargreaves, Nye, and Burgess 2010) and the sophistication of 
energy consumers (e.g. Strengers 2013). As such, recent scholarship has begun 
to question how individuals-as-energy-users are configured as calculative actors 
capable of reflecting on and making rational decisions about energy consumption 
irrespective of the situated complexities of energy demand. Indeed, as Noortje 
Marres (2012) notes, drawing on Michel Callon (2009), carbon accounting 
technologies, notably smart meters, ‘co-articulate’ the simultaneous enactment 
of multiple registers, including politics, economics and innovation. That is to 
say, such technologies elicit and mediate environmental action, political engage-
ment and domestic comfort simultaneously. Taken alongside Elizabeth Shove’s 
emphasis on social practices which similarly embeds the energy user within a 
nexus of technological, cultural and corporeal relations, it is clear that there are 
emerging alternatives to the economisation of the energy user, with its focus on 
the rational, calculative individual of energy demand reduction. In this context, 
it is unsurprising that the literature on feedback technologies that purportedly 
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reduce energy demand calls for a more nuanced, ‘thicker’, understanding of 
the energy user as constitutively situated within a sociotechnical assemblage. 
Such a view can also be set alongside a longstanding preoccupation within 
STS with the development and deployment of energy-related technologies, 
and the more or less problematic attempts to enrol users figured into particular 
innovation initiatives. For instance, we can point to such classic studies as the 
(failed) development of electric cars (Callon 1986), the prospective users of 
a mass transportation system (Latour 1996), the ambivalence of villagers to 
be enrolled as citizens by way of electricity meters in the Ivory Coast (Akrich 
1992), and the role of interpretive actors in constructing the meaning of electric 
light bulbs (Bijker 1995).
With all this in mind, the ECDC project set out to avoid narrowly con-
ceived assumptions about what constitutes a community, not least one that is 
composed of the rational, calculative energy users figured in energy policy and 
much supporting literature. In so doing, the approach taken was shaped by the 
particular interests and make-up of the project team, notably a combination of 
HCI approaches to ludic design (Gaver 2002) and speculative design (Michael 
2012; Wilkie, Michael, and Plummer-Fernandez 2015) – where designed 
artefacts are deployed to explore the prospects of technology and everyday 
life – and sensibilities in STS attuned to the empirical study of social processes 
involving heterogeneous mixtures of human and non-human actors. As such, the 
ECDC project set out to question, challenge and explore core assumptions at 
play in energy policy and the associated literature, namely the instrumentalised 
characterisation of communities as morally responsible collectives of rational 
citizens (see Rose 2000). Such communities can be understood as novel objects 
of policy that sit between measures for disciplining the conduct of individuals 
and broader policy instruments, such as the cap-n-trade economies of market-
based emissions trading. In contrast, the mixture of design and STS that com-
prised ECDC was sensitised to both rational and non-rational meaning and 
practices, as well as to collectives that did not privilege or reduce communities 
to human actors, let alone human actors of a particular sort. So while we began 
with a view that communities are constructed (e.g. Cohen 1985), we regarded 
their construction to be a heterogeneous process, one in which technological 
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practices could be seen to be constitutive of ‘hybrid communities’ (Callon 2004). 
However, as we discuss in the next section, the character of our methodology 
went beyond the mere documentation of such constructive heterogeneity: as 
we discuss in the section, we as researchers were intimately implicated in this 
constructive process.
Method  and  Meta phys i c s
As a collaborative project that spanned social science and design, ECDC can 
be understood in numerous ways. From a social scientific perspective, it is a 
speculative approach that assumes the performativity of its methods in making 
its objects of study. This view of method has become a commonplace, perhaps 
best articulated in the work of John Law (2004). For Law, reality is in flux, 
characterised by emergence, relationality and multiplicity. In trying to study 
such a reality, one is necessarily performing or enacting it, and, in some ways, 
fixing it. Rather than method, Law prefers the notion of ‘method assemblage’: 
this enables us to address the fact that any methodological engagement entails, 
on the one hand, many levels (e.g. affective, pragmatic, political as well as 
epistemic aspects), and, on the other, a partial process of rendering relations – 
relations which both reflect the flux and complexity of that reality and neces-
sarily delimit that reality. There is, as Law remarks, a ‘crafting of a bundle of 
ramifying relations that generates presence, manifest absence, and Otherness’ 
(Law 2004: 45). Nevertheless, the notion of ‘method assemblage’ allows us to 
‘imagine more flexible boundaries, and different forms of presence and absence’ 
(ibid. 85). In particular, we can also begin to imagine this as a process whereby 
these different forms of presence and absence are partially constitutive of the 
researchers themselves. That is to say, the method assemblage (which includes 
the researchers, of course), in its multiple relationality with the world-in-flux, 
is itself subject to emergence.
This argument can be approached through the notion of the event. Drawing 
on the process metaphysics of Whitehead, Deleuze and Stengers, the event 
is an ‘actual occasion’ that comprises social/material, micro/macro, human/
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non-human, and cognitive/affective elements (or prehensions). These ‘con-
cresce’, in Whitehead’s (1978 [1929]) terms, to yield a momentary durability 
or ‘satisfaction’. Crucially, one can regard this concrescence less as a matter of 
interacting elements (which retain their identity) and more as one of intra-
action (Barad 2007) in which prehensions mutually change, co-become, or 
become-with one another. Assuming that a method assemblage is a part of the 
concrescence that makes up the ‘research event’ (which can range from a single 
interview to an extended period of participant observation, or a multi-sited 
ethnography), then it too can co-become with other elements (e.g. human and 
non-human participants). This also raises the intriguing spectre that what is 
happening is not research but something rather different. No longer is it simply 
a matter of a research question being addressed, but rather the grounds of the 
empirical engagement begin to shift.
This account of the research event borrows heavily from Isabelle Stengers’ 
(2005) cosmopolitical proposal. Accordingly, when political actors interact, 
they can co-become, in the process reformulating not only their own interests, 
but also the very point of the cosmopolitical event. In other words, instead 
of seeking answers to a pre-existing question, issue or problem, the question 
or issue or problem has itself shifted. With such a shift comes the prospect of 
formulating a more interesting issue, or posing better, more relevant questions, 
that is of engaging in, as Mariam Fraser (2010: 78) puts it, ‘inventive problem-
making’. Two challenges arise here. First, how can (energy demand) problems 
be induced to express their relevance in and to the research event, something 
we address in what follows in the literal form of a designed research device. 
According to Fraser (ibid.), the ‘(ethical) obligation here, in other words, is not 
to solve a problem, or to explain it away but rather to try to enable it to “speak” 
or to pose it in terms that enable it to play itself out in productive ways’. Second, 
and given the researchers’ constitution in the research event, how to speak about 
the event without explaining it away as if from nowhere (Haraway 1988: 581)? 
In other words, how to be situated in the research event and contribute to its 
becomings and problem articulation?
One upshot, and response to the challenges posed above, is that the research 
event, by virtue of both making and being made by its objects of study, can take 
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on a more speculative tenor. As social scientists, we need not address ourselves 
to a shifting reality in which we are methodologically embroiled and epistemi-
cally emergent, in terms of our usual analytic frameworks. Perhaps we can take 
a more speculative tack and re-envision the research event, and imaginatively 
reformulate the issues at stake in it. Following Stengers (2010: 57), we might 
wish to develop an approach that ‘affirms the possible […] actively resists the 
plausible and the probable targeted by approaches that claim to be neutral’.
One might be tempted to read into this phrase an opposition between the 
possible and the probable. We often see these as tendencies that range over 
a no-doubt multi-dimensional spectrum, and as such we prefer to use the 
terms probabilistic and possibilistic. Indeed, as we shall see below, the relation 
between these is rather more topological, with what is to count as possibilistic 
or probabilistic being an emergent and relational property rather than some-
thing that can be measured against external criteria (Lash and Lury 2007). For 
the moment, however, we want only to note that our methodological entrée 
into the empirical field, which we briefly summarised in the preceding section, 
was a multivalent one, though our focus and that of our participants was mainly 
upon the speculative device of the Energy Babble (see next section). In other 
words, within our method assemblage, there was a battery of elements. These 
included devices such as cultural probes (Gaver, Dunne, and Pacenti 1999) 
and the project website, engagements such as probe workshops and site visits, 
re-scripting workshops to trace and interrogate the geographies of delegation 
(Akrich 1992: 206) materialised by existing feedback devices, experimental 
and evaluative prototypes, individual relations (though these born as much 
out of the contrast with other projects in the programme and the govern-
ment funding regimes to which the communities were connected), and so on. 
While our focus remains on the Babble, what the Babble ‘is’, and what it lures 
and co-becomes with, is multiple (Mol 2003) in the sense of being variously 
probabilistic and possibilistic. Phrased in the language of ‘inventing the social’, 
our method assemblage of devices, engagements, bodies, and so forth stands 
in the topological enactment of energy-and-community as at once marked by 
inventive problems and standardised questions.
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The  En ergy  Bab b l e : 
A  D e s i gn  D ev i c e  and  th e  Po s s i b l e
At the beginning of the project it was not evident that the interdisciplinary team 
of designers and social scientists (of which we were part) would design a research 
device in the form of a ‘product’ or appliance. However, through an engagement 
with and exploration of the problem space of community-scale energy demand 
reduction – including but not limited to ethnographic and designerly contact 
with seven existing energy communities, an investigation of environmental 
and energy demand reduction technologies, a review of energy literature and 
policy, as well as design propositions in the form of design workbooks (Gaver 
2011) – the design team began to focus on the design of a device that would 
itself playfully mediate the problem space of energy demand reduction.3 In part, 
this approach was inspired and informed by four pronounced design directions 
that gained traction during the project: 1) Energy Tourism: how sustainability 
changes our relation to visible energy infrastructures; 2) Insistent Activism: how 
to re-situate and reformat discourses of the environment and sustainability in 
unfamiliar, unpredictable or inappropriate ways and settings (e.g. apart from 
formal community meetings) and how to open up discourses that have hardened 
around known problems and solutions (e.g. behaviour change and off-the-shelf 
green industry technologies such as PV installations); 3) Energy Awareness: how 
to support communities of practitioners in sharing their experiences, expertise 
and successes (or failures), and; 4) Cosmopolitical Energy Communities: who or 
what are the members of energy communities, and what are their dynamics? 
Here, the increasingly salient role of the internet and social media in mediating 
environmental discourse and action as well as community initiatives sensitised 
us to the emergence of novel practices and energy actors such as Bots (Wilkie, 
Michael, and Plummer-Fernandez 2015).4
As these interests coalesced and concretised (over the period of a year), we 
formulated a design brief to synthesise our examination of the design space and 
to precipitate the design of the research device: ‘Design an Energy-Babble system 
that displays material, collected from some combination of individual, community 
and publics sources, to open and promote constructive affect and involvement in 
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energy reduction issues and orientations. More specifically, the system should support 
understandings of, and practices related to, energy demand reduction’.
Over the next eighteen months, the team designed what became the Energy 
Babble (Fig. 5.1, below), which took the form of (or parodied) a networked audio 
information appliance – to be given to community members – that vocalises 
(quite literally speaks out using software based synthetic voices) internet-
sourced and community contributed content. Needless to say, this involved 
much aesthetic and technological expertise and work, including a combination 
of graphic, product, sound, software and electronics design.
The resulting design and system consisted of twenty-eight individual devices, 
the audio content of which was produced and managed by an online server-based 
content scraping, audio generation and distribution system featuring algorithmi-
cally sourced and generated environmental and energy-related content.
The Energy Babble device combined a Raspberry Pi computer, a loudspeaker, 
a Wi-Fi card, a soundcard, a memory card (for the OS) as well as two blown-glass 
sections, an injection-moulded main enclosure and microphone handset, a 3D 
printed volume knob and internal support structures, and a large-diameter cable 
Fig. 5.1  The Energy Babble (photo: Alex Wilkie)
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to connect the microphone handset to the main enclosure. The server software, 
which provides and manages the audio content of the babble, included software 
routines and algorithms to retrieve web-based content including:
• Scraping Twitter feeds from a range of pre-identified energy-related feeds, 
including the communities, local and national government, the energy and 
green industries, and activists and other implicated actors.
• Querying Twitter for the occurrence of particular search terms, such as 
‘climate change’, ‘energy bills’, and ‘renewable energy’.
• Querying Twitter for the occurrence of tweets that include the text string 
‘switched off the…’ and returning a list of things (broadly put) reportedly 
having been turned off.
• Scraping textual content from URLs that are returned in tweets as part 
of Twitter queries.
• UK National Grid status updates, including current energy demand and 
carbon intensity, as well as the ratio of sources (coal, combined cycle gas 
turbines, nuclear, wind).5
In addition, the server software also managed the input of content from the 
community members who used the device, including a variety of questions and 
prompts that were sporadically spoken through the device. This was, in part, a 
means to invite users to contribute content by using the microphone handset 
to communicate with others using the system.
Lastly, and notably, the system featured a Markov Chain algorithm, which 
used the corpus of content generated from the above routines to probabilisti-
cally produce new and often locally intelligible (to the systems collection) text 
strings. In other words, the Markov function takes the words of others (human 
or non-human) and produces new content, sometimes appreciable, at other 
times nonsense.
When running, the Energy Babble system provided a sporadic interplay 
of spoken statements, evocative of talk radio, drawn from the pool of content 
provided by the sourced content, the algorithms and community inputted mes-
sages. Each message was cued by a short jingle, indicating and segmenting the 
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spoken feeds. In the main, the content comprised energy and environmental 
news, reports of energy practices, and other matters relating to sustainability. 
Often, though, other content and topics entered into the speech, originating 
from the source and the Markov-generated interjections.
In total, twenty-one Energy Babble devices were deployed to members of 
the seven energy communities we had engaged, each community receiving 
three to four devices, and often handing over the device to other community 
members after a period of use. The handing-over of the devices was conducted 
at pre-organised community events, events organised specifically for the hando-
ver, or to individual, typically prominently active, figures, where appropriate. 
The deployment continued for approximately six months, during which time 
members of the team repeatedly visited the communities and listened to the 
ensuing content using a device set up in the team’s studio or at home.
At base, the Energy Babble (the combination of the networked devices and 
the server-based system) was a research device designed to reveal how local 
communities engage with energy matters (news, views, practices, experiences, 
demand) as well as live with and include an energy-related and consuming tech-
nology as part of their everyday practices. On the one hand, the Energy Babble 
sought to mediate and explore how the seven communities share information and 
experience its multiplicity, utility or otherwise. On the other hand, the device 
also sought to occupy and actively articulate (by expressing and connecting) 
the problem space of energy demand and carbon reduction by scrambling, 
interjecting and provoking, or inviting, responses. How might the communities 
react to the presence of, or participate with, the Babble with all its idiosyncrasies 
and playfulness in what are, after all, issues of the utmost urgency? Rephrased 
in the terms of the preceding section, the Babble was designed to nurture a 
‘possibilistic research event’ in which the users might begin to co-emerge with 
the Babble and thus pose more interesting questions about energy demand 
reduction, about the nature of community and its embroilments with energy, 
and about the meanings of energy information and its movements (not least 
through and across communities).
In what follows we consider some of the ironies of the implementation of 
the Babble. While in this section we have gone into detail about the design 
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intent and effort that went into the Babble, the Babble does not stand alone. It is 
part of a method assemblage in which it arose amongst existing relations to the 
communities (and particular figures within those communities) and to a series 
of enactments of energy politics by both the communities and the members 
of the research team. As such, while we reflect on some of the reactions to the 
Babble on the part of community members, we mainly focus on those aspects 
of the method assemblage that militated against a possibilistic research event. 
Put another way, we begin to trace how the inventiveness of the invention of 
the social through the research process, despite the best of intentions, can 
become diluted.
A s s emb l ing  En erg i e s ,  Commun i t i e s  and  I ron i e s
The team’s initial contact with energy communities came about through a 
one-day event organised on behalf of the RCUK energy programme for all 
the award holders at a hotel in Central London. A key aim of this event, as it 
turned out, was to introduce and, preferably, match communities to research 
teams, and thus to initiate longer-term research engagements. This was done 
by way of presentations and posters (summarising each project), which the 
research groups brought to and displayed on the walls of the conference room. 
Representatives of LCCC communities, present at the event, were invited to 
approach research teams whose research interests matched their local efforts, 
initiatives and interests. The vivid yellow poster for ECDC described our 
research process in three stages (investigation, batch production of speculative 
devices, and ethnographic engagement) and portrayed, using photographs, 
two previous research devices (i.e. Gaver et al. 2010; Gaver et al. 2011) in 
order to communicate what was, in contrast to other projects, a more unu-
sual approach. Both here, and during the follow-up meetings with the com-
munities that approached the team during the event, it became apparent that 
many community members viewed ECDC as a curiosity in that it did not 
promise a technological fix, clear solutions or epistemic assurances. Despite, 
or perhaps because of, the lack of utilitarian or instrumental expectations, 
138
inventing the social
however, the communities were drawn to the prospect of hosting and living 
with an exploratory device as part of their routine energy practices (neither 
we nor they knew exactly what the device would be, beyond being a discrete 
product-like appliance). We surmised at the time that the relative popularity 
of the ECDC project lay not only in its novelty, but in its contrast to standard 
social methods – methods that the energy communities had long been exposed 
to as, or so we were told, one of the most researched populations in the UK 
(e.g. Clark 2008).
Notwithstanding the team’s seemingly successful efforts to frame the initial 
expectations of the communities, during the handover of the Babble to the 
community members – approximately two years after the first meeting – the 
expectations elicited again relied upon or required the device to address utilitar-
ian demands. Upon receiving the device, G, from the Meadows, for example, 
exclaimed, ‘We thought we were going to get a gizmo to save energy’. Another 
Meadows member asked if DECC was going to receive a Babble so that they 
could complain directly to the UK Government about an ongoing dispute with 
British Gas. A retired engineer from Rye Harbour, near Hastings, asked, ‘How 
does this improve the social operational wellbeing of the people who use it? If I 
make an investment, how do I get a payback?’ and continued: ‘I wanted it to solve 
a problem’. At Woodlands Valley Farm (an organic farm and conservation and 
sustainability activity centre), in Ladock, members of the Ladock Grampound 
Road Transition Group were initially perplexed, though curious, when intro-
duced to the Babble. Their expectations were altered, however, by an electrician 
who interceded as an impromptu spokesperson for the Babble. The electrician 
quickly realised that the Babble used a Raspberry Pi, a ‘British’ technology 
which he was already using at the heart of his home-made low-powered home 
media centre, and that the Babble could be repurposed (a common response 
across the communities) as a way to report on and broadcast the state of his 
experimental car-battery-operated home electricity system. In doing so, he also 
quelled the members’ concerns over the Babble’s energy consumption, and 
advocated the pedagogic prospects of the Raspberry Pi, suggesting that it could 
help members undertake their own experimental projects. J, from Sidmouth, 
echoed the impulses of the electrician to reconstruct the Babble by suggesting 
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that it could use the internet connection of a mobile phone and be powered by 
a car to allow for some kind of mobility.
Similarly, when deployed to the members of Energise Hastings, during a 
routine meeting at which representatives of Hastings Borough Council were 
present, the Babble was first likened to a smart monitor and its adoption was 
framed in terms of extending or integrating with existing feedback technologies. 
Crucially, it was also viewed as a device that could be enrolled for marketing 
purposes; as one member put it, ‘That is a very powerful sales tool’. Latterly, 
however, the views of the members changed, typified by one member’s response: 
‘It’s a new type of thinking, you don’t know what you’ll get, it might just be 
chaos’. Thus, at Hastings, and at Reepham and at Sidmouth, the Babble became 
construed, in part, as a device that could be enrolled to play a role in community 
outreach and awareness activities and thus operate to persuade people to become 
involved in sustainable issues and practices, as well as to interest prospective 
community members.
This instrumentalised view of the Babble does not simply reflect the practical 
interests of these members of energy communities. It is also partly a response 
to the way that we presented the Babble. The process of implementing a specu-
lative device involves presenting it as something strange or novel – however, 
this strangeness and novelty cannot be so extreme as to be threatening (as 
opposed to promising – see Michael, in press): as such, ironically, the temp-
tation is to temper the novelty or strangeness by suggesting that the device 
also has practical uses. In other words, the research event was affected by 
the ways in which we as researchers transmitted mixed messages that per-
formed our speculative device (the Babble) as simultaneously speculative and 
instrumental. We can see the contortedness of our enactment of the Babble 
in the ways in which it is described in Figure 5.2 (an article on the Babble in 
the November 2013 issue of Reepham Life). On reading the article, and Bill 
Gaver’s account, one is left with a sense of quasi-instrumentality, to coin a 
phrase: there are hints at the Babble’s oddness but also at its utility, though 
these are never quite clear. On reflecting on our own practices of implementa-
tion – especially on how we described the Babble to our energy community 
participants – we detect a similar ironic contortedness of trying to express 
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both the strangeness and utility of the device, to at once excite and reassure 
its prospective users.
Despite these observations, we can nevertheless note the variety of ways in 
which the Babble was instrumentalised: as an energy saving gizmo, a means of 
direct communication, a problem solver, a model use of Raspberry Pi, and as a 
marketing tool. Indeed, we suggest that these cumulative instrumentalisations 
imply a possibilistic opening up of the very idea of the instrumental in relation 
to energy demand reduction. In other words, there is a second-order irony at 
play here. Especially if these accounts of instrumentality were circulated via 
the Babble, there is a possibilistic prospect of speculative reflection on – that 
is, asking more interesting questions about – the meaning of what counts as 
instrumental (and this includes cognate terms such as practical, utility, or 
problem-solving). Moreover, there arises the possibility of using the Babble to 
Fig. 5.2  The Energy Babble, held by project member Matthew Plummer-Fernandez, 
as featured in the November 2013 issue of Reepham Life (Reepham Community Press)
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pose more interesting general questions about the complex practical purposes 
that might attach to communities-and-energy.
By contrast to (the ironies of) this highly instrumentalised view of the Babble, 
other rationalities or sensibilities were also evident across the communities. 
For example, D from the Meadows announced that she would name the device 
‘Finnegan’ in reference to James Joyce’s literary stream of consciousness style. 
An artist, also from Meadows, who was somewhat engrossed by an experimental 
form of sustainable living in a low-energy eco home, designed with her husband 
(an architect) and built on industrially polluted land, characterised (perhaps 
unsurprisingly) the device as an intercom-like ‘Art Babble’. Soon after receiving 
a Babble, J from New Cross sent an SMS: ‘It’s amazing! I love it so much already. 
The messaging system reminds me of the barbed wire telephone system in Wild 
West. Seriously – Google it. Thanks guys :)’. On first reading, this might sug-
gest that the instrumental can also be side-lined and the aesthetic privileged. 
However, the ease of such a categorisation (at least amongst some participants) 
might, ironically, imply a closing down or probabilistic enactment of the Babble’s 
speculative role. So, insofar as it can be categorised as an aesthetic other it might 
leave untouched the probabilistic, instrumentalised business-as-usual of the 
communities-and-energy.
So far, we have looked at the initial reception received by the Babble. We 
now reflect on how it was enacted over the course of its implementation in 
various private and public spaces. As above, there was a marked ongoing 
appreciation of the Babble as an aesthetic artefact as well as a novel techni-
cal device. R, from Reepham, described the device as beautifully well made 
in hand blown glass, and P from the Meadows called it a ‘really nice object’. 
However, here we concentrate on the varieties of instrumentalisation of the 
Babble, not least with regard to the utility of the information which it broad-
cast. It was clear that there were two key issues here, the first of which related 
to the type of information involved. Thus, during use, the germaneness of the 
internet-sourced content that the Babble recurrently uttered was called into 
question, although what counted or was construed as appropriate varied across 
communities and members. J, from the Meadows, who used the Babble in 
her office at the local social club, suggested that the device could have a ‘filter’ 
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(reporting on government and community rather than oil and gas) since it 
vocalised much extraneous information. M, from Hastings, who viewed the 
content as a reflection of the complex milieu of community energy demand, 
related how the repetitiveness of the content suppressed the relevance of the 
Babble (a view shared by J from Ladock). At the same time, M noted the 
similarities between the Babble’s information and the content of conversations 
on and around the topic of carbon reduction. Second, germaneness was also 
shaped by the timeliness of the Babble’s broadcasts. Here, J remarked how the 
Babble would not speak on cue, and that once spoken, messages could not be 
retrieved. Neither of these observations should come as much of a surprise: 
we would expect that an instrumental enactment of the Babble would focus 
on the content and timing of its messages. However, more intriguing was the 
ways in which the instrumentalisation of the Babble spun out to take in other 
elements of its milieu within the communities-and-energy.
To put this another way, the eventuation of the utility of the Babble brought 
into play a series of other elements. These can be summarised as the siting or 
placement of the Babble, the timing of its installation, and its connectedness to 
other issues and concerns. With regard to siting, the previously discussed arti-
cle in Reepham Life (Fig. 5.2), features the Reepham Green Team, who invite 
suggestions for further installation sites for Babble. With regard to timing, R, 
at St Leonards said, ‘if you had given this now, then it might have been more 
useful to me’. R reported using the device as part of the energy initiatives he 
was involved in, such as an energy advice event at Bexhill which, he claimed, 
attracted four hundred people, most of whom wanted advice on their energy 
bills. R also used the Babble in efforts to partner with a Dutch energy supplier in 
order to market and sell community tariffs to individuals. Most notably, R made 
repeated reference to the recent emergence of Community Energy South – a 
meta-community of sorts – that is itself a partnership of energy community 
groups across the south of England. The Babble could have been instrumental 
in this process had its timing been better. With regard to connectedness, the 
Babble’s utility was also played out as an aspect of proximity to other energy 
issues. In Ladock, for example, J spoke of how the Babble echoes her involve-
ment with Christian Aid and Credit Unions, where energy issues are associated 
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with issues of poverty (which overspill often parochial UK concerns with the 
environment and technology). The Babble also connected, according to J, to 
the relation between energy and the agricultural sector (in which individuals 
are employed and with which communities are engaged).
Taking all this together, we see how the typical problem of instrumentalising 
the Babble in pursuit of the probabilistic enactment of community-and-energy 
(business as usual, as it were) also shades into a possibilistic eventuation of 
community-and-energy. For example, the various attempts to make the Babble 
useful suggest that interesting problems can be posed about what counts as 
community-and-energy. What we see in the above brief examples are attempts 
to make the Babble informative – attempts that draw on the Babble’s spatial and 
temporal setting and its issue connectedness. Along the way, we also glimpse 
a more possibilistic rendering of community-and-energy in which the spatial, 
temporal and substantive (i.e. content-full) parameters of a community are 
questioned. The sorts of questions that come to mind might include, Where 
are the ‘right sites’ for the Babble, sites which recreate or challenge a sense of a 
discrete community-and-energy? How does the Babble evoke other versions of 
community-and-energy (e.g. around international poverty) and how do these 
fuse with, or become differentiated from, the local community-and-energy where 
the Babble is installed’? ‘How does the timing of the arrival and installation of 
the Babble affect the ongoing enactments of a particular community-and-energy, 
as some of its members forge connections into other collectives?
Conclud ing  R emark s
In this chapter, we have attempted to trace out how a particular design and social 
scientific interdisciplinary project might speculatively engage with communities-
and-energy. The key methodological intervention – the Energy Babble – was 
designed to enable people playfully to explore the character of energy demand 
reduction and thus the character of those communities themselves. As such, 
our aim was, via the Babble, to ‘invent a social’ that was possibilistic – that 
opened up an unforeseen or not-as-yet version of the social (more specifically, 
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the communities-and-energy). As it turned out, and partly as a result of certain 
tacit enactments of Babble by the research team (i.e. the de facto focus on the 
possible utility of the Babble) and the responses of the participants, we were 
faced with many instances of how the Babble was variously instrumentalised. 
However, rather than simply see these as probabilistic enactments of the Babble 
in which communities-and-energy emerged more or less unaffected (engaged 
in business as usual), we also detected more possibilistic dimensions to these 
processes. In particular, we suggested that in the attempt to render the Babble 
straightforwardly instrumental for the community, the very meanings or param-
eters of instrumental and community became open to more interesting questions.
Finally, there is a broader lesson to be drawn here, a speculative reflection 
on speculative method itself. If our interdisciplinary methodology was geared 
to accessing the possibilistic, it clearly provoked the probabilistic. We hoped to 
see an exploration of the possible in relation to community-and-energy; that 
is, an enactment of the social that was open and unfolding. Instead, we found a 
probabilistic enactment – an instrumentalisation – of our key methodological 
tool (the Energy Babble) that seemed to reinforce the existing performances 
of the social. And yet in this very process there were hints of a possibilistic 
enactment of community-and-energy. The anti-speculative responses to our 
speculative enactments ironically yielded a tacit speculation. Speculative 
method might thus be speculative, not because of its speculative character or 
intent, but in spite of it.
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Note s
1 See http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/research/xrcprogrammes/energy/. Accessed 11th May 
2015.
2 See http://www.esrc.ac.uk/research/major-investments/energy-and-communities-
collaborative-venture.aspx. Date accessed 12th May 2015.
3 The communities that were engaged as part of the ECDC project were a mixture of 
‘first mover’ (recognised by policy actors as exemplars of carbon reduction initiatives) and 
‘second mover’ (showing clear evidence and commitment to cutting carbon emissions and 
implementing sustainability measures) communities (DECC 2012: 10) and included: 
Energise Hastings; Greening Goldsmiths; Low Carbon Living Ladock; Meadows 
Partnership Trust (Nottingham); Reepham Green Team; Sid Valley Energy Action 
Group; and Transition New Cross.
4 We are paraphrasing Gaver et al. (2015), who provide a complimentary discussion of 
the design process which gave rise to the Energy Babble.
5 See http://www.gridwatch.templar.co.uk for an example of online National Grid status.
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Fig. 6.1  Barcelona Pavilion, above and below ground (photos and composition: Andrés Jaque, 2012)
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6
OUTING MIES ’  BASEMENT: 
DESIGNS TO RECOMPOSE 
THE BARCELONA PAVIL ION’S 
SOCIETIES
Andrés Jaque
Fig. 6.2  Broken piece of tinted glass in the basement of the Barcelona Pavilion 
(photo: Andrés Jaque, 2012)
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architectural practices are Meant to engage socially through 
transformation of the social – whether by bringing in non-existing possibili-
ties or reexamining old ones. Yet the field of architecture has often struggled 
with conceptualising the role of architectural practices within the processes by 
which associations rearticulate, particularly when dealing with the so-called 
masterpieces of modern architecture, whose exceptionality is often described 
as the outcome of their capacity to transcend the mundane. Among these mas-
terpieces stands the Barcelona Pavilion, the 1986 reconstruction of the German 
National Pavilion, which was designed for the 1929 Barcelona International 
Exhibition by Ludwig Mies van der Rohe and Lilly Reich, major figures of the 
twentieth-century German architectural avant garde. After decades of influenc-
ing architecture, the 1929 Pavilion still stands, with its almost complete lack 
of furniture, as an exemplar of formal minimalism. In 1929, journalists could 
read its features as evidence of the Pavilion’s detachment from the ordinary. 
Rubió i Turudí described it as ‘metaphysical architecture’ that uses technique 
to ‘abandon the realm of physics’ and ‘detach itself from the social forces that 
originated it in the first place’ (Turudí 1929). This metaphysical interpretation 
has played an important part in shaping architectural critics’ understanding of 
the Pavilion. For instance, in 1979, Manfredo Tafuri described the Pavilion as 
a radically empty architecture available for whatever reality one could occupy 
it with (Tafuri 1979). This reading of the Pavilion is the one that most Mies-
admirers participate in; the current daily management of the reconstructed 
Pavilion, which since its opening has functioned as an architectural monument 
open to visitors, has been designed to be perceived by visitors as metaphysical. 
This requires a great many design adjustments that must be imperceptible so as 
to make it seem that the Pavilion has always been read this way and, therefore, 
that the Pavilion does not seem designed at all. The following text provides an 
account of a number of architectural redesigns temporarily carried out in the 
Pavilion that were meant to challenge its daily management. All of them were 
effective to a certain extent in exposing the Pavilion’s daily life as a constructed 
process, rather than as something that occurred naturally, and its architecture 
as a momentous actor in the making of the milieu of associations the Pavilion 
exists by.
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M i e s - Knowing  Soc i e ty
Figure 2 is difficult to identify, but it was shot inside one of the best known and 
most photographed examples of modern architecture, the Barcelona Pavilion 
(built in 1986 according to designs of the architects Cristian Cirici, Fernando 
Ramos and Ignasi de Solá Morales). The Pavilion was conceived as a recon-
struction of the Reich Repräsentationspavillon (the German National Pavilion), 
designed and built under the direction of Ludwig Mies van der Rohe and Lilly 
Reich as part of the 1929 Barcelona International Exhibition. According to the 
Fundació Mies van der Rohe, the public foundation that manages the building 
and its image rights, the Barcelona Pavilion caters to four main functions: (1) 
To be open to the public from 10am to 8pm daily, with a 10 euro ticket cost. 
Visiting the Barcelona Pavilion is a cultural activity that people interested in 
arts and architecture would plan when travelling to Barcelona. It is part of the 
informal curriculum most architectural students from European, American 
and Japanese schools of architecture are expected to be familiar with. (2) To 
be available for temporary rental. Parties, commercial photo-shoots, cultural 
happenings, product launches, and wedding receptions are some of the events 
hosted in the Pavilion that contribute to the building’s economic feasibility. (3) 
To serve as a location where town hall officials take visiting decision makers to 
provide them with evidence of what Barcelona is about, its capacity to success-
fully engage on international projects and its belonging to the historical making 
of modernity.1 (4) To be periodically photographed as a key piece of Mies van 
der Rohe’s work and to be included in publications circulated on- and off-line.
All four functions that the Pavilion performs play an important role in the 
making of what could be called ‘the distributed societies of Mies-knowing. This 
refers to the collective way that societies constituted by Mies’ buildings – as they 
currently exist, have existed, are reconstructed, or as originally envisioned by 
the various architectural offices and student groups Mies directed – associate 
with the fabrication, sorting, archiving, publication, distribution, surveying, 
exhibiting, celebrating, fictionalising or criticising of Mies-related entities. The 
participants in this conversation are the many people who are enthusiastic about 
Mies (who I will call ‘Mies-knowers’ from now on).
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The  Ba s ement
Although visits, events, official tours and photographs are usually experienced 
as spontaneous registries of the ‘whole of the building’, they are actually the 
result of careful adjustments in the material constitution of the building itself, 
and of its daily maintenance, style and management.
The 1929 Reich Repräsentationspavillon only had a small underground recep-
tacle, no larger than 5 m2, but its 1986 reconstruction included a 1050 m2, 2.4 
metre-high mostly underground basement. The basement is not part of the 
visitor’s parcour. Until recently, it has never been included in the numerous 
circulating photographs of the Pavilion; nor has it ever been discussed by any 
of the many architectural historians, critics or theoreticians who have written 
about the building. Cirici, Ramos and de Solà-Morales initially conceived the 
basement as the place where the plumbing and the filtering equipment – which 
reclaims the water of the two ponds located aboveground – could be accom-
modated and reached for periodical maintenance, thus avoiding having to do 
work on the upper floor, which would affect the building’s visitors and events. 
However, the basement ended up performing many other functions as well. The 
broken tinted glass in Figure 6.2 was removed from the Pavilion’s aboveground 
floor when it was accidentally broken. In the same way, broken travertine marble 
slabs (Fig. 6.1) and ripped white-leather cushions that once were part of the 
upper floor’s decor are stored down in the basement once they are no longer 
pristine – to be replaced by identical-looking new ones, so that the upper floor 
never manifests the existence of accidents, breaking or ripping. Figure 3 shows 
a velvet curtain faded by the sun. It was removed, replaced by a new one, and 
put in the basement once it lost its uniform red color, in case its presence on the 
upper floor reminded anyone that the Pavilion has aged, and also to avoid any 
dissimilarities from photographs taken of the Reich Repräsentationspavillon on 
its opening on the morning of 27 May 1929, when only new materials where 
in evidence.2
The bottom of one of the ponds was initially covered with black acrylic panels 
that warped unexpectedly within a few months. They were replaced by glass 
panels and stored in the basement (Fig. 6.3). One of the stainless steel frames 
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of the Pavilion pivot doors deformed due to its weight and eventually broke at 
its upper hinge. The whole door was replaced by one with a lighter frame and 
stored in the basement. Evidence of trial-and-error tentative material develop-
ment are concealed in the basement, so that the upper part of the Pavilion can 
be acknowledged as resulting directly from Mies’ mind and thoughts.3
The basement also shapes the Pavilion’s association with different kinds of 
life. Early in the morning, before the Pavilion is opened to the public, Fanny 
Nole, a staff member (Fig. 6.6), removes the algae growing in the rainwater that 
accumulates in the holes of the travertine paving slabs, using for this purpose 
a Kärcher machine, which injects pressurised water into the holes, and then a 
vacuum cleaner. Both machines are placed in the basement before visitors are 
allowed in (Fig. 6.5). The basement is also the place where Nole has lunch, 
puts on her working clothes and rests. Figure 9 shows the hidden-in-the-
basement machinery that filtrates and dilutes chlorine into the Pavilion’s two 
ponds. Figure 7 shows the place where the cat Niebla (Fig. 6.8) sleeps, eats 
and defecates. Niebla is taken to the upper floor every night to help prevent 
rodent infestation.
Fig. 6.3  Broken travertine slabs and remaining pieces of Alpine marble stored in 
the basement of the Barcelona Pavilion (photo: Andrés Jaque, 2012)
Fig. 6.4  Fading velvet curtain stored in the basement of the Barcelona Pavilion 
(photo: Andrés Jaque, 2012)
Fig. 6.5  Hoses, Kärcher machine, vacuum cleaner and mop in the basement of 
the Barcelona Pavilion (photo: Andrés Jaque, 2012)
Fig. 6.6  Fanny Nole (photo: Andrés Jaque, 2012)
Fig. 6.7  Niebla’s cat space in the basement of the Barcelona Pavilion (photo: 
Andrés Jaque, 2012)
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Specific spatial, technological and performative design arrangements are 
carried out within/by the basement to remove algae and rodents from spaces 
where crowds use the Pavilion. To effect this, presences like the Kärcher, the 
vacuum cleaner, Nole and Niebla are convened to realise specific daily perfor-
mances by which they engage with the Pavilion’s ongoing production. These 
performances thus include the temporary confinement of the Kärcher, Nole and 
Niebla in the basement, which helps to conceal from visitors the processes and 
performances by which the presences and absences of the rodents and algae – 
and of the Kärcher, Nole and Niebla themselves – are distributed and effected. 
One result of this is that visitors experience the appearance of the Pavilion as a 
given, one whose association with living beings is embodied in its design and 
not dependent on practices such as the ones that the Kärcher, Nole and Niebla 
perform daily.
Two architectural elements connect the basement with the aboveground 
part of the Pavilion, neither of which is suitable for human circulation: a spiral 
staircase and a dumbwaiter. The stairway’s headroom clearance fails to comply 
Fig. 6.8  Niebla, the cat of the Barcelona Pavilion (photos and composition: Andrés 
Jaque, 2012)
Fig. 6.9  Filtering system in the basement of the Barcelona Pavilion (photo: Andrés 
Jaque, 2012)
Fig. 6.10  Removed plexiglass cladding in the basement of the Barcelona Pavilion 
(photo: Andrés Jaque, 2012)
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with architectural regulations and, together with the lack of a fire escape, makes 
the basement unsuitable for an occupancy permit. This could be seen as a design 
flaw, but it was actually an intentional decision taken by the architects to make 
it unlikely that in the future the Pavilion’s visitor tours would expand into the 
basement. Consequently, visitors’ unawareness of the basement was, so to speak, 
built into their relationship with the Pavilion.4
Carpets, lights, cables, microphones, chairs and other equipment used when 
space is rented out at the Pavilion is hidden in the basement when not in use 
(Fig. 6.12).
According to Víctor Sánchez, the Pavilion’s manager, no visitor has ever 
asked about the basement: ‘Visitors coming here already have a relationship 
with architecture and design.5 They already know the Pavilion. They know what 
it is that they come to see. They know what to expect. They do not ask, “What 
is going on?” or “What is it?” They just come, sit down on the benches. Some 
of them spend three hours like that. […] Our visitor is one that knows Mies, 
and one who knows that comes to see “nothing”’.6
Fig. 6.11  Broken door in the basement of the Barcelona Pavilion (photo: Andrés 
Jaque, 2012)
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This ‘nothingness’ is the Pavilion itself, not as the all-above-ground-building 
that ages, breaks and fades, with spontaneously evolving aquatic ecosystems, 
mice and rats, produced in a tentative process of material experimentation, but 
as a two-storey building that is part of and contributes to producing a society 
of people, books, historiographies, and the performance of visiting the Pavilion 
itself. Thus visitors photograph it the way it is expected to be photographed, 
and photograph themselves within the interior of the Pavilion’s upper floor – 
all of them ignoring the existence of7 its basement, by which certain presences, 
and certain performances, are promoted and others evacuated. In this way the 
basement determines the Pavilion’s aesthetics and therefore the way its social 
dimension is sensed. It distributes visibilities and hides the evidence that prove 
the Pavilion’s materiality to be the result of an iterative experimental develop-
ment affected by contingency and uncertainty, and evolving in time through 
processes of aging, accident and emergency.
Fig. 6.12  Events equipment in the basement of the Barcelona Pavilion (photo: 
Andrés Jaque, 2012)
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S pott ing  th e  F law a s  H i e rarchy-
Maker  V e r su s  Soc i a l  Mult i p l i c i t y
The performance of interrogating the material configuration of the built Pavilion, 
in regards to the constructed-in-the-circulating-documents known Pavilion, when 
visiting the built Pavilion, produces a hierarchy among different ways of being a 
Mies-knower. Mies-knowers visiting the Pavilion often engage in a sort of ‘spot 
the difference’ activity that provides opportunities to acknowledge the superior 
competence of those capable of recognising small differences. The capacity to 
spot features – such as the fact that it was not the Philips-head screws of the 
1986 reconstruction that were used in the 1929 Pavilion, or that the butterfly-
like disposition of the onyx’s veins shows that it is not the one used in the 1929 
construction – identifies particular Mies-knowers and specific ways of perform-
ing as a Mies-knower as advanced Mies-knowers. Hierarchy makes it possible 
for the Mies-knowing societies to avoid reading those differences as evidence 
of the impossibility of detaching the materiality of the Pavilion from the social 
dependencies and contingencies that shape it. Rather, differences are presented 
among Mies-knowers as mistakes (mistakes caused by a lack of knowledge or 
capacity to connect knowledge with design and construction on the part of the 
architects who reconstructed the Pavilion in the 1980s).
This way of assessing architects’ authority by their competence to recognise 
the reconstruction’s similarity or dissimilarity with the 1929 Pavilion played an 
important role in the decision-making process during the construction of the 
Barcelona Pavilion. In response to a scarcity of onyx in the last stages of the 
Pavilion’s construction in 1986, one of the architects proposed replacing that 
rare mineral with a large printout of photographed onyx. The architect’s sup-
posed lack of engagement with what is generally considered to be the truthful 
materiality of the 1929 Pavilion is recurrently narrated in conversations as an 
evidence of his lack of ‘knowledge’ about Mies’ material sensitivity (Reuter and 
Schule 2008). As I interviewed different people involved in the daily running 
of the Pavilion, I was often told about this infamous architect’s cladding pro-
posal, and was advised to discount anything this person might tell me related 
to my project.
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In 1938, Mies van der Rohe patented, with Walter Peterhans, a ‘Method for 
the production of large photographs and negatives’, with the intention of using 
wall-sized photographs of precious materials as architectural components. This 
fact being a lesser-known aspect of Mies’ trajectory, most Mies-knowers are not 
aware of it. It would have been perfectly possible to recognise the discredited 
architect as a Mies-knower participant of an alternative Mies-knowing society, 
but this would have eliminated the hierarchy’s capacity to deny multiplicity 
among the Mies-knower societies.
The evaluation of the capacity to ‘find authenticity flaws’ among Mies-
knowers – understood as their capacity to express disappointment when con-
fronted with differences between the Pavilion as a circulating and discussed 
reality and the built Barcelona Pavilion – is performed by Mies-knowers as a 
means to collectively agree on how roles are distributed among different ways of 
performing as a Mies-knower and also as a multiplicity resulting from different 
ways of constituting Mies-knowing societies.
Other  M i e s - Knower s  for  Other 
M i e s - Knowing  Soc i e t i e s
The Pavilion is simultaneously part of many different social enactments. People 
often access the building trying to find a place to relax or talk after partying 
in Montjuïc. There are numerous cases of drunk youngsters trying to dive 
into the 30 cm-deep pond. There are also people who engage in gay cruising 
at night in its back garden, and others who enter the Pavilion searching for 
shelter from the rain. Homeless people use it as a place to sleep. Stray cats 
sneak in to drink from the ponds. A number of realities neither associated 
nor registered with/by the publications, the photographs, the narrations, the 
archives and the performances of the previously mentioned Mies-knowing 
societies are themselves enacting alternative ways of knowing Mies by regis-
tering it and visiting the built Pavilion, contributing to other possible Mies-
knowing societies.
Fig. 6.13  Phantom. Mies as Rendered Society (photo: Andrés Jaque, 2012)
Fig. 6.14  Phantom. Mies as Rendered Society (research and drawings: Office for 
Political Innovation. Graphic design: David Lorente and Tomoko Sakamoto)
Fig. 6.15  Phantom. Mies as Rendered Society (photo: Andrés Jaque, 2012)
Fig. 6.16  Phantom. Mies as Rendered Society (research and drawings: Office for Political Innovation; 
graphic design David Lorente and Tomoko Sakamoto)
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Tak ing  th e  Ba s ement  Content s  U p s ta i r s
In 2011, the architectural office I direct, the Office for Political Innovation, was 
invited to intervene in the Barcelona Pavilion through a temporary architectural 
installation. Our intervention, called Phantom. Mies as Rendered Society, was 
programmed from December 13 2012 to February 27 2013. It consisted of two 
strategies: (1) Distributing a great selection of objects usually stored in the base-
ment around the ground floor. Faded curtains, pieces of broken glass, broken 
travertine slabs, chlorine bags, the acrylic panels removed from the bottom 
of the pond, the Kärcher and vacuum-cleaner, event chairs, Niebla’s litterbox, 
and so on were set in the most visible parts of the Pavilion’s upper floor (Figs. 
6.13, 6.14, 6.15), confronting the main axes of visitor movement in that area. 
(2) Maps of the installation were piled at the entrance and offered to visitors. 
The maps exposed the material histories of twenty-three objects (or groups 
of objects) taken from the basement to the upper floor, as well as the objects’ 
participation in extended social interactions (Fig. 6.16).
Three periods can be distinguished in the way the Pavilion’s societies evolved 
following the intervention. During the first weeks it was mostly Mies-knowers 
who responded to the intervention. Their reactions manifested the technologies 
and practices by which they engaged with the Pavilion, and this made it possible 
to track the networks that the built Pavilion is part of.
The intervention was temporarily ‘the most popular story’ in several design-
oriented blogs (Fig. 6.17). The stories related to the twenty-three objects were 
not published online, but photographs of the intervention itself were published. 
The first reactions, prompted by photographs, were followed by fleshed-out 
reviews in architectural media by well-known critics, who contextualised the 
intervention within a number of specific architectural and artistic traditions8
The intervention succeeded in redistributing Mies-knowers visiting the 
Pavilion as participants in specialised Mies-knowing groups.
Group 1. A great number of visitors, not informed of the intervention, con-
spicuously complained of the way unexpected presences disturbed the experi-
ence they had anticipated, as an exacerbated version of the ‘spot the difference’ 
practice. In their complaints, Phantom was described as a ‘mistake’ and the 
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result of a lack of competence on the staff ’s part in their capacity to assess how 
to manage the Pavilion. As a result of their confounded expectations, a number 
of visitors, according to the testimonies of the Pavilion’s staff, engaged in actions 
that challenged the authority of the Pavilion’s custodians, such as refusing to 
pay to enter the Pavilion, or insulting them. The use of photographic cameras, 
however, often helped those same visitors construct their expected image of 
the Pavilion. By trying to find points of view in which the main features of the 
building could be photographed without including any of the objects added 
by the intervention, these visitors were obliged to experience the building in 
ways divergent from the usual visitor’s tour, in a kind of tactical displacement. 
The work of finding the place from which the expected image could be recon-
structed through photography became a reconstructive performance itself, one 
that turned the ‘spotting the difference’ practice into a ‘removing-the-difference’ 
one, rendering uninformed Mies-knowers as constructors of the Pavilion as one 
coupled with its expanded Mies-literate accounts.
Group 2. This group comprised followers of architectural blogs who rapidly 
incorporated the intervention as part of the Pavilion’s temporary online social 
life. Reviews and images of the intervened Pavilion encouraged them to revisit 
it. They accepted the intervention as an extension of the Pavilion-knowing 
society of which they were a part.
Fig. 6.17  Comments in Dezeen reacting to Phantom. Mies as Rendered Society
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Group 3. A number of interactions within online platforms frequented 
by Mies-knowers had the effect of expanding the intervention’s strategy and 
mobilising unnoticed parts of the Pavilion’s enactment. Many comments hosted 
information on accidents, unknown events or artists’ guerrilla works on the 
Pavilion. Outraged Mies-knowers, who considered the intervention to be 
misaligned with Mies’ ‘essentiality’, satirised the intervention by distributing 
images of compositions of what they would consider non-Miesian disgraceful 
technologies (including buckets, mops or Hello Kitties); they identified these 
technologies as disconnected to their shared notions of what Mies’ essence 
could mean, but by publishing these images they also made them visible, thus 
inadvertently creating a collective archive of the counter-Miesian.
Alt e r ing  La bour  A s s e s sment
The relocation of a number of needed technologies on the ground floor, such 
as the vacuum cleaner, the Kärcher machine and the pesticides used by the 
Pavilion’s gardeners, transformed some of the Pavilion’s daily routines. Usually, 
the distinction between the custodial staff and the floor staff is clearly marked: 
there is a time for the custodial staff (before the Pavilion opens to the public, 
mainly consisting of cleaning) and a time for the floor staff (after the cleaning has 
ended). The two staff sections are also hired in different ways: the custodial staff 
is hired through a subcontracted company, which makes their jobs less durable 
and more sensitive to daily assessment, while the floor staff is hired directly by 
the Fundació Mies van der Rohe. The Foundation’s endorsement by both the 
municipal and the regional government means that the employment situation 
of the floor staff is more durable and less dependent on daily assessment. The 
intervention’s displacement of cleaning objects such as the vacuum cleaner, 
the Kärcher machine and pesticides rearticulated the way decisions were taken 
in regards to the way visitors experienced the Pavilion. Nole’s knowledge was 
needed in deciding where the machinery could be safely exhibited to visitors, 
and in weighing the risk of exhibiting pesticides within visitors’ reach. The 
presence of previously segregated agents in locations where they would have 
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the opportunity to interact with visitors implied/required a redistribution of 
the roles played by individual staff members. If this could be seen as an oppor-
tunity for subcontracted employees to remain vital and enliven their jobs, it 
also worked the other way around. According to Nole’s testimony, a large part 
of her job was perceived by others as easy to do, whereas in fact she considered 
it tough and risky. She was responsible for the care of precious materials, and 
if things were damaged, she would likely be the one to take the blame. Due to 
the usual time divide between her job and the rest of the staff, others had never 
witnessed her working. When Nole’s work became transparent, any accidents 
that might occur – and according to her, ‘accidents are inevitable’ – would likely 
lessen her chances of retaining her job.9
The  S t inky  Water  D i l emma
The displacement of objects made it more difficult to treat the pond water in 
the usual way. The water stopped being raked, and after several weeks leaves had 
accumulated and the water started to lose its clarity. Even though the intervention 
was originally met with great resistance among the directors of the Foundation, 
the support of art-interested board members, the media impact and the increased 
flow of visitors attracted by the media attention eventually caused the direc-
tors to celebrate the project. Once the pond was filled with objects from the 
basement, it became too difficult to rake the water. Most of the intervention’s 
transformations remained unnoticed by the Foundation’s directors, but there 
was concern that the water would start to smell, which obliged acknowledge-
ment of the capacity for the intervention to result in actual, as opposed to merely 
symbolic, ecosystemical transformation. The Foundation perceived the smelly 
water as a problem that would unnecessarily deter prospective event-location 
seekers. But since the intervention had been officially presented as a culturally 
valuable art work, any action to remove the installation would make it seem as 
if the Foundation was not being supportive in its cultural program, and could 
even jeopardise its partnership with donors such as Fundació Banc Sabadell that 
had specifically supported the intervention. Two of the Foundation’s sources 
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of income (rental of space and sponsorship) were jeopardised by incompat-
ible versions of the built Pavilion’s ecosystems. The Foundation’s directors 
were paralysed by the impossibility of making a decision that would resolve 
the dilemma. The installation, for those Mies-knowers informed of its context 
within contemporary art, was already part of a Mies-knowing society, the one in 
which previous interventions in the Pavilion sponsored by the Fundació Banc 
Sabadell were already participating in a superadvanced Mies-knowing society. 
In a step towards a further layering of the Mies-knowers’ societies, for other 
groups of Mies-knowers the accumulation of leaves in the pond was turning 
the pristine Pavilion into what they would consider a non-Miesian swamp. 
No decision was taken, so the leaves accumulated until the day the installation 
closed. Once it was dismounted, the elements brought to the upper floor were 
taken back to the basement.
Whereas the 1929 German National Pavilion, as one of the preeminent 
masterpieces of modern architecture, has often been explained by architectural 
critics, such as Rubió i Tudurí and Tafuri, as an autonomous material entity 
operating beyond the mundane and the contingent, the role played by the 
basement of the Pavilion’s 1986 reconstruction shows the Pavilion as a socially 
distributed assemblage, one produced by the association of the building with 
humans, books, and documents circulating online. The design of the actual 
experience of visiting the Pavilion plays a key role in both stabilising the extended 
assemblage and enacting the process by which the evidence of its mundanity 
is excluded, hidden or policed as external to the assemblage or discredited as 
‘mistaken’. The durability of this metaphysically-perceived assemblage depends on 
its capacity to keep its constructed condition hidden, a task that relies heavily 
on the basement’s performance.
The intervention Phantom subverted the long-running relationship between 
the basement and the upper floor of the Pavilion by exposing the way that 
the Pavilion, rather than transcending the mundane and deploying a capacity 
to accommodate the social, is itself the social and contributes to the making 
of the social. The intervention enabled this contribution to gain new layers 
of multiplicity by allowing the Pavilion’s assemblages to divide and increase, 
not least by drawing attention to the participation of the building itself. The 
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intervention also forced the detachment of previously important contributors, 
such as Fanny Nole, from the Pavilion’s assemblage; for instance, in the way Nole’s 
involvement in the sensibility of the assemblage was challenged. Including the 
Kärcher and Niebla in the Mies-knowers’ aesthetics, therefore making acces-
sible Nole’s performance, eventually excluded her from the assemblage. The 
dilemma of the stinky leaves shows the impossibility for design of delivering 
universal enrolment, and also demonstrates the role aesthetics can play in the 
daily competition between self-excluding assemblages, each based on alterna-
tive ways of sensing propriety (in this case, those based on the value of cultural 
experimentation versus those dependent on notions of celebration based on 
stereotypical sensorial comfort).
Note s
1 This practice started soon after the 1986 Barcelona Pavilion began construction, in 
the years that Pascual Maragall was the mayor of Barcelona. Cristian Cirici, architect and 
co-author of the 1986 Barcelona Pavilion in audio-recorded conversation with Andrés 
Jaque, 2011.
2 With the only exception of Der Morgen, a 1925 bronze sculpture by Georg Kolbe, that 
was considered the only ‘artistic content’ of the 1929 Pavilion. It is part of a two-piece 
installation, ‘Der Morgen und Der Abend’, placed at the Ceciliengärten at Tempelhof-
Schöneberg, Berlin. It was temporarily included in the Pavilion and brought back to 
Ceciliengärten soon after the Pavilion’s dismantling.
3 ‘When it comes to take decisions about the Pavilion we try to put ourselves in the 
architect’s head [in Mies’ head]’. Marius Quintans, architect in charge of the Pavilion’s 
maintenance, in audio-recorded conversation with Andrés Jaque, 2011.
4 Isabel Bach, on-site architect during the construction of the Pavilion and the architect 
in charge of the maintenance after its opening, in audio recorded conversation with Andrés 
Jaque, 2011.
5 For those not familiar with the historiography of modern architecture, it is important 
to understand the relevance of the 1929 building and its circulation through all kinds of 
media in the construction of a shared discussion among most Western-educated architects. 
Photographs and plans of the Pavilion were included in the 1932 exhibition ‘Modern 
Architecture: International Exhibition’ at the Museum of Modern Art in New York, 
which was remarkably influential in the formation of the modern canon. A black-and-
white photograph of the Pavilion illustrated the front page of the catalogue of the 1947 
exhibition that the Museum of Modern Art dedicated to the work of Mies van der Rohe, a 
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catalogue that, according to most Mies’ historians, consolidated his image as it is currently 
known among many architects, and promoted Mies, by means of numerous technologies, 
as a ‘master’ of the modern architectural movement. The most relevant researchers of the 
work of Mies van der Rohe, including Beatriz Colomina, Caroline Constant, Michael K. 
Hays, Henry-Russell Hitchcock, Philip Johnson, Franz Schulze, Manfredo Tafuri and Wolf 
Tegethoff have all considered that the extensive circulation of photographs, drawings, 
models and literary descriptions of the Pavilion, since its construction to the present, 
has made it the most quoted and the most influential of Mies’ works, a game-changing 
design that anticipates the work developed by him in different parts of the world after he 
moved to the US in 1937, and a formal and constructive model in the development of 
corporative, cultural, educational and residtential modern architecture since the 1960s.
6 Víctor Sánchez in audio-recorded conversation with Andrés Jaque, 2011.
7 ‘[Visitors] always make sure to have the building as a background in their photographs. 
Like it is happens in this case [pointing to a couple giving instructions to another visitor 
about the way to include a sculpture and a green marble wall as the background to the 
photograph the other visitor is taking of the couple]. It is often difficult to achieve, 
specially in the stairs. […] I guess it is the normal way for them to “access” a place like 
this’. Alejandro Raya in audio-recorded conversation with Andrés Jaque, 2011.
8 Axel N. (n.d.) and Pohl, E.B. (2013).
9 Fanny Nole in conversation with Andrés Jaque, 2012.
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EARTH,  F IRE ,  ART: 
PYROTECHNOLOGY AND 
THE CRAFTING OF THE 
SOCIAL
Nigel Clark
I n troduct ion :  I n s i d e  out,  Out s i d e  i n
celebrated for his depiction of atMospheric effects, the painter J. 
M. W. Turner is often regarded as a predecessor of impressionism or even abstract 
expressionism. Philosopher Michel Serres takes a different angle, proposing 
that the artist is a ‘proper realist’ (1982: 57). With deadly accuracy, proclaims 
Serres, Turner reveals a social order being transformed by fiery energy. He is first 
amongst artists to truly capture the changes under way in the early nineteenth 
century, as a way of life pushed along by wind, water-flow and muscle submits 
to a world propelled by steam. While the forms of trains, boats and bridges 
may still be visible amidst elemental upheaval, what Turner’s paintings actually 
show, Serres insists, are the thermochemical reactions taking place inside the 
industrial heat engine: ‘Turner no longer looks from the outside […] he enters 
into the boiler, the furnace, the firebox’ (1983: 56). While the boiler envelops 
and harnesses the forces of the cosmos, so too does the whole universe begin 
to appear in the guise of the blazing energetic metamorphoses occurring within 
the steam engine:
174
inventing the social
the engine dissolves into the world that resembles it. […] Heaven, sea, earth, 
and thunder are the interior of a boiler which bakes the material of the world 
[…]. Hotter and hotter, less and less confined by a boundary (1983: 60).
As Serres would have it, Turner’s canvasses show us not merely an energetic 
societal transition in process, but the emergence of a whole new way of relat-
ing to and understanding the earth and the universe: a cosmology mediated by 
machines whose primary purpose is to convert heat into work. But perhaps it 
is the late twentieth-century philosopher who is as much the visionary as his 
early Victorian subject. Serres’ article on Turner was first published in 1974, in 
the midst of an energy crisis but well in advance of the rise of global concern 
over climate change. As climate scientists would soon be telling us, the energetic 
reactions taking place inside the boiler, the turbine and the motor were indeed 
transforming the world on the outside. The industrial heat engine’s impact was 
being felt far beyond the bounds of its metallic casing: its cumulative carbon 
emissions were quite literally baking the material of the world, rendering the 
earth hotter and hotter.
Climate change has quickly emerged as an imperative – perhaps unprec-
edented in scale and urgency – to reinvent the social. Successive international 
forums, reports and manifestos have called for new and binding international 
legislation, novel political architectures, technological and infrastructural tran-
sition, new economic instruments, and even complete socioeconomic system 
change. If the semantic core of invention, as Jacques Derrida reminds us, is the 
Latin venire – to come (2007: 6; Caputo 2012: 28), so too is climate change – in 
the most literal sense – an incoming, an arrival, an event.
Recent research points to an eventual sea level rise of around 2.3 meters for 
each degree of warming – an irreversible advance of salty and increasingly acidic 
water into the low-lying coastal zones where our species now clusters in vast 
numbers (Montaigne 2013). Along with these more-or-less calculable changes 
comes a host of possible but defiantly unpredictable outcomes: nonlinear shifts 
in climatic systems, ecosystem collapses, extreme weather events. Shorthanded 
in the Anthropocene concept is the proposition that thermo-industrially induced 
changes in atmospheric composition are one of the main drivers pushing the 
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entire earth system into a new state, a possibility that would afford humankind – 
or part thereof – the status of geological agent (Crutzen 2002; Zalasiewicz et 
al. 2008; Clark 2014).
At the 2015 UN Climate Change Conference in Paris, representatives of 
195 nation states agreed in principle that the prevention of dangerous climate 
change requires some 80% of known reserves of fossil hydrocarbons to remain 
in the ground. One way or another, Turner’s world of irrupting fiery energy – 
which is still in many ways our own energetic cosmos – must undergo yet 
another transformation. A pressing question now is whether the productivity, 
mobilities and levels of consumption attained through combusting the fos-
silised biomass of ancient geological epochs can be sustained using alternative 
energy sources, or whether there needs to be a fundamental shift in the kinds 
of social existence that we are trying to power (see Urry 2013). A related and 
no less important question is whether we should be thinking in terms of social 
groups and formations with heavy carbon footprints renouncing their geologi-
cal agency, or whether it might be more fruitful to consider what other forms 
or modalities of collective ‘geological being’ might be explored and developed 
(see Yusoff 2013). To ask, in other words, what kinds of geological agents we 
might yet become.
In this way, it is not only social futures but entire planetary futures that now 
seem to be at stake. From the point of view of social agency, however, the sheer 
scale of such issues – encompassing at once the spatial extensivity of the whole 
earth and the temporal span of past, present and possible geological epochs – can 
feel numbingly distant from lived experience and collective purchase ( Jasanoff 
2011: 237–38). It is in this sense that I want to come back to Serres’ twist on 
Turner, and his elegant idea of turning outsides in and insides out. What Serres’ 
depiction of the industrial heat engine as an enfolding of the forces of the earth 
might offer us is a means of moving between scales. His image of an envelopment, 
a concentration and intensification that in turn opens outwards to transform 
the world, can take us from the tangible scale of single enclosed space to the 
vastness of the planet, and back again. More than just a way of getting our heads 
around planet-sized problems, Serres’ folding/unfolding logic points to how 
we might get our hands involved in the crafting of social and planetary futures. 
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The idea of enfolding a section of the world’s turbulence and forcefulness so 
that it is modestly enough scaled to actually do some work, I want to suggest, 
could help us imagine spaces conducive to collective experimentation with 
geological agency.
While Serres offers us an alluring entry point to the folding-in-and-out theme, 
it is Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1987) who have more systematically 
explored the fold as a worldly operation or practice that brings new things into 
being. Borrowing the idea of ‘creative involution’ from Henri Bergson (1998), 
they propose that the most surprising and generative changes in the world tend 
to come not from following a single line of development (evolution) but from 
an enfolding or involution of an outside that is composed and structured very 
differently from the interior into which it is drawn. ‘Becoming is involution-
ary, involution is creative’, Deleuze and Guattari argue (1987: 238, see also 
pp. 46–7). Such creative involution might include previously distinct human 
technologies coming together or the conjoining of unrelated life-forms, but so 
too might it include human or other living things reengaging with the whole 
geological substratum in some new way (De Landa 1997: 25–8). But Deleuze 
and Guattari also make it clear that capturing and incorporating elements from 
a completely different layer or stratum of existence is inherently risky, precisely 
because it involves a new intimacy with an entire domain of potent and unfa-
miliar forces (1987: 502–03).
What interests me in this chapter is how – in the context of changing cli-
mate and shifting earth systems – we might reinvent the social and ourselves 
as social beings by transforming the way we tap into, enfold and incorporate 
the planet’s geological strata. What I am not going to do is to try and map 
out the precise forms that such a geological renegotiation – a geologic involu-
tion – might or ought to take. Instead, I want to take an extended run up, and 
ask what the contemporary challenge of constructing novel geo-social futures 
might be able to learn from a long and rich history of prior social engagements 
with geological strata.
That early industrial moment that Serres (with the help of Turner) depicts 
so evocatively was far from the beginning of the enclosure and setting to work 
of the earth’s fiery energies. In order to utilise the potent, condensed energy 
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of fossilised hydrocarbons, the inventors of modern heat engines required a 
wealth of collective experience in working with fire or combustible matter. More 
specifically, they needed to be able to contain and control intense combustion 
in an enclosed space. This ability, I argue, emerged gradually over countless 
generations from diverse and widely distributed practices involving the use of 
concentrated heat in ovens, kilns and furnaces: a set of arts or techniques that has 
been described as ‘pirotechnia’ or more recently, ‘pyrotechnology’ (Biringuccio 
1990; Wertime 1964, 1973; Rehder 2000). Scholars of the deep history of tech-
nological innovation have spoken of ‘a single, complex pyrotechnic tradition’ 
spanning some ten thousand years, that includes the ceramic, metallurgical and 
glass-making arts (Wertime 1973: 676). But whereas modern heat engines are 
centred on the use of heat to produce force or do ‘prime-moving’ work, these 
fiery arts are focused on the transformation of a whole range of materials into 
novel forms, structures and objects.
In a quite literal fashion, pyrotechnology generated many of the materials 
out of which sedentary – some would say ‘civilised’ – social existence has been 
composed. But it is as much the process as the products that concern us here. 
Pyrotechnology can be seen as a multi-millennial spree of experimentation – one 
that involved a whole new enfolding of the geological domain into the social 
world. It is in this sense that we might ask what lessons, insights and inspira-
tions the pyrotechnic arts offer for any current social renegotiation with the 
geologic. And in particular, what role fire might come to play in the invention 
of novel social worlds if it were to be set to tasks other than burning fossilised 
hydrocarbons.
F i e ry  Art s  and  th e  I nv ent ion  o f  th e  Soc i a l
Revisiting Turner two decades after his first engagement with him, Serres speaks 
of the painter’s ‘pyrotechnical canvases’ (1997: 2), a phrase that gestures at once 
to the fiery themes of his artwork and to the more general way in which new 
modes of combustion were then transforming the very fabric of nineteenth-
century society. But Turner, his art suggests, is no cheerleader of industrial 
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revolution. His is a profoundly ambivalent vision of the turbulent new world. 
And he is not alone. For all their innovations in putting fossil hydrocarbons 
to work, northwest Europeans have been deeply equivocal about the whole 
business of combustion-driven industrialism – and en masse they have rarely 
mourned its outsourcing to other regions. Then again, Europeans are not par-
ticularly enamoured with open-air fire either (Pyne 2001: 168–70; Clark & 
Yusoff 2014: 209–10).
By planetary standards, Europe is ‘an anomalously fire-free patch’, as envi-
ronmental historian Stephen Pyne puts it (2001: 168). This is partly an effect 
of Europe’s perennial coolness, dampness and corresponding lack of a defined 
fire season, though it also reflects the intensity of agriculture that can be sup-
ported by its recently glaciated soils (Pyne 1997: 18–20). In such a densely 
gardened region, there is simply not much of a niche left for burning, and 
not a lot of enthusiasm for letting flames claim a share of biotic productivity. 
Whereas most cultures worldwide have tended to appreciate the value of open 
fire or ‘broadcast burning’ for enhancing the productivity of grassland, scrub 
and forest, Pyne observes, modern Europeans and their cultural progeny have 
developed a pronounced tendency to associate blazing fire with disorder and 
wastefulness. They have come to see open flame as a signal of bad farm manage-
ment or societal breakdown rather than as a medium of regeneration and new 
life, a tool of insurgents and ‘firebrands’ rather than a means of crafting com-
munal bonds or caring for the landscape (Pyne 1997: 162–68; 2001: 145–46; 
see also Marder 2015). And this tendency to dwell on fire’s destructive side 
seems to be exacerbated by the highly publicised impact of combusting fossil 
fuels on the global climate.
European discomfort with anything other than fully domesticated flame is 
paralleled by a marked marginalisation of fire in Western scientific and philo-
sophical thought, as Gaston Bachelard has noted (1987: 2–3). ‘In the twentieth 
century,’ adds sociologist Johan Goudsblom, ‘social scientists have tended to 
follow their colleagues in the natural sciences and have dropped the subject 
of fire from their agenda’ (1992: 3). That fire does not have its own science is 
remarkable when we consider that Earth is the only planet in the solar system 
on which fire occurs, that Homo sapiens is the earth’s only fire-manipulating 
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species, and that over the last million or so years the genus Homo has deployed 
fire with such prodigiousness as to have transformed most of the planet’s surface 
(Pyne 1994; 1997: 3). Fire, as Pyne (2015) would have it, is not so much an 
element or a substance as a reaction that brings together the earth’s other ele-
ments – synthesising air, water, and earth into a single event. This too is how we 
might see the role of fire in crafting social worlds. Not only do flames transform 
the very stuff of the world, but fire also has a special role in simmering, fusing, 
melding, alloying and annealing the heterogeneous elements of social life into 
workable unity. To which must be added fire’s omnipresent capacity to unravel 
and obliterate the very order it has helped bring into being (Derrida 1991: 
43–4, 57; Clark 2012).
How humans first came to an understanding of fire’s transformative effects 
on vegetation, flesh, wood, bone, stone and clay is largely a matter of speculation. 
It is with the development of agriculture and more sedentary settlement pat-
terns shortly after the end of the last Pleistocene glaciation – some 10 to 11,000 
years ago – that evidence mounts of the systematic use of heat to transmute 
the structure of inorganic matter (Wertime 1973). There is broad agreement 
amongst pyrotechnic scholars that ceramics was the first real pyrotechnology, 
emerging most likely as an offshoot of the ovens whose intense heat rendered 
grains and other agricultural products palatable (Wertime 1973: 676; Rehder 
2000: 42). While the oven itself might appear to be no more than a stepwise 
development of the open cooking hearth, there is another sense in which we 
might view these novel enclosures of fire as a new kind of human geological 
agency, and as such one of the most ‘geo-socially’ significant innovations since 
the capture and propagation of fire by early hominids.
With advances in kiln technology in the ancient world came the gradual 
ascent of a ladder of heat intensity. Higher temperatures enabled an ever-greater 
range of materials to be subjected to transformation, from the baking of clay 
starting at around 500 °C through to the 1400 – 1600 °C required to smelt 
iron and fuse it with carbon (Wertime 1973; Rehder 2000: 6–7). More than 
a quantitative shift along the thermal spectrum, chambering allows skilled 
agents to set up and modulate the environment in which combustion occurs – 
a level of control that could never be achieved with the multiple variables at 
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play in any ‘open air’ combustive event. And it is in this sense that we might 
see fire’s ‘creative involution’ into contained spaces not simply as a human 
achievement, but as a transitional moment in the very trajectory of terrestrial 
fire that would make it a significant event in the earth’s own history (see also 
Pyne 1994: 889).
A recurrent theme in pyrotechnical scholarship is that the impulse toward 
heat-induced metamorphosis of earth materials cannot simply be read off the 
uses eventually found for its outputs. As metallurgist and materials scientist 
Cyril Stanley Smith observes, ‘the making of ornaments from copper and iron 
certainly precedes their use in weaponry, just as baked clay figurines come before 
the useful pot’ (1981: 242). It is not only that beauty and adornment so often 
precede – and exceed – utility, but that the very process of discovery seems to 
resist cause-effect relations (Clark 2015). It has often been noted that many of 
the thermo-chemical reactions discovered by ancient artisans involve changes 
too dramatic to have been intentional. How it came to be known that crumbly 
ores could transmute into lustrous metals or powdery oxides into translucent 
glazes, it is surmised, could only have come about by accident or some kind 
of open-ended experimentation (Childe 1942: 85; Forbes 1950: 201). What 
metallurgical historian R. J. Forbes – one of Deleuze and Guattari’s key sources – 
has to say about his own field would seem to apply to pyrotechnology more 
generally: ‘the early metal worker was not pushed along the path of progress 
because he had no idea it was a path at all’ (1950: 12).
But discoveries indeed settled into pathways, both figuratively and liter-
ally. ‘Although they might have been launched as innocent and isolated skills,’ 
observes archaeometallurgist Theodore Wertime, ‘the pyrotechnic crafts in the 
years between 10,000 B.C.  and 2000 B.C. became formidable industrial “disci-
plines,” entailing the most severe chemical controls on daily operations’ (1973: 
670). So too were pyrotechnic products channelled into particular uses, both 
practical and symbolic (Forbes 1950: 11). As the objects fired and fashioned 
by artisans were set to work, many of them came to play their own formidable 
disciplining role in the operations of daily life. As metallurgist and historian 
J. E. Rehder sums up, ‘[t]he material fabrics of nearly all settled civilisations 
have by and large consisted of things that exist only because of pyrotechnology 
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(2000: 3). Or as we might say in another register, the oven, the kiln and the 
furnace helped forge and weld together an entire ‘order of things’ (See also 
Foucault 1989).
In the context of burgeoning sedentary life – as human beings convened 
in unheard of numbers and unprecedented proximities – the outputs of the 
artisanal oven came to play a vital role in the ordering of time and space. Just as 
they could collect and channel flows of water, impound seeds or grains, or store 
and portion out foodstuffs, pyrotechnic products could also help to distribute 
and direct living bodies. Kiln-fired materials lent substance and durability to 
the built environment, a hard-baked rigidity that served to regulate ‘the move-
ment of human flesh’ (De Landa 1997: 27–8). So too, from out of the artisan’s 
furnace arrived eye-catching adornments and sumptuary objects, to be used in 
‘visual displays of identity’ that signalled where and when bodies belonged in 
ever-more complex urban spaces (Roberts et al. 2009: 1019). And not least, from 
the ancient foundries came standardised and portable mediums of exchange: 
gleaming metallic tokens that both aided the circulation of other objects and 
provided hitherto unthinkable possibilities for hoarding wealth (Wertime 1973: 
680; Goudsblom 1992: 63).
As Bruno Latour noted some time ago, one of the key characteristics that 
distinguishes human societies from those of other complex organisms is their 
propensity to extrude, sediment and concretise social interactions into durable 
objects (1996, 2002). But, as Latour continues, the objects, materials and tech-
niques that we enrol as the mediators of our social transactions rarely function in 
a neutral and predictable manner: ‘They do not transmit our force faithfully,’ he 
muses, ‘any more then we are faithful messengers of theirs’ (1996: 240). While 
the proliferation of the pyrotechnic arts across much of ancient world effected an 
irruption of artefactual quantity, diversity and durability, it is only in retrospect 
that anything like a coherent story can be pieced together of the contribution 
these productions made to emergent social orders and formations. Latour’s 
attention to the transmission of force is pertinent, and it might be added that it 
is not only the power or potentiality of the objects themselves that is at stake, but 
the way these objects actualise and express the forces of an entire stratum. For 
what both the products and the processes of the pyrotechnic arts encapsulate, 
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I suggest in the following section, is something of the very forcefulness of the 
earth itself. And it is the experiential breadth and depth of this enfolding of the 
geologic into the social that makes the ten thousand-year pyrotechnic adventure 
so relevant for any renewed negotiation with the stuff of the earth.
En fold ing  G eology
Excavations of the Neolithic town of Çatalhöyük in southern Anatolia have 
revealed a remarkable mural featuring a dappled orange mound foregrounded 
by a black and white grid-like formation (Schmitt et al. 2014). Some research-
ers refer to the image as the earliest documented landscape painting; others 
consider it the world’s oldest warning sign. Though interpretations abound, the 
favoured reading is of a volcano spewing effluvia over a townscape. It has been 
proposed that the twin peaks of the frescoed mountain represent the double 
volcanic cones of Hasan Dağı, located seventy miles north-east of Çatalhöyük. 
Adding heft to this hypothesis, volcanologists recently confirmed that Hasan 
Dağı erupted around 9000 BP (Before Present), a date just prior to the estimated 
execution of the wall painting (Schmitt et al. 2014).
Widely regarded as the largest and best-preserved Neolithic settlement, 
Çatalhöyük is also the site of some of the oldest known pottery works. Excavated 
kilns, featuring thick walls, built-in covers, and flues to regulate air supply 
are again dated at around 9000 BP (Rehder 2000: 9; Joseph 1999: 1–2). 
Çatalhöyük is also one of the earliest sites with plentiful copper artefacts and 
clear evidence of working with metal. The ceramic-copper concurrence may be 
more than coincidental. Copper was most likely the first terrestrial metal that 
artisans learnt to smelt, a process entailing the use of heat and a reducing agent 
to trigger a chemical reaction that separates metal from its ore. The smelting 
of copper calls for temperatures of around 1100 °C, well within the thermal 
range of the pottery kilns found in the Anatolian settlement. The reduced or 
oxygen-poor atmosphere required to fire the red or black clay used by the pot-
ters of Çatalhöyük would also have produced the conditions required to melt 
copper ores ( Joseph 1999: 2). Moreover, azurite and malachite, two of the 
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ores of copper, are known to have been introduced into the firing processes 
in the form of pigments used in the decorative glazing of ceramics, leading to 
speculation about the accidental discovery of smelting in the course of ceramic 
production (Aitchison 1960: 40).
Whether this adds up to evidence of very early copper smelting in Çatalhöyük, 
or whether the metalwork recovered from the excavations relied upon naturally 
occurring – hence unsmelted – copper, is still debated (Birch et al. 2013). Even 
more speculative is the existence of any clear connection between pyrotechnic 
breakthroughs and proximity to volcanic activity, though it is well established 
that the active plate tectonics of this region – a belt of folding and thrust where 
the Eurasian and Arabian plates meet – results in crustal stresses that squeeze 
out exceptionally rich and visible fluxes of metallic ores (Yener 2000: 1–2). 
But direct causal linkages need not concern us here. What I want to explore is a 
more general line of inquiry that contextualises pyrotechnic innovation within 
an expanded field of geological eventfulness and potentiality.
Both the well-documented climatic volatility of the Pleistocene and the pos-
sibility of an unstable Anthropocene have served to accentuate the stability of 
the Holocene. This exceptional spell of climatic quiescence is often credited with 
providing the preconditions for agriculture and sedentary life. It is important 
to note, however, that the exit from the last Pleistocene glacial maximum was 
anything but smooth. Between 15,000–6,000 BP, a span that includes the early 
Holocene and takes us into the heart of the pyrotechnic developments in ques-
tion, sea levels rose by 120–130 meters (Nunn 2012). Not only were coastlines 
drowning and new alluvial flats forming, there is strong evidence that the crustal 
stresses caused by changing ice volumes triggered an intensification of volcanic 
activity. As geophysicist Bill McGuire and his colleagues demonstrate in a study 
of the eastern Mediterranean, despite the distance of the volcanic edifices from 
the melting ice sheets, there is a significant correlation between rapid sea level 
rise from 17,000–6,000 BP and enhanced frequency of explosive activity of 
volcanoes (1997).
For their human witnesses, such geological upheavals can be experienced 
as both threat and incitement, as Immanuel Kant (2005: 75–6) ventured in the 
latter 18th Century. Philosopher Elizabeth Grosz puts a more Deleuzean spin on 
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this intuition. Grosz sets out not from any Kantian sense of the innate powers 
of the human subject to rise above the chaos of the cosmos, but from the idea 
that human practical and creative capacities are ultimately an extension of the 
dynamism and self-differentiating structure of the universe itself (2008: 19). 
For her, art – understood in the broadest sense – is the propensity of human and 
nonhuman life to express itself in ways that exceed immediate need or utility:
Art is an agent of change in life, a force that harnesses all the other forces 
of the earth, not to make sense of them, not to be useful, but to generate 
affects and to be affected, to affect subjects, but also objects and matter 
itself (2011: 189).
These same inhuman forces of the earth and cosmos that threaten to overwhelm 
us, Grosz argues, also provide ‘the excess of colors, forms, materials’ that are 
taken up, extended and elaborated upon in creative processes (2008: 9). But this 
is not a matter of plunging unprotected into the fire, the volcano, or the tumult 
of biological life – which would be more than most of us could endure. Drawing 
on Deleuze and Guattari’s creative involution theme – and their injunction to 
experiment cautiously – Grosz speaks of the need to extract, isolate and envelop 
something of the forcefulness of the earth in order to bring it down to human 
scale. Just as ‘the living produce a barrier, a cell, an outline, a minimal space 
or interval that divides it from its world’, any other creative agent must find a 
way to calve off a more hospitable interior from a vast and potentially hostile 
exteriority (Grosz 2011: 38).
Though Grosz does not explicitly engage with the pyrotechnic arts, her logic 
of an extrapolation on the forces of the earth played out on a manageable scale 
would seem to be exemplified by the walling of fire in a robust chamber, the 
control of atmospheres of combustion, and the application of heat to metamor-
phose matter. Which is to say that we might conceive of the oven, the kiln, the 
furnace as means to ‘temporarily and provisionally slow down chaos enough 
to extract from it something not so much useful as intensifying, a performance, 
a refrain, an organization of color […]’ (Grosz 2008: 3). Or as Michel Serres 
puts it, in a related sense, ‘The furnace is the engine for going back toward chaos’ 
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(1983: 61). Mythopoeic accounts of pyrotechnology are, of course, replete 
with volcanic imagery. But Grosz’s diagramming of the creative impulse, with 
its reference to specific physical forces – ‘the relation between fields, strata, and 
chaos’, ‘the geology of the earth’ – invites a more literal interpretation (2011: 
45; 2008: 45). Such a reading would take seriously the rise and fall of sea levels, 
climatic turbulence, and volcanic and seismic activity.
Not merely a backcloth or context, nor even an object of representation 
like the Çatalhöyük mural, the geologic manifests itself in the pyrotechnic arts 
as process or force. Rehder points out that as ancient artisans improved their 
pyrotechnic skills, their kilns and furnaces regularly achieved levels in excess 
of 1200–1300 °C. This, he reminds us, is the temperature that volcanologists 
believe to be the maximum heat of molten lava (Rehder 2000: 54). And indeed, 
excepting only lightning, this is the highest temperature naturally occurring 
anywhere on the surface of the planet. Across much of the ancient world, then, 
wherever pyrotechnology emerged or spread, human settlements forged them-
selves around and through heat intensities rivalling those of the most powerful 
‘inhuman’ forces on earth.
We might say that what the pyrotechnic arts do is to introduce the igneous 
and metamorphic processes of the earth itself into the very core of social exist-
ence. In short, pyrotechnology installs the transformative power of volcanism 
and other geologic forces in the space of the village, on the street corner, in 
the rhythms of everyday life. And this is much more than just a diffusion or 
multiplication of force. Over the generations, artisans attempted to transmute 
nearly every conceivable mineral element. They explored spaces of possibility 
that included compounds, variations and embellishments as yet unrealised by 
the earth itself. Many of the resulting products have a beauty and exuberance 
that still enchants contemporary audiences, while the skills that were acquired 
are often credited with being vital precursors of the scientific knowledge and 
industrial techniques of the modern world (Smith 1981: 242, 203–06; see also 
Childe 1942).
In retrospect, we can track continuities between the chambered fire of the 
ancient world and the heat engines that powered the eighteenth and nineteenth-
century industrial revolution. Without the experience of controlling heat in 
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robust chambers, and without the metals and the metalworking skills to construct 
these casings, there would have been no blazing boilers, no steam-powered 
machines, no internal combustion engines. But the emergence of industrial 
machinery fuelled by buried hydrocarbons is by no means a necessary end-
point of pyrotechnical innovation. This is no simple progression, no ‘path of 
progress’ – to recall Forbes’ point about metallurgy. What is vital to remember 
is that the chambered fire of the pyrotechnic artisan is intended to transmute 
the structure and properties of heterogeneous materials into new forms. For 
the firebox of the modern era, on the other hand, metamorphosis is simply the 
means to an end. The contained fire of the industrial heat engine is primarily 
devoted to the conversion of fuel into regular and replicable motive or kinetic 
functions. From the point of view of the power these new machines unleash, 
they represent a massive expansion on the exertions of their predecessors. But 
from the perspective of their metamorphic or transformational capacities, the 
application of chambered fire to prime moving or mechanical work can be seen 
as an equally momentous contraction (Clark & Yusoff 2014: 212; Clark 2015). 
From being ‘the great transmuter’ (Pyne 2001: 120), fire has been reduced to 
pushing and shoving.
It is in this sense – rather than in any notion of pure aestheticism or art for 
art’s sake – that we might reconsider the open-endedness and experimentality of 
the pyrotechnic arts in our own era. As we have seen, the current environmental 
predicament is beginning to prompt industrialised social formations to turn away 
from their dependence on fossilised hydrocarbons. Both conventional economic 
logic and ecological critique, in this context, exhort us to do more with less, to 
tighten and close the circuits of matter-energy. But the carbon descent question 
can also be posed in terms of what other geological strata, what other forces of 
the earth, we might turn to. Put differently, we might ask what else energy or 
matter is for, and what else we might do with fire. Such questions do not neces-
sarily eschew efficiency or renounce restraint. What they can do, however, is to 
draw us away from the preoccupation with how much work we can get out of 
available energy, and turn us toward all the other possibilities that still inhere 
in the geological strata. These are questions, practical challenges, that bring 
us to the potentiality of the earth itself – to the field of forces, processes and 
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properties that, as Deleuze or Grosz would insist, is far in excess of whatever 
humans or other forms of life have yet been able to make of it.
And it is this sense of the virtuality of the earth exceeding its actuality that 
invites renewed mineral-energetic probing, new variations on igneous and 
metamorphic themes, and further elaboration on the rhythms and singularities 
of the earth, experimental modes that are likely to be as least as much aesthetic 
as techno-scientific or managerial (Clark 2015). So too, as we enter an era of 
possible destabilisation of earth systems, is it important to keep in mind that 
the pyrotechnical innovations of the early–mid Holocene may have responded, 
in some indeterminate and irrecoverable way, to the provocations of geologic 
and climatic unrest. It would be unfortunate if this were to be taken as a call 
to aestheticise or dramatise geophysical catastrophe. But what it might do is 
to help attune us to the ways in which the earth explores its own possibilities, 
crosses its own thresholds, enacts its own experiments. And to remind us that 
this very unruliness is what we will need to reach into, enfold and take hold of 
in order to perform our versions of experimentation.
Futur e  Earth  and  P lanetary  Convent ions
By tracking the chambering of heat back to its primordial moments, and in 
characterising pyrotechnic origins as an experimental involution of the geologi-
cal substrata, I have sought to salvage a genre of inventive engagements with 
the earth from the dense accretion of functions and purposes it later accrued. 
This is not to ascribe an originary purity to artful genesis, or to assume that all 
functionality is a fall from grace. If artistic expression is indeed an extrapolation 
of the excessive forces of an inhuman earth, there is no guarantee of beneficent 
creation. As Elizabeth Grosz reminds us, ‘art is also capable of that destruction 
and deformation that destroys territories and enables them to revert to the chaos 
from which they were temporarily wrenched’ (2008: 13). Or in the words of 
Cyril Stanley Smith, reviewing the long history of craft production, ‘aesthetic 
creation suggests things that may, if widely adopted, cause disruptive change’ 
(1981: 346). And if fire is the medium of our creative ventures, that capacity 
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for destruction or disruption will never be far away. It will be as near as a stray 
spark, or a flicker of inattention.
To play on the theme of primordial pyrotechnology is not to imply that we 
can or should dis-assemble subsequent developments and start anew from some 
baseline of raw, uncommitted artisanal potentiality. But it is to suggest that any 
pathway out of the ‘new and burning society’ we have composed for ourselves 
will need to engage on the same excessive and unstable plane. Just as our species 
has gradually learnt how to isolate, encapsulate and intensify the unruly forces 
of the cosmos, so too will we have to learn to enfold, enclose and elaborate on 
the chaos that our own activities have added to the earth’s inherent turbulence.
We should be mindful too that any call for a new societal involution of earth 
processes quickly comes up against complications or tensions that inhere in 
the very idea of invention. Deleuze and Guattari are insistent that destratifica-
tion – the reworking of the earth’s constitutive strata – needs to be undertaken 
with caution. It calls for trial runs, a slow accumulation of skill and experience, 
a safety net of fallow spaces and uncommitted resources to fall back on if things 
go wrong (1987: 161). Such provisos suggest that, for all their affirmation of 
surprise and open-endedness, Deleuze and Guattari’s bid ‘for a new earth and 
people that do not yet exist’ (1994: 108) requires a carefully modulated play 
of difference and repetition, exuberance alloyed with restraint: ‘It is through 
a meticulous relation to the strata’, they contend, ‘that one succeeds in freeing 
lines of flight’ (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 161. My emphasis).
This tempering of ‘unheard-of becomings’ with circumspection and care – 
what we might see as an originary complication of inventiveness – is more 
explicitly analysed by Derrida. For Derrida, as for Deleuze and Guattari, a creative 
event implies a rupture with the known and the familiar, and thus an inevitable 
degree of disturbance and transgression: ‘An invention always presupposes 
some illegality, the breaking of an implicit contract; it inserts a disorder into the 
peaceful ordering of things, it disregards the proprieties’ (Derrida 2007: 1). At 
the same time, to make any real difference to its world – to have a future – an 
invention must also entail a certain conventionality: it must abide by the rules 
or habits by which new things are admitted into their social context, passed on 
and disseminated:
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It will only receive its status of invention, […] to the extent that th[e] 
socialization of the invented thing is protected by a system of conventions 
that will at the same time ensure its inscription in a common history, its 
belonging to a culture: to a heritage, a patrimony, a pedagogical tradition, a 
discipline, a chain of generations. Invention begins by being susceptible to 
repetition, exploitation, reinscription (Derrida 2007: 6).
While we might now trouble Wertime’s assumption that pyrotechnic crafts began 
as innocent skills, his observations about their developments into disciplines is 
well made, not just with regard to the technical aspects of controlling matter, 
but also in the sense of the complex customs, codes and ritual through which 
knowledge has been both protected and transmitted. Indeed, the very propensity 
of socio-material processes and techniques to transmit their effects ‘unfaithfully’ 
depends, ultimately, on the presence of more or less effective modes of uptake, 
transmission and iterability.
To affirm such logics of invention – with their indissociability of eventful 
rupture and conventionality – is to raise questions about the distinctiveness of 
generative processes in the stratum that is recognisable as ‘ours’. However much 
the creative involutions of other strata give rise to novel structures, assemblages, 
and operational possibilities, and however much the forces of the ‘inhuman’ 
strata might energise, summon or provoke our own becomings, there are limits 
to how far we might wish to stretch the idea of conventionality. Though other 
sites or modes of creativity ‘provide […] the ground and support for human 
invention,’ Derrida notes, ‘no one has ever authorized himself to say of animals 
that they invent’ (2007: 25), a verdict we can assume he would extend to other 
nonhuman creatures and to the geologic. So too do we need to recall that for all 
their affording of ontological dignity to the articulations of all strata, Deleuze 
and Guattari acknowledge specific cultural-linguistic capacities that help merit 
human productions a stratum of their own.
Today, as evidence of intensifying planetary heating provokes increasingly 
urgent demands for the reinvention of human socio-material relations with 
the rest of the earth, the tension between the advent of the wholly new and the 
conventions through which novelty is re-inscribed flares with especial intensity. 
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‘Even a summit of all the nations of the earth, preceded by the most strident 
media campaigns, could not digest an issue so intractable and so enmeshed in 
contradictory interests as this one’, remarks Latour of the current deadlock in 
climate change politics (2010: 228–9).
On the one hand, this impasse appears to issue from the limitations of 
unfathomably complex and interminable deliberation. Global forum after global 
forum seem at best only to generate new conventions, but never an inventive 
rupture with existing socio-material orders. On the other hand, the procedural 
commitment to fairness, inclusion and consensus to which many climate 
negotiators ascribe is increasingly haunted by the possibility of new kinds of 
grand scale physico-material intervention: geoengineering schemes or climate 
modification experiments that vaunt their inventiveness while threatening to 
circumvent deliberative processes (Clark 2013). In short there appears the 
disconcerting spectacle of two extremes: convention bereft of invention, and 
invention untethered from convention.
Under the current compulsion to invent – to contrive new legislation, tech-
niques, products – Derrida detects a further paradox. In the context of political 
economic competition and national rivalries, it is increasingly seen as necessary 
to pre-order and institutionalise creative change. Not only is the logic of attempt-
ing to programme the unforeseeable inherently contradictory, Derrida contends, 
but the demand for incessant innovation soon becomes tiresome and draining:
A closer analysis should show why it is then the word “invention” that imposes 
itself […]. And why this desire for invention, which goes so far as to dream 
of inventing a new desire, remains, to be sure, contemporary with a certain 
experience of fatigue, of weariness, of exhaustion (2007: 23).
Climate change – a topic Derrida himself barely broached – couples the almost 
universal exhortation to innovate with the enervation attending interminable 
effort in a world of diminishing resources. As philosopher Michael Marder notes, 
the consequence of intensifying industrial combustion is burnout, ‘the break-
down and exhaustion we experience when we run out of the mental and physical 
resources to be expanded at an ever-accelerating rhythm of self-incineration’ 
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(2015: 94). Burnout, Marder insists, is at once a planetary and a personal 
predicament. Under such pressure, even the ardent affirmation of creativity in 
radical visions might come to seem world wearying. While broadly sympathetic 
to Deleuzoguattarian notions of becoming, ethical philosopher John Caputo 
eventually draws breath and confesses, ‘I find it too exhausting, all this outpour-
ing and overflowing, all this firing away of forces night and day’ (1993: 53), a 
lament we might imagine the earth itself echoing.
Given conditions of compounding emergency and exhaustion, it is small 
wonder that the planet-scaled task of reinventing the social threatens to over-
whelm. Faced with the daunting prospect of crafting what we might refer to 
as new ‘geosocial formations’ (Clark & Yusoff 2014: 224), the deep history of 
pyrotechnology offers no answers, though it may offer hints, clues and prompts 
about how we might ‘learn to be affected’ by the matter-energy of the earth (see 
Latour 2004). The key to the success of the emergent pyrotechnic complex 
seems to have been its ability to corral, enclose and insulate; to downsize vast 
and intimidating forces to an intimate level; to sublimate inhuman forces into 
everyday spaces. Attuned to accidents, perhaps enamoured with chance and 
surprise, pyrotechnic knowledge was also enframed in lore and convention, 
though its inscription into the social frequently took forms we would hardly 
wish to revisit.
That the work of reinventing the social in a turbulent world might respond 
to the allure of matter and flame, that critical practice might coalesce around 
palpable workings with the grit and grain of proximate materials, points towards 
social sciences with a more sensuous touch and an expanded toolkit. Our focus 
on the longue durée of artisanal practice serves as a reminder that metaphors 
of forging, shaping, moulding or constructing social worlds have literal traces, 
and in turn hints at the distance that has opened up between modern social 
thought and what was once the everyday work of manipulating matter-energy 
to make useful and beautiful things (see Ingold 2013; Guggenheim et al., this 
volume). More than simply admonishing would-be earth system engineers for 
their circumvention of socio-political procedures, it might be time for social 
thinkers to seek out modes of geotechnics and material-energetic experiments 
more to our liking. It should also be kept in mind that there are likely many 
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more pathways along which the materials of the earth might be coaxed than 
have yet been pursued, though neither should we downplay looming doubts 
about whether we still have time or energy enough to craft whole new social 
worlds out of the intransigent forces of the earth.
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HOW TO SPOT THE 
BEHAVIOURAL SHIBBOLETH 
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
Fabian Muniesa
in a reMarkable paMphlet titled The WesTern IllusIon of human naTure, 
Marshall Sahlins wrote the following:
Time and again for more than two millennia the people we call “Western” 
have been haunted by the spectre of their own inner being: an apparition 
of human nature so avaricious and contentious that, unless it is somehow 
governed, it will reduce society to anarchy. The political science of the unruly 
animal has come for the most part in two contrasting and alternating forms: 
either hierarchy or equality, monarchical authority or republican equilibrium: 
either a system of domination that (ideally) restrain people’s natural self-
interest by an external power; or a self-organizing system of free and equal 
powers whose opposition (ideally) reconciles their particular interests in the 
common interest. Beyond politics, this is a totalised metaphysics of order, for 
the same generic structure of an elemental anarchy resolved by hierarchy or 
equality is found in the organization of the universe as well as the city, and 
again in therapeutic concepts of the human body. I claim it is a specifically 
Western metaphysics, for it supposes an opposition between nature and 
culture that is distinctive of our own folklore – and contrastive to the many 
peoples who consider that beasts are basically human rather than humans 
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basically beasts. These peoples could know no primordial “animal nature,” 
let alone one that must be overcome. And they have a point, inasmuch as the 
modern human species, Homo sapiens, emerged relatively recently under the 
aegis of a much older human culture. By our own paleontological evidence, 
we too are animal creatures of culture, endowed with the biology of our 
symbology. The idea that we are involuntary servants of our animal dispo-
sitions is an illusion – also originating in the culture (Sahlins 2008: 1–2).
Animal Spirits (Akerlof and Shiller 2009), together with Nudge (Thaler and 
Sustein 2008), Driven (Lawrence and Nohria 2002) or even The Map and the 
Territory (Greenspan 2013), to name a few recent achievements, exemplify quite 
well the type of social-scientific streams that justifies the worries expressed by 
Sahlins in the above extract, as well as in earlier disquisitions (Sahlins 1976a; 
1976b). The paragraph following the preceding quote also applies:
I am going against the grain of the genetic determinism now so popular in 
America for its seeming ability to explain all manner of cultural forms by 
an innate disposition of competitive self-interest. In combination with an 
analogous Economic Science of autonomous individuals devoted singularly 
to their own satisfaction by the “rational choice” of everything, not to men-
tion the common native wisdom of the same ilk, such fashionable disciplines 
as Evolutionary Psychology and Sociobiology are making an all-purpose 
social science of the “selfish gene.” But as Oscar Wilde said of professors, 
their ignorance is the result of long study. Oblivious to history and cultural 
diversity, these enthusiasts of evolutionary egoism fail to recognize the 
classic bourgeois subject in their portrait of so-called human nature. Or 
else they celebrate their ethnocentrism by taking certain of our customary 
practices as proof of their universal theories of human behavior. In this 
kind of ethnoscience, l’espèce, c’est moi – I am the species (Sahlins 2008: 2).
The breadth of what may be called the ‘behavioural shibboleth’ is indeed 
observable in numerous quarters of the social sciences, but also in the conduct 
of policy and, more widely, in the worldviews that control mundane talk about 
197
hoW to spot the behavioural shibboleth and What to do about it
what is meant when ‘the social’ is uttered. Why a ‘shibboleth’? A shibboleth 
determines the extent to which one is a legitimate member of a community 
on the grounds of how authentic the use of a keyword sounds. The shibboleth 
shall here denote the belonging to an all-encompassing folklore in which the 
thing that is referred to as ‘social’ (e.g. ‘social phenomena’ or ‘social dynamics’, 
but also ‘social problems’ and their ‘solutions’) is haunted by the idea of units 
of behaviour that interact with each other (through whatever medium, includ-
ing electronic mass telecommunication), and which partakes, in one form or 
another, of the ultimate social science, i.e. an extended ‘Economic Science’. What 
follows is an attempt to contribute to the preoccupation signalled by Sahlins, 
but to do so in a rather condensed and purposeful manner. The point here is 
not to analyse, but to alert – and to provide, accordingly, a counter-shibboleth, 
a sort of an amulet. This might, arguably, be of some interest to those who 
already share Sahlins’ sense of dismay, but it is addressed more emphatically to 
those who have found themselves carrying out research inside a medium of data 
excitement (electronic mass telecommunication, for example) or participating 
in creative disciplines (design, computing, architecture) in which the shibboleth 
often goes unremarked.1
B ehav ioura l  Fo lk lor e
The constant reference to the idea of ‘human nature’ seems to be, for Sahlins, one 
particularly salient cultural trait of the phenomenon under scrutiny here. Other 
manifestations, less vividly marked by the rule of naturalism, might however 
play a deeper role in the establishment of the behavioural shibboleth. Googling 
‘society’ (vernacular for the quick harvesting of dominant expressions of the 
shibboleth) might of course precipitate the proverbial images of wolves, sheep 
and a few leviathans. But a far more telling render of the shibboleth might be 
observed, in scientific guise, if one looks more carefully: the drawings of little 
dots with arrows that one is likely to encounter in the course of this visual 
exercising (Fig. 8.1).2 Epstein and Axtell (1996) provided a landmark with their 
pioneering ‘agent-based’ computational models of ‘society’ and their collections 
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of 51 x 51 cell grids in which agents look around for sugar. With the refine-
ment of the cybernetic imagination came the time of ‘emergent behaviour’ in 
‘complex systems’, a time which duly blended into that of the ‘social network’ 
(Watts 2003). The magic of ‘network visualisation’ augmented this time with 
the spectacle of order springing from the disorder of information (Lima 2011). 
One might very well just raise an eyebrow at all this and then pass on. But the 
task here consists in furthering the characterisation of the shibboleth within 
these visions in order to address its dangers at root level.
The behavioural shibboleth can be recognised through at least two important 
structural traits. The first is indeed what might be called the ‘little dotted agent’. 
The unit of analysis takes the form of a schematic, delineated individual agent 
whose conduct corresponds to the conjunction of contextual signals (be they 
consumption offers, regulatory constraints, data impulses, monetary incentives, 
or such like) and internal schedules (be they preferences, orientations, aversions, 
beliefs, habits, desires, or such like), often considered in terms of more or less 
neat or limited forms of computation. The analysis of the conduct of this little 
dotted agent indeed requires the intervention of hypotheses on human nature 
(because such agents are considered to be human) which usually go along the 
line of selfishness (maximisation of utility, reputational gaming, opportunism, 
survival, strategic solidarity) doubled with some kind of narrowness (bias, 
Fig. 8.1  A usual rendering of society (adapted by the author from a quick online 
search)
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opacity, knowledge deficit, bounded rationality).3 The conduct of sets of these 
agents translates into the emergence of aggregate phenomena (also termed 
‘social’) that are mapped and analysed in terms of influence, network dynamics, 
imitation, calculation, herd behaviour, contagion, socially-driven rationalities and 
irrationalities, and so forth. Critics have claimed extensively and intensively that 
this view is flawed – e.g. ‘reductionist’ – when not silly (e.g. Barnes 1995). But 
these terms, which may seem rather absurd if one tries to apply them seriously 
to one’s own acts in one’s own life, lose their absurdity and gain in relevance 
when applied to the little dotted agent (Fig. 8.2).
The second important trait of the behavioural shibboleth is ‘scientific 
estrangement’. Knowledge produced about the little dotted agent is in essence 
knowledge possessed by an actor – the scientist – who is qualitatively differ-
ent from the little dotted agent. In short, otherness is crucial: I am not the 
little dotted agent. Although reflexivity and self-analysis are not excluded in 
principle, the idea of the behaviour of agents is in practice usually at odds 
with that of the behaviour of oneself as a scientist. Scientific estrangement 
is in part the cause of an interesting paradox in the behavioural sciences: 
the more the analysed situation gets closer to a process of ordinary life as 
experienced by oneself (e.g. shopping in the bazaar), the more it will appear 
as scientifically messy and meaningless (e.g. it cannot be modelled), and the 
more the scientist will feel alienated. Conversely, the more trivial and alienat-
ing for participants is the analysed situation (e.g. bidding in a blind auction), 
the more the scientist will find it meaningful and controllable (e.g. it can 
be modelled). This is what Jean-Pierre Dupuy once called ‘Von Foerster’s 
Conjecture’, in reference to a conversation with Heinz Von Foerster (Dupuy 
1982: 11–28; 1992: 255–62). The behaviour of agents is always a curious 
Fig. 8.2  The little dotted agent
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object for ‘us’ scientists, even if our scientific penchant is, naturally, for triv-
ial machines (waiting lines, computer clicks, traffic jams). ‘Our’ behaviour, 
conversely, irrespective of how poorly trivial it might be (e.g. writing this, 
arguably), would not strike us as a curious object at all. Otherness, produced 
through the device of an overhead view, thus stands as a crucial element of 
the behavioural shibboleth (Fig. 8.3, Fig 8.4).
Both the little dotted agent and scientific estrangement are perfectly legiti-
mate ingredients for particular kinds of scientific endeavour. They are also 
terribly enticing.4 But they are also both artefacts of our behavioural folklore, 
and this piece is just a humble guideline to help us recognise where we are.5 
The academic areas where this can be noticed (once the incantatory effect has 
been dispelled) are abundant. For a rewarding catch, one has only to follow 
the track of the ‘animal spirits’ literature signalled above. It leads inevitably to 
the realm of behavioural economics and to one of its favourite fetishes, namely 
the stock market ‘crowd’, which it willingly shares with the sociological per-
spectives that see in financial markets, and in markets in general, yet another 
version of the Empire of Information and its cortege of ‘dynamics’ (see Preda 
2009). Another, quite different variant of the syndrome under scrutiny here 
can be observed in the particular blend of ‘people textures’ or ‘scalies’ offered 
in competition renderings of architectural designs as a way of improving their 
behavioural plausibility (Houdart 2013). But what should be done about the 
shibboleth once spotted?
Fig. 8.3   
Scientific estrangement
Fig. 8.4 
Von Foerster’s Conjecture
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Sc i ent i f i c  Corr ect i v e
Once it has been correctly identified, the behavioural shibboleth invites a 
number of possible objections. It is, at this point, particularly crucial not to fall 
into the trap of what may be called ‘chimeric scientism’. This refers to the all-
too-often heard critique of the inhuman aspect of the scientific, positivistic logic 
governing behaviourism, that is, the implicit assumption that the trouble with 
the behavioural shibboleth is that it subjects the mystery of human experience 
to the cold rule of metric reason – the problem, it is said, is science itself, and 
its monstrous objectifying power. Why not indulge in this otherwise affable 
critique? Because this would be, precisely, the triumph of the behavioural shib-
boleth: that of equating its science with sound science, for better or worse. It is 
as if in effect the two main ingredients of the behavioural shibboleth (the little 
dotted agent and scientific estrangement) were in fact ingredients of the scien-
tific viewpoint as such (Fig. 8.5). Its condemnation would then waver between 
impressionistic rejections of scientific ‘objectification’ in general (a basically 
hollow idea) and lateral disquisitions on the ‘politics’ behind the science (e.g. 
it comes from neoliberal cold warriors).6 Chimeric scientism leaves the heart 
of the behavioural shibboleth untouched.
Let us position ourselves instead in the positive, propositional realm of sound 
science. It is necessary to point to the fact that the ingredients of the behavioural 
shibboleth, despite the noise they make, have been disqualified to a great extent 
Fig. 8.5  Chimeric scientism
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by scientific investigation, and especially by the scientific specialty whose object 
is, precisely, scientific culture – namely, science studies.7 One thing that has 
been shown and repeated ad nauseam in such quarters is that anyone with an 
interest in the behaviour of people should develop an interest in the behaviour 
of people studying the behaviour of people. And this is not a chimeric devia-
tion from the subject matter (an elevation into intra-academic reflexivity) but 
a result of scientific evidence. I am referring here to the well-known fact that 
behaviour is an artefact of the behavioural apparatus.
Well known? Well, just think about one particularly pressing problem of 
behaviour today: that of energy consumption. The contemporary engineer-led 
turn towards the consumer in large utilities translates into a particularly pow-
erful invocation of the behavioural shibboleth. We are talking about ‘demand 
response’ in the energy sector, for example, and the now pervasive use of social 
sciences to serve it. Two increasingly relevant and quite contrasting constraints 
seem to justify this invocation. The first is privatisation, and hence competition, 
with the idea that the disarticulation of public services follows a focus on the 
requirements of demand (the demanding little dotted agent). The second is 
the rise of the ecological preoccupation, with the idea that price signals would 
suffice if the objective shifted from obeying demand to taming it.
But what kind of behaviour is energy consumption? It is the behaviour 
of electrical equipment and of electricity grids linked to electricity sources.8 
It makes sense to say that people consume kilowatts, willingly or not, but it 
only makes sense insofar as we acknowledge that ‘people’ is here a euphemism 
that stands in reality for buildings, rooms, heating technologies, appliances 
and machines. Economists may not understand that quite straightforwardly, 
but engineers do. They do because their job consists precisely in engineer-
ing these electric apparatuses. Hence the counter-shibboleth: the study of 
behaviour shall be but, to begin with, that of engineers and their engineered 
and engineering creatures. Or, in other words, the right science of behaviour 
starts when one looks not at the little dotted agent but at the other end of 
scientific estrangement.
Examples abound in which sound social-scientific knowledge requires pre-
cisely abandoning the two ingredients of the behavioural shibboleth indicated 
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above. The little dotted agent fades out in favour of what one can readily call 
the ‘behavioural configuration’: collective assemblages, socio-technical devices, 
institutional apparatuses. There is no shortage of names with which to refer to 
these units of analysis (Fig. 8.6). And scientific estrangement disappears to the 
benefit of both a reflexive sense of affinity (the behaviour of science is part of 
the problem to be dealt with, as scientists should know) and an honest meth-
odological acceptance of the performative condition of social-scientific inquiry 
(Law 2004). We might want to call ‘performative entanglement’ the articulation 
of a scientific antidote to the behavioural shibboleth (Fig. 8.7).
Fig. 8.6  The behavioural configuration
Fig. 8.7  Performative entanglement
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I n s t i tut i v e  Cav eat
But let us take a step aside. Not all is about science, and one has the right to 
enquire into other kinds of concerns. Drawing attention to the ‘juristic damper’ 
is here in order: the function of the killjoy has been eloquently assumed by a 
number of comparatist jurists, anthropologists and historians of law that are 
severely preoccupied with the growing role of the modern social sciences in 
general, and the behavioural in particular, in the institution of society (Fig. 8.8). 
Pierre Legendre has been quite explicit about that, in his usual reactionary way 
(Legendre 1995), and, in different style, Yan Thomas has also dealt with this quite 
clearly (Thomas 1999, 2005; see also Supiot 2005, 2015).9 First, these critics 
claim, ‘the social’ is, if anything, a legal artifice. The law is the prime vehicle for 
the institution of society. It is through juristic craft, and more precisely through 
the performative technology of the juristic fiction, that parties are delineated, 
objects formulated, agencies attributed and properties ascribed. And it is through 
jurisprudence, widely understood, that human institutions can be shaped and 
made sense of. But, second, this does not mean that the law is about human facts, 
not at all. What the juristic damper tends to emphasise, especially through its 
interest in Roman Law and its Christian interpretations, is that juristic formu-
lation is an artifice. It is through the articulation of a legal fiction that society 
can be formed. The ‘operations of the law’ – to use an expression that happens 
to be shared by both the French school of the historical anthropology of law 
and by the North American tradition of legal realism (Thomas 2011) – are 
performative in essence. They are not there to respect a supposedly positive, 
social-scientific appraisal of social behaviour, but to institute what society is 
Fig. 8.8  The juristic damper
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about. The conclusion is that any attempt by judges to ground their decisions 
on a sound scientific appraisal of social reality is silly at best, reckless at worst.
How does the juristic damper speak to the behavioural shibboleth? The 
shibboleth serves several purposes. One is to recognise fellow social scientists, 
people skilled in the arts of observing and comprehending social behaviour. But 
the second is political: to recognise fellow policy advisers and social engineers 
preoccupied with the improvement of society (e.g. Banerjee and Duflo 2011). 
It is through a sound – that is, economic – recognition of behavioural patterns 
and social mechanisms (their wording) that collective wealth and wellbeing 
can be augmented.10 What is the trouble, then? It is not just that the proverbial 
‘Nudge Unit’ (the expert political cabinet that you may enter as you pass the 
behavioural shibboleth) is fostering an undemocratic understanding of what the 
improvement of society means (how can the little dotted agent be considered 
as the locus of sovereign power, that is, as the people in ‘We the people’?).11 In 
the end, technocratic paternalism is not the worst thing that can happen. The 
problem is rather the anthropological menace of the collapse of the foundations 
of society – significantly more daunting. Reinventing society on the ground of 
the behavioural shibboleth (e.g. through a behavioural analysis of law) would 
only amount to destroying it, according to the juristic damper.
The  R i ght  B ehav iour
But would society really be destroyed by such a reinvention? Perhaps not. The 
juristic concern is not raised here with the purpose of intimidating us or of 
hampering the arguably inescapable progress of the reconstitution of society 
by other means. What we need is just an antidote to cancel the full impact of 
the behavioural shibboleth, not another religion. A juristic approach is only 
fine to the extent that it lays open explicitly how society is constructed. But 
this reactionary statement is helpful for the articulation of what the antidote 
should consist of. As we have seen, both the little dotted agent and scientific 
estrangement can be easily countered in the domain of science, provided we 
equip science with the right kind of science studies. But, as we very well know, 
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the fact of being scientifically right does not guarantee sanity in the business of 
constituting what the social should be about.
Social research today is marked by two imperatives that can, unfortunately, 
turn the researcher into easy meat for the behavioural shibboleth: these are data 
and design. ‘Data’ is the name that is given in our own culture of computer busi-
ness to the traces behaviour (social or otherwise) leaves behind, and ultimately 
consists of. Abundant and complex, by the very same cultural standard of the 
behavioural shibboleth, data can orient the researcher towards archetypical 
problems of visualisation (Fig. 8.1), and modelling (Fig. 8.2), but also of epis-
temic perplexity and informational escalation (Fig. 8.3, Fig. 8.4). ‘Design’ is a 
new word for politics – especially when connected to other crucial notions of 
our economic cosmology, such as that of innovation – but with politics under-
stood as the modern art of the informed fix. How appropriately informed a 
design solution is to anything social depends, quite naturally, on the intelligence 
felt by or conferred to the researcher-qua-designer (Fig. 8.4), but also on the 
eradication of a view that would downplay this intelligence hubris, or consider 
design to be itself part of the problem (Fig. 8.6, Fig. 8.7).
There is nothing wrong with data and design as such, but they can certainly 
encourage a form of scientific folklore that paves the way to the behavioural 
shibboleth. Who has not seen the little dotted agent lurking in the graphs of 
the internet sociologist, in the renders of the environmental architect, in the 
models of the crowd economist or in the indicators of the policy consultant? 
There is no such a thing as a latent behavioural menace in data and design 
practices. On the contrary, engagement with data and design opens tremen-
dous opportunities for critical awareness and reflexive elucidation (Law and 
Ruppert 2013; Lury, Parisi, and Terranova 2012; Lury and Wakeford 2012; 
Ruppert, Law, and Savage 2013). But data and design constitute a medium 
in which the shibboleth can spread rapidly once it has made its way into it. 
What an anthropological interrogation can introduce at this point, better than 
a regressive rebuff (Fig. 8.5), is precisely a critical examination of the juristic 
complex on which the very political relevance of data and design is grounded 
(Fig. 8.8).12 Where does the ownership, alienability and purpose of data reside? 
When does something qualify as such, under which jurisdiction and for what? 
207
hoW to spot the behavioural shibboleth and What to do about it
What is the mandate of design? Where does its authority come from? How 
are its liabilities formulated? Tackling these questions from the standpoint of 
a pragmatics of jurisprudence (which is what our amulet would consist of) 
can certainly contribute to an understanding of ‘behaviour’ as a compound of 
imputations, which is exactly what it is.
Should the researcher, then, behave as a lawyer when facing the behavioural 
shibboleth? Take at least enough time to examine all relevant clauses? Impose 
a moratorium? What kind of lawyer, though? An anthropologist in a corpo-
rate lawyer suit? Marshall Sahlins might agree: in the latest instalment of his 
take on the subject, Sahlins sees in ‘the triumph of capitalism’ the crux of our 
behavioural folklore:
This libertarian political economy is believable because it is an average 
common experience of the participants in a full-blown capitalist society in 
which all happiness indeed depends on getting and spending, as virtually 
everything is for sale including of necessity one’s own commodifiable attrib-
utes. The conditions of people’s existence then depend on husbanding their 
monetary resources, always scarce relative to the possible benefits on offer, in 
order to acquire the good things in life – to maximise one’s satisfactions, as 
economists say. And since, as they also say, there’s no going behind people’s 
tastes, and moreover what people desire is apparently a matter of personal 
choice, it seems to all concerned that the entire social and cultural order is 
laid down by economic behaviour (Sahlins 2015: 10).
Note s
1 An earlier version of this piece was prepared for ‘Inventing the Social’, a symposium 
celebrating the tenth anniversary of CSISP at Goldsmiths, 29–30 May 2014. I thank the 
organisers and participants, and the CSISP (now CISP) at large, for the discussion. I am 
thankful in particular to Daniel Neyland for his splendid commentary, and to Noortje 
Marres for her continuing critique. The argument borrows heavily from an earlier exchange 
with Catherine Grandclément and Emilio Luque: I thank them for the concern and for 
half of the ideas. Acknowledgement is also due to the support of the European Research 
Council (ERC Starting Grant 263529).
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2 Google Images, the image content search service provided by Google Inc., behaves in 
this regard with more clarity when one augments the usual wording (e.g. ‘society’, ‘social’, 
‘behaviour’, ‘conduct’) with the keyword ‘network’.
3 The notion of ‘bounded rationality’ works as a magic caveat that immediately dissipates 
the objections that a too narrow view of rational interest might raise. The notion of ‘altruism’ 
too, conveniently translates into utilitarian nature (i.e. solidarity is good for others and 
therefore also good for oneself, since oneself is other for others).
4 One particularly telling example of the behavioural shibboleth’s power to defeat an 
intellectual mind can perhaps be found in the late Alain Resnais, who, after the unsettling 
profoundness of Providence, just bought into Henri Laborit and came up with Mon Oncle 
d’Amérique, a comforting interpretation of the life of characters in terms of their shallow 
struggle for reward (see Lemerle 2009).
5 It should be noted that this critique cannot claim to be an STS-informed critique, as 
STS (the amalgam of approaches that gathers under the rubric of ‘science and technology 
studies’) can very well and very easily display the traits that are emphasised here.
6 Is the behavioural movement in the social sciences just bad because of its entanglements 
with the Cold War (game theory, cybernetics, operations research and other instances of 
‘the mechanisation of the mind’)? Or are these entanglements (which are interesting in 
and by themselves) of little help in preparing a critical reaction to its scientific claims? For 
a discussion, see Amadae (2003), Davies (2014), Dupuy (2000), Erickson et al. (2013), 
Hayles (1999), Mirowski (2002) and Turner (2006). Adam Curtis, in his 2011 BBC 
television documentary series All Watched Over by Machines of Loving Grace, provides 
both a vivid illustration of the span of this movement and a daunting examination of its 
political implications.
7 I am referring to the portions of STS that engage in an empirical examination of the 
conditions and productions of scientific activity. For a notable entry-point for the case 
of the social sciences, see Steinmetz (2005).
8 For indications on the EDF complex, for example, see Cihuelo, Jobert, and Grandclément 
(2015).
9 For an introduction to Legendre in English, see Goodrich (1997).
10 Among the best antidotes available are Will Davies’ examination of the neoliberal 
critique of law (2014), immediately followed by his critique of behavioural policy 
(2015).
11 ‘Nudge Unit’ is the nickname of the Behavioural Insights Team (BIT), a service 
originally set up as a team within the Cabinet Office of the government of the United 
Kingdom with the purpose of applying behavioural analysis to public policy. The word 
‘nudge’ refers here to the central notion of the same-name bestseller (Thaler and Sustein 
2008). On the rise of a nudge-inspired behavioural analysis of law, see Alemanno and 
Sibony (2015).
12 Engagement with data and design in the field of appropriation art provides, in some 
particularly remarkable instances, palpable demonstrations of the potentials of juristic 
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experimentation for the circumvention of the behavioural shibboleth. A particularly 
relevant example would be No Ghost Just a Shell, a project by Pierre Huyghe and Philippe 
Parreno that can be read as a study of juristic artifice in the determination and critique of 
the behavioural medium (see McDonough 2004; Barikin 2012).
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9
THE SOCIAL  
AND ITS PROBLEMS: 
ON PROBLEMATIC 
SOCIOLOGY
Martin Savransky
Ce qui oblige à changer d’optique théorétique, ce sont des problèmes à résoudre
Judith Schlanger (1975)
I n troduct ion :  Th e  Soc i a l  and  i t s  So lut ions
yet again, the perennial question: What is ‘the social?’ if there 
is one commonplace that seems to traverse the multiplicity of practices we 
have come to associate with the so-called ‘social’ sciences, it is the implicit 
sense that the nature of ‘the social’ constitutes a problem. Indeed, far from 
serving as an agreed first principle capable of articulating a scientific commu-
nity, the definition of the social has become a problem which persists in the 
many attempted solutions that have been proposed as a response to it over 
and beyond the history of the social sciences. In this sense, as intellectual 
historians have attested, struggles with the problematic nature of the social by 
far predate their emergence. Keith Baker (1994: 95), for example, notes that 
already in 1775 the Comte de Mirabeu characterised the social as ‘a dangerous 
word’ whose senses were multiple, while some early attempts at solving the 
problem – in the sense at least of providing an authoritative definition for the 
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term1 – can already be found in the Encyclopédie of Diderot and D’Alambert 
(1779).
By the late nineteenth century the problem of the nature of the social 
may be said to have found scientific expression, thereby giving rise to more 
systematic endeavours to capture it through the emerging disciplines of sociol-
ogy, anthropology, economics and psychology (Wagner 2000). It is evident, 
however, that this modern expression did not, by itself, make the problem 
disappear. Many of the so-called ‘founding fathers’ of such disciplines and the 
various traditions they gave birth to disagreed about the nature of the social, 
finding possible solutions to the problem in – to name but a few – the mode 
of solidarity and sociability that emerges from the constraints of a collective 
morality, as in Émile Durkheim’s case; the orientation of human behaviour 
and meaning-making to the existence of others, as Max Weber would have it; 
or indeed, in a more Marxist vein, in the historical forms of production and 
exchange by which individuals become organised into classes (for a detailed 
study of such attempts, see Halewood 2014).
The nature of the social has been, and still is, widely recognised as a prob-
lem, but only to the extent that it poses a problem for thought or knowledge, and 
therefore for particular kinds of scientific inquiry concerned with it. And insofar 
as the nature of the social seemed to pose a problem for knowledge, the fate of 
the social sciences became inescapably tied to the discovery, or the fabrication, 
of solutions to it. Thus, in his Sociology, Georg Simmel (2009: 27) began his 
exploration of the study of social forms as a means of coming to terms with, 
and clarifying, ‘the fundamental problem’ that called for the development of 
sociology. Similarly, Max Weber (2011 [1949]: 68. Emphasis in original), who 
was convinced that ‘it is not the “actual” interconnections of “things” but the 
conceptual interconnections of problems which define the scope of a science’, 
and on this basis suggested that a new science emerges in the pursuit of ‘new 
problems’ by new methods, complained about the ambiguity and generality 
of the ‘social’.2
The various functionalisms and social constructivisms that for a period 
of time in the second half of the twentieth century dominated much of the 
social sciences did attempt to break away from this problem. They did so, 
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though, by equating ‘the social’ with reality tout court. In this way, if the 
very existence of ‘nature’ was to be conceived as a ‘social construction’, then 
surely to ask what the nature of the social may be was rather absurd, the 
mere product of a weakness of thought. As a result, a generation of social 
scientists was cultivated who, when confronted with the question of the 
meaning and purpose of the social sciences, were ‘much more articulate […] 
about the science half of this lexical couple’ than about the social half, and 
became ‘satisfied to let the “social” in social science take care of itself ’ (Sewell 
2005: 319).
More than a solution to the problem of the social, then, theirs was arguably 
a dissolution, an active forgetting of the problem that only rendered the social 
tautological, the pervasive product of a circular play between nouns and adjec-
tives. In this way, ‘society’ came to be defined in terms of ‘social relations’ and 
‘social constructions’, and these, in turn, were defined in terms of ‘society’. The 
social became dissolved into everything, and apart from it, there was nothing, 
bare nothingness.
Nevertheless, as problems do, the problem of the social has stubbornly per-
sisted in its attempted dissolutions. Its persistence becomes apparent in more 
recent discussions by those who claim to have witnessed its demise under the 
auspices of advanced liberal forms of government (Rose 1996) and are now 
witnessing its reemergence under different media devices (Davies 2013); by 
those who have attempted to put it down themselves (Baudrillard 1983); and 
even by those whose aim has been to ‘reassemble’ it by restituting a tradition – 
that of Gabriel Tarde – that had itself fallen prey to the amnesiac solutions that 
often seem to characterise the so-called ‘progress’ of the social sciences (Latour 
2005; Candea 2010).
In light of the persistence of this problem, the aim of this chapter is neither 
to simply add another case of solution – or of dissolution – nor to argue that ‘we 
have never’ really known what the social is. It is not here a matter of explaining 
the problem away by repeating what, pace social scientists’ own embracing of 
his concept of the ‘paradigm’, Thomas Kuhn (2012 [1962]: 48, 159–60) had 
already observed. That is, that the social sciences remain pre-paradigmatic – 
hence pre-scientific – endeavours whose histories are ‘regularly marked by 
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frequent and deep debates over the legitimate methods, problems, and stand-
ards of solution’ that ‘serve rather to define schools than to produce agreement’. 
Instead, in what follows I will attempt to take the commonplace seriously, and 
to take the risk of thinking from and with it by opening it up to a different sense. 
A sense that perhaps might, in its turn, open up what it is that we do when we 
engage in inquiries into the social – or what, for want of a better word, I shall 
here speculatively dub ‘sociology’.3
In other words, it is not so much that we have never known what the social 
is, but that perhaps we have known it all along – the social is a problem. Taking 
this commonplace seriously forces us to move carefully, but it also demands 
that we take a risk, which is to shift our mode of attention with regards to the 
sense of this assertion. In other words, it is no longer a matter of asking again 
what the nature of ‘the social’ is. As I will show, to suggest that the social is a 
problem has the paradoxical effect of launching us beyond the question of what 
may constitute the essence of the social, that is, beyond the question ‘What is 
the social?’.
The task, rather, is to begin from the other half of the proposition. That is, to 
ask what a problem may be, once we resist the longstanding habit of assuming 
that problems are only of knowledge or thought, that they only have a subjec-
tive, epistemological, or methodological existence. In contrast, as I will suggest, 
problems have an existence of their own, a mode of existence that is never just 
immanent to thought, but to a historical – which is to say, unfinished – world; 
as such, they can never be reduced to a matter of human psychology, epistemol-
ogy, or methodology. Problems, in other words, are not that which a certain 
mode of thinking or knowing encounters as an obstacle to be overcome, but 
that which sets thinking, knowing and feeling in motion.
Conceived thus, to say ‘the social is a problem’ may cease to be a euphe-
mism for ‘we are not sure what the social is’ and become instead a provocation 
to develop a different kind of sociology. How might we envisage a manner 
of doing sociology that would take the social not as a rallying flag, not even 
as its central foundation or ontological ground, but as an open problem to 
be developed here and there, in the heterogeneous cultivation of a world in 
process? What kinds of knowledges might emerge from such adventures? 
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Would we still need to call them ‘knowledge’? What might we mean by it 
if we did? My hope is to suggest that as soon as we come to terms with the 
mode of existence of problems, what was once a commonplace may become a 
novel source of perplexity, and a new lure for thinking, knowing, and feeling. 
For, at the same time, as soon as we affirm that the social is a problem, being 
becomes an entirely different thing.
In this way, what follows is animated by the hope that this coming to 
terms with the problematic existence of the social might contribute to opening 
up, simultaneously, the possibility of a different understanding of the nature 
of problems, a different orientation to the nature of the social as such, as 
well as some preliminary steps to imagining a mode of social inquiry that 
is fundamentally problematic. That is, an inquiry at once singularly sensitive 
to the heterogeneous events by which the problem of the social may and 
does come to matter in diverse ways, and experimentally oriented towards 
the creation of novel forms of sociality. It is this mode of inquiry that I will 
here tentatively call a ‘problematic sociology’.
Open  th e  Soc i a l : 
On  th e  Mode  o f  Ex i s t ence  o f  P rob l em s
Perhaps the first step required for the task of imagining a problematic sociology is 
to attempt to come to terms with what Gilles Deleuze (1994: 165) once referred 
to as ‘the coloured thickness of the problem’. Indeed, as intimated above, my 
sense is that one of the reasons why the commonplace has never succeeded in 
becoming a different kind of lure might be related to the fact that we insist on 
treating problems negatively, as diaphanous, subjective conditions that testify 
to the limits of our knowledge, our certainty, and to the imperfections of our 
methods. Problems, it would seem, are what we are confronted with at those 
unhappy moments when we do not yet ‘know’.
Moreover, this requirement to come to terms with the thickness of prob-
lems seems particularly pressing for some fields of study that, in the pro-
cess of trying to dissolve the problem posed by the coming into being of the 
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social, in the 1970s and 1980s proclaimed a certain expertise in what were 
then termed ‘social problems’ (e.g. Blumer 1971; Spector and Kitsuse 2009 
[1987]). Following the strategy of dissolution referred to above, the turn from 
the question of the problem of the social to the study of ‘social problems’ had 
the effect of melting the thickness of problems themselves, turning problems 
into nothing but definitional activities, into the products of subjective and 
intersubjective human acts of claim-making.4 Indeed, one consequence of the 
then ‘new’ study of social problems was to undermine the objective nature of 
problems as such, confusing the actual, progressive determination of problems 
with the various manifestations and practices by means of which they acquire 
public expression.
In contrast to this habit of understanding problems in terms of non-being 
or lack, in terms of subjective or intersubjective (confused) states of mind, ‘as 
though problems were only provisional and contingent movements destined 
to disappear in the formation of knowledge’ (Deleuze 1994: 159) or by the 
moral resolution of ‘putative’ – hence not quite real – conditions (Spector and 
Kitsuse 2009), coming to terms with the thickness of problems requires that 
we endow them with ‘a minimum being’ of their own (Deleuze 2004: 67). It 
requires that we affirm that they do not simply exist in our heads but are ‘a 
state of the world, a dimension of the system and even its horizon or its home’ 
(Deleuze 1994: 280).
But does this invitation to think of the social as a problem and to assign a 
positive ontology to problems, to endow them with their own thickness, not 
throw us back into that paralysing habit of trying to determine the ultimate 
nature of the social as such, of seeking a final word on what constitutes the 
social? Does this not promote a form of essentialism that rejects that the 
social could be, in any non-trivial way, invented? Is this not, at the end of the 
day, an invitation to stick with the perennial question ‘What is the social?’ 
as if the nature of the social could finally be captured in a single clenching 
of a mental fist? The answer, as I have already anticipated above, is a resolute 
‘no’ – because to affirm that problems exist does not imply that their existence 
is essential, nor that a problem comes ready-made and is simply awaiting its 
one true solution.
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Rather than existing as fixed essences, problems ‘occur here and there in the 
production of an actual historical world’ (Deleuze 1994: 190). Thus, it is not 
just that problems are, but that they become: problems are posed by events. 
Rather than emerging from ignorance or from so many other negative mental or 
epistemological states, in this alternative sense, problems are the noise the future 
makes as it is folded into the present. Problems are, literally, ‘com-pli-cations’5 – 
relational foldings of tension and transition, of entangled incompossibles that 
events introduce into the world as they demand to be implicated in it. Thus, the 
mode of existence of problems belongs to the call, and the process, of inherit-
ing an event; they exist as a reality-to-be-done. This has happened, or is about 
to happen; it cannot be taken away: how to inherit it? For this reason, Deleuze 
(1994: 64) argues that, ‘the mode of the event is the problematic. One must 
not say that there are problematic events, but that events bear exclusively upon 
problems and define their conditions […]. The event by itself is problematic 
and problematizing’.
In other words, insofar as problems are brought into existence by the differ-
ences that emerge from, and subsist in, those happenings that mark the pulse 
of reality; if they are the result of time being thrown out of joint, marking a 
difference between a ‘before’ and an ‘after’ (Savransky 2016); then problems 
are real, but they are not for that reason finished, complete or closed.6 For if 
the force of an event is the production of an irreversible call for a future – and 
an equally irreversible past – then this future comes always undetermined, 
posed in the form, not of a prescription, but of a noisy, complicated question. 
In other words, events happen whether we want them to or not, but they are 
not the bearers of their own signification (Stengers 2000). They demand to be 
inherited, but they do not dictate the terms in which their heirs might inherit 
them. Events pose problems, but they never determine how those who are faced 
with the problems they pose will come to develop them.
Thus problems and questions go hand in hand, the former emerging in fact 
‘from imperatives of adventure or from events which appear in the form of 
questions’ (Deleuze 1994: 197). Therefore, like James Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake 
(2012 [1939]), which begins and ends in the middle of the same sentence; or 
like Julio Cortázar’s Hopscotch (1966), which ‘[i]n its own way […] consists 
219
the social and its probleMs: on probleMatic sociology 
of many books, but two books above all’, and where the reader, by confronting 
the possibility of reading the chapters of the book in many different orders, is 
invited to create her own sense of the development of the story; like these works, 
the mode of existence of problems is fundamentally ‘open’. Open, that is, in 
the way that a good debate might be said to be open. Not because it is made of 
indefinite suggestions and propositions, or because it is thoroughly transparent, 
but because while the problem demands solutions, these must be produced by 
the collective practices of those who partake in the task of determining its sense 
(on the open work, see Eco 1989).
Thus, because problems exist yet do so as the open, incorporeal, troubling 
effects of events that make up our historical, natural-cultural worlds, to come 
to terms with the thickness of problems is not, cannot be, a matter of defining 
their true ‘essence’. Rather, the being of problems is difference itself. In this way,
[o]nce it is a question of determining the problem […] as such, once it 
is a question of setting the dialectic in motion, the question “What is X?” 
gives way to other questions, otherwise powerful and efficacious, otherwise 
imperative: “How much, how and in what cases?” […] These questions 
are those of the accident, the event, the multiplicity – of difference – as 
opposed to that of essence, or that of the One, or those of the contrary and 
the contradictory (Deleuze 1994: 188).
By the same token, then, once it is a question of determining the problematic 
existence of the social, the logic of contradiction and closure involved in the 
perennial question ‘What is the social?’ ceases to take hold, and we are instead 
called upon to explore – not in the abstract, but as a matter of practical inquiry – 
the degrees, manners and scopes in which the social comes to matter as an open 
problem that demands to be developed. In other words, to say that the social 
is a problem is not simply to reiterate that it poses a problem to thought, or to 
particular kinds of knowledge. It is to assert that the social is the name for a 
problem that the world poses to itself, that certain events pose in the futures they 
create. Thus, rather than taking a general, unitary abstraction such as ‘society’ 
to be the ground upon which a special form of inquiry, a ‘sociology’, may be 
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founded, we may think of societies, in the plural, as the historically contingent, 
partial, and always provisional solutions to heterogeneous events that have here 
and there posed the social as an open problem to be developed.
To be sure, to refer to the plural genesis of societies as cases of solution for 
the problem of the social is not meant to imply that we need to speak of many 
different societies in the anthropological sense of the term. For such an invita-
tion already assumes society to be a bounded entity, and as Marilyn Strathern 
(1996: 51) has rightly argued, this additive operation cannot free itself from 
‘our mathematics of whole numbers, the tendency to count in ones’. Indeed, the 
mathematics of whole numbers that is presupposed by the concept of society 
as a bounded entity already betrays the open problem of the social as such. By 
counting in ones, such an understanding of the plurality of societies still rests 
on an opposition of abstractions – ‘society’ versus ‘individual’ – that closes 
down the problem of the social by conceiving of it merely as the shadow of a 
particular case of solution. For what is an individual if not itself a solution to 
a problem that sets a process of individuation into motion?7 When we begin 
from the opposition between society and individuals, we are left with the false 
problem, or the ‘unreal question’, as John Dewey dubbed it, of how individuals 
come to be organised in societies and groups:
the individual and the social are now opposed to each other, and there is 
the problem of “reconciling” them. Meanwhile, the genuine problem is 
that of adjusting groups and individuals to one another (1954 [1927]: 191. 
Emphasis in original).
Indeed, Strathern (1996: 51) already noted the mistake we make in projecting 
the problem of the social backwards from such abstractions, ‘in that we cannot 
really count them [societies] up’. As she put it elsewhere,
anthropologists [and many other social scientists too] by and large have 
been encouraged to think of number [in such a way] that the alternative to 
one is many. Consequently, we either deal with ones, namely single socie-
ties or attributes, or else with a multiplicity of ones brought together for 
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some purpose. […] A world obsessed with ones and the multiplication and 
divisions of ones creates problems for the conceptualization of relationships 
(Strathern 2004: 52–53).
Therefore, if we must begin somewhere,8 rather than doing so from the opposi-
tion that would allow us – or not – to add up and count Societies and Individuals 
as bounded entities, to speak of societies and individuals as plural, lower-case 
solutions to events that pose the social as a problem is to begin, like James Joyce, 
from the middle, that is, from the fact of togetherness (Whitehead 1978: 21) of 
the entities that compose every ‘here’ and ‘there’ in the becoming of an actual 
historical world. To begin in the middle, in the midst of togetherness, moves us 
away from the opposition between the ‘one’ and the ‘many’ and towards their 
reciprocal presupposition, such that
[t]he term ‘many’ presupposes the term ‘one’, and the term ‘one’ presupposes 
the term ‘many’ […]. The novel entity is at once the togetherness of the ‘many’ 
which it finds, and also it is one among the disjunctive ‘many’ which it leaves; 
it is a novel entity, disjunctively among the many entities which it synthesizes. 
The many become one, and are increased by one (Whitehead 1978: 21).
In this way, the problem of the social is not projected backwards from one of its 
possible solutions – namely, the upper-case, abstract concept of ‘Society’ – and 
it cannot be a matter of explaining the relation of individuals to Society. Instead, 
it forces us to inquire into the modes of togetherness, or the actual and possible 
forms of sociality, that ensue as solutions or ways of folding the events that pose 
the social as a problem. Coming to terms with the thickness of problems, with 
their own modes of existence, enables us to entertain the proposition that the 
mode of existence of the social is the problematic. That it is the open adventure of 
togetherness by means of which and in response to which, contingent, novel 
modes of sociality come into existence while giving the problem new means 
of expression.
In so doing we may understand, for example, the introduction of the terms 
‘social’ and ‘civil society’ in the Encyclopédie – and obviously, beyond it – as 
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a historically contingent and provisional, but also conceptual and secular, 
enlightened solution to the problematic modes of human togetherness brought 
about by the reformist resurgence of Augustinianism in the religious sensibili-
ties of the seventeenth century. Thus, as Keith Baker (1994: 119) reads it,
[i]n religious terms, then, it seems that société emerged, in response to the 
problem of Augustinianism, as a bearable middle-ground between grace and 
despair. […] A world from which God was hidden was a world in which 
authority was deligitimized and political order dissolved. It was a world 
condemned to civil strife and religious wars. […] But the Enlightenment 
evaded that choice. And it did so by recourse to the notion of society as an 
autonomous ground of human existence, a domain whose stability did not 
require the imposition of order from above, and whose free action did not 
necessarily degenerate into anarchy and disorder below.
Moreover, as I have suggested above, like all problems the social insists and 
persists in the solutions or modes of sociality that are contingently created as a 
response to it. And it is renewed as solutions give way to possible futures that in 
turn problematise existing modes of togetherness, inducing novel expressions, 
differences and challenges. Think, for instance, of the ‘national’ socialites that 
emerged, according to Wagner (2000), as a result of the French Revolution, 
and in relation to which the problem would also later find seminal scientific 
expressions in the early discipline of sociology. Also, more recently, think of the 
heterogeneous modes of togetherness involving viruses, medical specialisms, 
novel modes of gay activist socialities, antiretroviral drugs, and new forms of 
treatment and intervention that became together as provisional, evolving cases 
of solution to the problem posed by the event of HIV/AIDS (Epstein 1997). 
These solutions have never ceased to mutate as they have become exposed to, and 
been forced to inherit, the problems posed by the events of novel subjectivities, 
practices of knowledge, technologies of communication, and forms of treatment 
and prevention to which they themselves gave rise (Rosengarten 2009).
In this sense, it seems to me that an advantage of approaching the thickness 
of the problem of the social from the middle of togetherness is that it prevents 
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us from presupposing ready-made Societies or Individuals, and that it does 
not force us to assimilate ‘the social’ to ‘the human’. Indeed, in one sense, both 
human and other-than-human beings are individuals, such that ‘for some pur-
poses, for some results, the tree is the individual, for others the cell, and for a 
third, the forest or the landscape’ (Dewey 1954: 187). But in another sense, 
what are particular human and nonhuman individuals if not themselves contin-
gent solutions to the problems posed by the togetherness of their internal and 
external, and natural and cultural, milieus (Simondon 2005)? What are they if 
not societies themselves, as Alfred North Whitehead (1967; 1978) would call 
all enduring organisms?9
Undoubtedly, to think of the social as an open problem, and of modes of 
sociality as historically contingent cases of solution, presupposes the ubiq-
uity and multifariousness of associations. Neither problems nor solutions, 
however, can be reduced to these associations. To begin from the middle of a 
togetherness of things is to affirm that there is nothing as such which is alone 
in the world, developing an isolated existence in separation from others. But 
to affirm that the social exists in the form of a problem is not the same as 
claiming, as some versions of Science and Technology Studies (STS) and 
Actor-Network Theory (ANT) would seem to suggest, that it is synonymous 
with the associations between humans and nonhumans (e.g. Latour 2005). 
For as Dewey (1994 [1927]: 188) argued, ‘while associated behavior is 
[…] a universal law, the fact of association does not itself make a society’.10 
Rather, societies of diverse shapes and manners, with diverse capacities and 
interdependencies, emerge here and there as contingent solutions whenever 
the social is posed as an open problem by the events that make up our 
historical world.
This last point begs the question of what this attention to the social as an 
open problem entails for those practices of inquiry that we have come to relate 
to ‘the social’. In other words, it raises the possibility, but also the challenge, of 
wondering about the ethical constraints that might situate the adventures I have 
here associated with the notion of a ‘problematic sociology’. This, then, will be 
the aim of the following and final section of this chapter.
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For  an  Art  o f  Togetherne s s : 
S t e p s  to  a  P rob l emat ic  Soc io logy
The relationship between problems and methods is far from straightforward. 
Just as solutions are not given in advance but emerge at the same time, or 
better, at the same pace, as the sense of a problem becomes determined and 
is articulated in one or other mode of historical expression, so must methods 
in practice adjust themselves to the thickness of problems, learning to pose 
questions at the same time that answers become amenable to development.11 
Problems, I have suggested, are open, and they do not say how they should be 
developed. Thus, in a chapter titled ‘Method, problem, faith’, political theorist 
William Connolly (2004: 332) challenges the view that a mode of inquiry 
could be simply determined either by its methods or by the problems it attends 
to, and instead argues that an ‘intervening variable’ needs to be brought into 
play – namely, that of the different existential faiths that animate the tones and 
affective dispositions of any form of inquiry:
[a]n existential faith is a hot, committed view of the world layered into 
affective dispositions, habits and institutional priorities of its confessors. 
The intensity of commitment to it typically exceeds the power of the argu-
ments and evidence advanced [which does not mean that] existential faith is 
immune to new argument and evidence […] rather, it is seldom exhausted 
by them (Connolly 2004: 333).
Elsewhere I have also called this faith an ethics (Savransky 2016),12 in the sense 
neither of the discernment of good and evil, nor of the production of a code of 
conduct for research, but of an ethos of inquiry – an existential orientation to a 
mode of knowing, thinking and feeling that makes inquiry not just a practice 
directed towards ‘knowledge’, but a matter and manner of cultivating a whole 
way of inhabiting the world. At the beginning of his chapter, Connolly (2004) 
suggests that it is through an examination of these existential commitments 
that we may understand the relationships between problems and methods 
in the conduct of inquiry. I fully agree with him that the ethical dimension of 
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inquiry, that which makes rationality more of a sentiment than a faculty, is in 
need of attention, as it often gets lost or suppressed in the rationalising hubris 
of debates around methods and methodology. On this occasion, however, I am 
less interested in the issue of the priority of the ethical than in the reciprocal 
entanglements through which ethics, methods, and problems become articulated 
in the practice of inquiry. In other words, I am interested here in the question 
of whether an attention to the open thickness of problems and the problematic 
existence of the social might become, not a foundation, but a lure for cultivating 
a different mode of social inquiry.
Admittedly, the open nature of problems generates difficulties for outlining 
strict prescriptions for inquiry. The reason for these difficulties lies in the fact 
that, when this insight is taken to its limit, the openness of problems makes 
them different in kind from the solutions that may be provided as a response to 
them.13 While a solution is always already a manner of determining the sense of 
a problem, problems as such transcend any single field of solvability (Deleuze 
1994: 179).14 This is why they persist and insist in their solutions, rather than 
being dissolved in them. And it is also for this reason that Deleuze claims rather 
enigmatically that we should not apply the test of truth and falsehood to solu-
tions, but to problems themselves. For a ‘solution always has the truth it deserves 
according to the problem to which it is a response, and the problem always has 
the solution it deserves according to its own truth or falsity – in other words, in 
proportion to its sense’ (1994: 159; emphasis in original).
Solutions are always dependent on problems, just as answers are always 
dependent on questions. Not the other way around. Thus, as Mariam Motamedi 
Fraser (2009: 76) has rightly argued, ‘[t]he best that a solution can do therefore 
is to develop a problem’. At the same time, however, problems become actualised 
by means of the determination of their sense, that is, by way of solutions. Thus, 
a problem is simultaneously transcendent and immanent with regards to its 
solutions. It is incarnated in the latter in such a way that it ‘does not exist, apart 
from its solutions’. (Deleuze 1994: 163).
The above situates any mode of inquiry in something of a bind with regards to 
problems. On the one hand, it must be said that no form of inquiry – no matter 
how methodologically sophisticated, how politically radical, or how ‘practically’ 
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grounded (read policy/impact/etc.) it may claim to be – can ‘solve’ problems, if 
by that we mean making problems disappear. We live, it seems, in a world popu-
lated through and through by questions and problems. Indeed, as Dewey (2004 
[1920]: 80) was always at pains to stress: ‘a life of ease, a life of success without 
effort, would be a thoughtless life, and so would be a life of ready omnipotence’.
‘And so would be a life of ready omnipotence’: In my view, cultivating an ethics 
of problems belongs less to the question of which methods to deploy, than to 
the development of humbler sensibilities with regards to the question of what 
a ‘method’ may be capable of. This, it seems to me, is a point that deserves to be 
stressed. Following a long period in which almost every reference to ‘method’ 
was associated with a reactionary and narrow-minded, positivist past, the last 
ten to fifteen years have witnessed a renewed interest in social and cultural 
research methods (e.g. Back and Puwar 2012, Law 2004, Lury and Wakeford 
2012, Vannini 2015, among others). A considerable part of this renaissance 
of methods research has been animated by a particular interpretation of John 
Austin’s theory of the illocutionary force of performative utterances, according 
to which the claims that the social sciences make about the worlds they study – 
and therefore the means through which those claims are achieved – are said to 
bring those worlds into being, instead of merely representing them. As John 
Law and John Urry (2004: 392–393) succinctly put it in a programmatic text 
with the telling title ‘Enacting the Social’: ‘The argument, then, is that social 
science is performative. It produces realities’.
There is much that I find unconvincing – and on occasion, misleading – about 
such propositions, but not all of my disagreements with these arguments are 
directly pertinent here.15 For our current purposes, suffice it to say that, in such 
performative accounts, the social appears to be seen as a product of, rather than 
as a problem for (and beyond), social inquiry. Accordingly, the renewed fascina-
tion with methods in social research is concerned less with the representational 
validity of the knowledge claims to which certain methods give rise, than with 
their inventive capacities for ‘enacting the social’ or for ‘problem-making’ (e.g. 
Michael 2012).
As I hope the discussion above makes clear, however, it is the becoming of 
problems that sets inquiries into motion, rather than the reverse. Thus, to the 
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extent that inquiry emerges in response to the problems posed in the indetermi-
nate futures opened up by events, it cannot but remain on the side of proposi-
tions, of solutions, determining the senses of problems, failing and succeeding 
here and there in accomplishing its ends and effecting consequences. Thus, if 
we are overstepping the mark whenever we claim to have solved, or to be able 
to solve, problems, I fear we do so too when we assign to methods of inquiry 
the capacity to ‘enact’ the social, to ‘frame’ or ‘make’ problems, as if problems 
were yet another product of our omnipotent performativities. For the ques-
tion is not whether methods ‘solve’ or ‘make’ problems, but whether or not 
the solutions that they articulate can enable problems to develop in alternative 
and valuable ways.
To suggest, then, that there are no ultimate solutions to problems, that our 
inquiries are incapable of making problems disappear, is not to say that every-
thing is lost, that inquiry is the result of an error, or indeed, of a false problem 
that takes problems themselves to be confused states of mind susceptible to 
dissolution. The openness of problems is not the negation of inquiry, concerned 
as it inevitably is with the production of solutions. Solutions there must be, no 
matter how partial, provisional, and contingent these inevitably are. Deleuze 
expresses this paradox in the following way:
It would be naive to think that the problems of life and death, of love and 
the differences between the sexes [as well as the problem of the social] 
are amenable to their scientific solutions and positings, even though such 
positings and solutions necessarily arise without warning, even though they 
must necessarily emerge at a certain moment in the unfolding process of the 
development of these problems (1994: 107. Emphasis added).
The question, rather, is ‘what can solutions do?’ The short answer is ‘we never 
know’. But rather than inviting the laissez-faire and rather omnipotent attitude 
cultivated in claims that methods produce realities, this ‘we never know’ is 
instead an invitation to remain vigilant about the ways in which solutions – 
and methods – are proposed. Thus, I think that if this coming to terms with 
the open thickness of problems has any ethical implications – in the sense of 
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ethics defined above – then perhaps these involve an invitation to conduct a 
form of inquiry neither oriented toward producing solutions that could put an 
end to problems, nor toward the hubris of making its own problems. As I have 
argued elsewhere (Savransky 2016), an event constitutes a break in the order of 
causality, an effect that is irreducible to its cause. Thus, just as an event cannot 
be explained away by historical reasons,16 a science, a theory, or a method may 
will an event and work with a view towards its possible actualisation; but no 
one, no method or solution, can claim to produce events at will, nor to become 
the ‘condition of possibility’ for their becoming. An event is, after all, the trans-
formation of the possible.
Rather than lend itself to methodological prescriptions, therefore, an ethics 
of problems invites us to cultivate a singular sensitivity to the manners and 
occasions where the social insists and persists in the form of a problem with 
its own thickness, its own folds and snags, consistencies and determinations, 
tensions and potentialities, as well as to the many different modes of sociality 
that emerge historically as contingent cases of solution. To engage the social 
as an open problem is therefore also to imagine a form of inquiry whose task 
is that of a permanent experimentation with problems themselves. An experi-
mentation that trusts the possibility of developing problems otherwise, so that 
their solutions, always partial, provisional, and contingent, may themselves 
engender new differences that transform the sense of a problem. These novel 
differences may certainly be deemed events of invention, but it is to the event 
that such an inventiveness belongs. As Celia Lury and Nina Wakeford (2012: 
7; emphasis added) acknowledge in their Inventive Methods, what they refer to 
as the ‘inventiveness’ of methods, that is, ‘their capacity to address a problem 
and change that problem as it performs itself – cannot be secured in advance’.
Perhaps, then, the challenge for a problematic sociology is neither to dissolve 
nor to make problems but to cultivate an art of togetherness. An art concerned 
with producing, in the course of its own creative activity, intellectual, material 
and felt tools that emerge in the unfolding process of the development of prob-
lems. Tools that are necessarily insufficient with respect to any final capture of 
problems themselves, but that nevertheless may, sometimes, provide certain 
determinations and pathways for problems to find new means of expression. 
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Acknowledging this necessary insufficiency of any mode of inquiry with regards 
to the mode of existence of problems does not, however, entail viewing such 
inquiries as fundamentally lacking or flawed. Rather, it is a provocation to 
think of and engage in inquiry as an ongoing practice of experimentation with 
open problems. It is what makes sociology, like the development of problems 
themselves, an infinite task.
Note s
1 As they defined it, the ‘social’ – which was classified as an adjective rather than a noun 
– was ‘a word recently introduced in language to define the qualities that render a man 
useful within society’ (Diderot and D’Alambert 1779: 216).
2 While Weber (2011 [1949]: 68; emphasis in original) suggested that ‘new problems’ 
were generative of new inquires because they were capable of opening up new and 
‘significant points of view’, he complained that the ‘social’, ‘when taken in its “general” 
meaning’, was too ambiguous and multifarious a reality to provide a ‘specific’ point of 
view. He thus rejected both the assumptions of the Marxist traditions that would reduce 
the social to the economic, and the very possibility of an ‘absolutely “objective” scientific 
analysis of […] “social phenomena” independent of special and one-sided viewpoints 
according to which – expressly or tacitly, consciously or unconsciously – they are selected, 
analyzed and organized for expository purposes.’ (2011: 72).
3 Speculatively, that is, because rather than serve as a reference to an actual, disciplinary 
state of affairs that could be contrasted with that of anthropology, psychology, economics, 
geography, or other social sciences, the term ‘sociology’ here is addressed to what could 
be, that is, to the creation of a possible (Savransky 2016). This is a possible whose seeds 
are perhaps contained in the challenge posed by the very composition of the term itself 
– the challenge, that is, of a logos of the socius, of a companion-talk, of addressing those 
we are with, those with whom we exist together.
4 For a more recent approach that, although not in direct conversation with this literature, 
reverses this sociologising tendency in order to think about how publics are made by, 
instead of making, problems, see Marres (2005, 2012).
5 It is perhaps no coincidence that terms like ‘complication’, ‘implication’, and ‘explication’, 
all crucially retain the presence of the morpheme ‘pli’, which is the French word for ‘fold’.
6 Instead, closed or overdetermined problems would be a case of ‘false’ problems, as in 
the conventional pedagogic scenario when a teacher poses a problem the solution to which 
is known in advance, and the student is assigned the task of solving it. Despite the notable 
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efforts of John Dewey (see e.g. 2009 [1909]), this conception not only pervades much 
research in education on – tellingly – ‘problem-solving’ but, more disquietingly, it still 
pervades pedagogical practices at all levels, as it incarnates itself in the situation of exam 
questions. This is the scene that constitutes ‘the problem as obstacle and the respondent 
as Hercules’ (Deleuze 1994: 158). Deleuze calls this an ‘infantile prejudice’ but I wonder 
whether this would not be better called an ‘adult’ prejudice, pivotal as it is in the jealous 
demarcations of ‘expertise’ and in the entire economy of seriousness that sustains them.
7 Thus, the philosopher of individuation Gilbert Simondon (2005), who was a source 
of inspiration for Deleuze, would describe the various phases of individuation (physical, 
vital, psychic, collective) as cases of solution to problems posed by relations of tension at 
a previous phase. For example, the becoming of a living individual is thought as a solution 
to the tension emerging in the relations between a physical individual and its milieu, while 
this solution would subsequently pose its own problems by introducing a new tensed 
relation between perception and affectivity, thereby giving rise to a new solution that 
involved a process of ‘psychic’ individuation, and so on.
8 My sense is that, from the point of view of practical, empirical inquiry, it is not clear 
that we must begin at all. Rather, as I will argue in the next section, inquiries always ‘begin’ 
after events that have posed a problem, and their challenge is always how to inherit the 
event and how to develop the problem (Savransky 2016). The question of beginnings is 
thus entirely speculative, in the best sense of the term.
9 On Whitehead’s concept of ‘society’ see also Savransky (2016) and Halewood (2014).
10 As far as STS is concerned, the problem of the social may arguably make itself felt 
more keenly in what Bruno Latour (2004) has called ‘matters of concern’. From this 
perspective, moreover, the insistence and persistence of problems is what makes Maria 
Puig de la Bellacasa’s (2010) concept of ‘matters of care’ vital for the development of a 
problematic STS.
11 Or else they may give rise to false problems, to imposed problems that emerge not out 
of real historical situations but out of an excessively rigid, dogmatic ethics of method.
12 As indeed has Connolly (1995) himself.
13 This difference in kind is, of course, the ontological difference stressed by Bergson and 
Deleuze between the actual and the virtual. Problems are ultimately always virtual with 
regards to their ‘actual’ solutions and thus can neither be contained by, dissolved into, or 
reconstructed from the latter. Although the virtual dimension of problems in Deleuze is 
philosophically important and intellectually stimulating, it introduces a transcendental 
dimension that, I fear, risks situating problems well beyond the remit of whatever we 
might take ‘sociology’ to be, or indeed, beyond that of any other science (a risk also 
noted by Fraser [2009: 76]; for an account of the transcendental in Deleuze’s thinking see 
Bryant [2008]). Worse still, overemphasising the virtual, elusive character of problems in 
approaching the social bears the enormous danger of opening the door to familiar social 
theory rhetorics of ineffability, excess and unknowability, whose consequences are, to 
my mind, counterproductive for practical, ethically committed forms of inquiry. Surely, 
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there are things that are ‘unknowable,’ in the sense that they have nothing to do with 
knowledge as such. But to acknowledge this is quite different, I think, from celebrating 
‘unknowability’ in relation to a ‘knowledge-practice.’ When it is a matter of the latter, I 
stand with Whitehead (1978: 4): ‘the unknowable is unknown.’ Moreover, as I will show 
below, placing problems entirely in the realm of the virtual is indeed a betrayal of the 
problem itself, for problems are also crucially immanent to their solutions, insisting only 
in the latter, and being developed as solutions are produced (Deleuze 1994: 163).
14 This is why a problematic sociology should not concern itself simply with something 
called ‘social problems’, as if some problems were ‘social’ to begin with. As I have suggested 
above, it is the social that is a problem, and not the problem that is social.
15 For a more in-depth, critical exploration of contemporary social science debates about 
the ‘performativity’ of knowledge see Savransky (2016. Especially the chapter titled 
‘Modes of Connection’).
16 Which does not mean that it does not tolerate that stories about it be told.
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THE SOCIALITY OF 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES
Marsha Rosengarten
in his preface to Jorge luis borges’ labyrInThs, andre Maurois brings 
the reader’s attention to the significance of problem-making. We are offered a 
glimpse of what we might expect from Borges’ text through reference to the 
idea for a ‘frightening story’ by the renowned writer and poet Paul Valéry: ‘it is 
discovered that the only remedy for cancer is living human flesh. Consequences’ 
(Maurois 2000:11). This eerie and, as I read it, paradoxical remedy that requires 
what it also aims to succour, serves as a provocation to reflect on the manner 
by which a problem is posed (Fraser 2010; Michael and Rosengarten 2013; 
Savranksy, this volume).1 I offer it here as a foretaste of a problem-making 
arguably no less labyrinth-like than Borges’ tales. In what follows I ask in what 
manner might it be said that the biomedical endeavor of dealing with infec-
tious disease conceives the social as a resource? But, also, what might infection 
suggest otherwise?
Throughout the chapter, my primary focus will be HIV, with mention also 
of the newly emergent Zika virus as well as Ebola and Tuberculosis (TB). Of 
these latter three, TB will be discussed in more detail as a co-infective agent with 
HIV in the concluding sections. As I hope will become evident, the biomedical 
notion of the social, as it is posed in response to each of these life-threatening 
events, is not simply for sustaining. Indeed, by way of a small number of textual 
examples, I want to expose the manner by which the biomedical depends on 
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constituting the social as its purpose but, in doing so, treats it as little more than 
a passive or disruptive obstacle to the challenge of dealing with such infections. I 
argue that this bears conceptual but, more crucially, questionable cost to human 
life, despite science’s not infrequent achievements.
Cons equence s
When I first began working as a social scientist in the HIV field my late friend 
Alan Brotherton, connoisseur of many things that no doubt contributed to the 
brilliance of his activism and policy making, said to me ‘we got antiretroviral 
drugs which are by no means ideal but their presence has interceded in the pos-
sibility of something better’.2 I’ve often contemplated this statement, or a version 
of it, in relation to the manner in which pharmaceuticals have acquired a claim 
on approaches to the epidemic with the consequence that other dimensions 
of HIV, commonly perceived as the social dimensions of the epidemic, have 
become marginal for inquiry. Arguably, one of the most notable of these has 
been the inventive engagement of those now targeted and, without argument, 
aided by pharmaceutical interventions. Long before HIV antiretroviral drugs 
showed efficacy in suppressing the virus, safe sexual practices were enabled by 
gay sexual communities instituting condom use. Yet despite this potentially 
telling feature of what has contributed to preventing transmission, alongside 
medical advancement, other novel and inventive modes of risk negotiation that 
have emerged with the drugs are often reduced within biomedical narratives 
to simply risky or not (Kippax and Race 2003; Rosengarten 2009; Stengers 
1997). Brotherton’s observation was made at a time when the drugs were 
considerably less sophisticated, not only reducing viral presence but also, for 
many, inducing damaging life disruptive drug effects (Rosengarten, 2009). 
Although it was these drugs’ unanticipated unwanted effects — the iatrogenics 
of HIV biomedicine — that initially provoked me to contemplate the work of 
biomedical intervention, here I wonder how this connects with a conception of 
the social in the continuing problem-making of HIV as well as other infectious 
diseases such as Zika, Ebola and TB.
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During the 2014– 2015 Ebola epidemic in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
biomedical approaches involved drastic measures such as placing those infected 
(or thought to be infected) in isolation wards, without their families or others 
close to them knowing whether they were still alive, and unable to provide them 
with any form of care. Another drastic intervention was to isolate villages sus-
pected of harbouring the infection, leaving entire communities without access 
to vital necessities. A third intervention involved heavy-handed security threats 
of jail terms for those caught hiding someone with the virus (Mullen 2014:e550 
Marí Sáez, Kelly and Brown 2014). Because underdosing with antibiotic TB 
drugs can result in drug resistance (CDC 2016), TB treatment is prescribed 
through directly observed therapy (DOT) in countries with high prevalence 
and poor infrastructure. The treatment involves an onerous daily dosing regimen 
(usually for six months) that may incur feeling dizzy, sick, flu-like symptoms 
and jaundice, while the strategy of DOT demands repeated, often lengthy and 
costly travel to a clinic (Harper 2010; Noyes and Popay 2006).
When I was preparing to write this chapter, the Zika virus dominated the 
headlines of major news outlets because of its capacity to be transmitted by a 
strain of mosquito bite, with life-damaging consequences to the foetus carried by 
a pregnant woman (Baud et al. 2017). One of the most prominent newspapers 
in the United Kingdom, the Guardian, reported on 3 February 2016 that a race 
was on to produce a vaccine to protect ‘the unborn’ (Milman 2016). Noting 
that this aim was made difficult by the need to test drugs on pregnant women, 
a group ‘normally shielded from experimental trials,’ Mike Turner, head of 
immuno-biology at the Wellcome Trust, was quoted as stating, ‘[t]esting a vac-
cine on pregnant women is a “practical and ethical nightmare”’.3 Nonetheless, 
amidst acknowledgement that it would be difficult to produce a vaccine for 
the current epidemic, Anthony Fauci, Director of the US National Institute of 
Allergy and Infectious Diseases, was reported to state that a vaccine to prevent 
future infections might be available by 2017. Leaving aside the complexities of 
vaccine development, a year later, the means for preventing the damage of Zika 
infection to a foetus continues to reside with vulnerable women.4 The website 
of the US Centre for Communicable Diseases (CDCa no date) includes the 
following advice to women of child-bearing age: ‘If you live in or must travel 
237
the sociality of infectious diseases
to one of these areas, talk to your doctor or other healthcare provider first and 
strictly follow steps to prevent mosquito bites and practice safe sex’. Needless 
to say, it is not always possible for women to control safe sex, as is well-known 
from the experience of HIV prevention. Compounding what is constituted 
as a highly gendered biomedical problematic of Zika prevention, termination 
of a pregnancy is illegal in many of the affected countries (Aiken et al. 2016).
My hunch is that the above style of media reporting does well to highlight 
the crucial need for intervention and then, with the suggestion of a biomedical 
solution, provides reassurance to those of us at some distance from the identi-
fied site and source of infection that its problem will, eventually, be solved. 
But as the risk of Zika infection for pregnant women and the foetus shows, 
the promise of a biomedical solution is able to take centre stage while glossing 
the demands on those affected by the agent of infection. Although a medically 
inscribed public health approach to Zika, Ebola and TB may be thought a neces-
sary protective measure for the greater good of more lives saved, others argue, 
with differing modes of emphasis, for a more patient or community oriented 
approach (Hanson, Zembe and Ekstro 2015; Harper 2010; UNICEF 2016).5 In 
HIV, the challenges of preventing transmission continue despite the advent of 
treatments and, although as I have noted above, drugs have radically improved 
there is no cure in sight (Sankoh et al. 2015).
However, it is the different but not unconnected effects arising from the 
biomedical response to HIV, Zika, Ebola and TB that lead me to propose a 
related, yet somewhat differently oriented focus to that addressed to individual 
and community needs. Leaving aside the no doubt important focus on health 
economics and poor infrastructure raised by others and predominantly in the 
field of anthropology (Harper 2010; Farrar & Piot 2014; Ghazanfar et al. 2015), 
I would like to bring into question the logics and indifferences that, as Isabelle 
Stengers (1997; 2011) has shown, succeed in constituting a situation of concrete 
difficulties. But because in this chapter I am unable to do justice to Stengers’ 
complex undertaking for a different science, I shall attempt the beginning of 
a response to a more modest set of questions: How does biomedicine remain 
cocooned from accountability, despite evidence of a vastly complex array of 
dynamic relations that cut across a conventional science/social divide to effect 
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what becomes biomedical intervention? What labyrinth-like process are we – 
scientists, social scientists, policy makers and those directly affected, including 
health professionals – caught within? And, not least, by what mode of attention 
might this process be opened to the possibility of consequences different to 
those analogous, in some manner, to feeding human flesh to attenuate cancer?
Nav igat ing  th e  La byr inth
For the reader who may be thinking that I have ventured too far into the phan-
tasmagorical by drawing an analogy between Valéry’s tale and that of modern 
medical science, I want to say that, in truth, I have my own reservations. I am 
most certainly hesitant about my decision to pursue the analogy if it should 
be mistaken as a damning of medical science. I am taken with the analogy 
precisely because it enables me to dramatise the boundary that constitutes the 
social as external to biomedical science and, arguably, as it does so, forecloses 
the possibilities for a more responsive or, as Maria Puig de la Bellacasa (2017) 
proposes, ‘caring’ science. That is, a science attentive to its own selective, yet 
highly infective modes of knowing, and the consequences that may follow in the 
endeavour of bringing about a finite solution (Rosengarten 2009; Race 2012; 
Edelstein, Angelides and Heymann 2015).
Of the three infections discussed in this chapter, HIV has acquired consid-
erably more resources and its networks are vast, involving specific public and 
philanthropic funding, multiple disciplines, numerous national and global civil 
society organisations, and ring-fenced social research in contrast to what may be 
observed in response to the much longer event of TB and, perhaps less surpris-
ing, to the more recent events of Zika and Ebola. Indeed, the field of HIV can be 
viewed as exemplary for the labyrinth-like manner that those of us working across 
the field of infectious diseases – if not health and medicine more broadly – may 
be caught within. While on the one hand, it is evident that health resources but 
also continued debate and reflection are crucial for responding to the dynamics 
of health and disease, it can also be said that what attracts resources is the field’s 
legitimation by science as an object worthy of inquiry.6 In short, and based on 
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my direct involvement in the HIV field, I am inclined to deduce that resources 
come hand-in-hand with entrenched logics and modes of practice and that, as 
I show below, once such logics are established, they serve to inoculate against 
other modes of engagement.
The first international conference on HIV took place in 1985. Since its 
fledgling beginnings, it has now grown under the auspices of the International 
AIDS Society to attract delegates in the thousands (the Washington DC 2012 
conference had close to 20,000 delegates), including scientists of multiple per-
suasions as well as members of numerous activist civil society organisations, 
national public health authorities from all over the globe plus major public, 
philanthropic and commercial research funders.7 Not surprisingly, conference 
proceedings are watched over by invited local and international media outlets 
and, since the introduction of antiretroviral drugs in 1996, there is invariably 
much ado about what suffices as the latest scientific findings. Shoring up the 
reputation of such conference events as worthy of national and global media 
attention, high-ranking politicians such as Bill Clinton and the late Nelsen 
Mandela are now an expected feature of the opening and closing addresses, 
along with prominent biomedical scientists and activists.
To be sure, such forums with their public advocacy for HIV has import 
for maintaining funding support for research and intervention. Nonetheless, 
it is important to bear in mind that what is active in their possibility of public 
advocacy is an assemblage inclusive of a veracious virus and the paraphernalia 
that has come with this, for example: diagnostics, drugs, prevention education, 
social marketing, chairmanships, grant applications, changes in sexual practice 
and the more nuanced work of a diverse array of civil society organisations. And, 
as is acknowledged amidst such forums, also included are the millions who have 
died and those who are now infected or at risk of infection. As this collective 
and highly complex dynamic is presided over, and massively overshadowed, 
by the weighty orchestration of a biomedical conference agenda, an attentive-
ness to what has come to matter and the complex manner in which it bears on 
the costs of this to life, is peculiarly subsumed within the thinking constraints 
of modern science and the world it expresses. Within such forums, presenta-
tions – whether scientific, social scientific, policy or activist – are required to 
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comply with one of two formats for first stage abstract review: option 1 must 
contain a background and hypothesis tested, methods, results and conclusions 
with future implications; option 2 must contain a background and objectives 
of a programme, project or policy, a description of the project, lessons learned, 
conclusions/next steps. In short, there is no place for exploratory conceptual 
work that attempts to experiment with different modes of engagement, modes 
that might, for example, pursue an appreciation of the designated ‘social’ as 
more than composed of distinct agentive human actors warranting aid and/
or correction.
This blatant exclusion of what else might come to matter beyond or contrary 
to a modern scientific schema came home to me during the opening speeches of 
the 2012 IAS Conference in Washington DC when Fauci, cited above in refer-
ence to Zika, and whose research and advocacy have no doubt contributed to 
gains in the HIV epidemic, took the stage to announce ‘the end of AIDS’ was 
now on the horizon, thanks entirely to the singular achievements of biomedical 
antiretroviral drugs and other biomedical developments. If the consequences 
of Fauci’s seeming indifference to the deemed ‘non-scientific’ for what will 
change the epidemic were not so apparent in his claim, the statement might 
have been laughable – suggesting that the rest of us ‘non-biomedical scientists’ 
could go home to wait for the cure. Fauci’s statement was mediated just a little 
in its backing by Hillary Clinton, at the time Secretary of State for the United 
States of America. As a major American international political figure, Clinton’s 
opening speech underscored the acclaimed role of biomedicine, but did so with 
a somewhat different claim of the coming of an ‘AIDS Free Generation’. Perhaps 
her speech writers had the foresight to recognise that none of the biomedical 
interventions currently available offer the likelihood that existing HIV infec-
tion is soon to be cured, and the experience of HIV ended. That said, Clinton’s 
promise ventured no further than Fauci’s in its premise that a generation free of 
HIV infection would be achieved through the prioritising of a finite biomedical 
solution.8
Leaving aside the conflation of HIV and AIDS in both Fauci and Clinton’s 
pronouncements — with AIDS no longer a near inevitable consequence of 
HIV due to antiretroviral drugs to prevent HIV infectivity, their having already 
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been established as preventative of AIDS — the world audience might have 
been tempted to believe we are on the cusp of an extraordinary biomedical 
achievement, an achievement premised on an inert social in wait or, at best, as 
we see below, to be held against its deficit tendencies that might prevent the 
singularity of biomedicine.
Since the Washington (2012) and also Melbourne IAS (2014) confer-
ences – the latter turning on the announcement that consistent dosing with 
antiretroviral drugs can function as a form of pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) 
for HIV negative people, a claim that informed Clinton’s speech – Kane Race 
(2015: 7) has challenged the HIV field to attend to what he terms its compart-
mentalised/ non-relational thinking and, specifically, a ‘presumptive negativ-
ity of sex’ in dealing with the virus. By paraphrasing the research questions 
cited in biomedical presentations at the IAS and other international HIV 
conferences, namely: ‘Had trial participants adhered to the dosing require-
ments? How do we know? Are they telling the truth? How should we measure 
this?’ Race (2015: 9) underscores how medical science logics are fixed to 
their own project as if above and beyond what has called for intervention. 
By illuminating how the demand for dosing not only excludes what makes 
for its happening, but succeeds in doing so by reducing the social that we 
might otherwise expect to be paramount for its complex possibilities, Race 
proposes a different perspective. Acutely attuned to the worlds of gay cultures 
and their togetherness with other entities in the event of HIV prevention and 
pleasure, his challenge to the field goes to the heart of what might be more 
responsively considered at stake:
[C]omparatively little thought or attention has been given to the processes 
through which HIV-negative and untested individuals might (or might not) 
become subjects of HIV prevention. […] How might we think about and 
begin to exercise responsibility at a scene whose appeal consists, to some 
extent, for its participants, in the way it promises to suspend or momentar-
ily interrupt any grip on the sovereign or rational subject that is taken to be 
the foundation of responsibility in modern culture? Or, put differently, how 
might we attend responsibly and effectively to pleasure, where this pleasure 
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consists in some form of ecstasy or de-subjectification? I’m talking about 
sex and drugs (Race 2013).
By pointing to the coming together of sex and non-medical drugs in the pursuit 
of sexual pleasure – precisely where, as he sees it, a mode of ‘de-subjectification’ 
or ‘de-rationalising’ may be the experienced effect – Race not only contests the 
exclusionary and somewhat contradictory assumptions by the HIV biomedical 
field that come with the causal framing of the problem of dosing adherence. 
Going beyond this, he highlights the situated process by which HIV trans-
mission may or may not take place. This is a process that well exceeds simple 
presuppositions that the social is merely the doing of human actors, thus 
extending the research terrain and resisting the foreclosure of biomedicine 
on what could be claimed as its concern for a sustained achievement of HIV 
prevention.
De e p  W i th in  th e  La byr inth
Race’s pithy account of the social for biomedicine and the import of the notion 
of ‘togetherness’ in his proposal raises, in turn, the question of what drives the 
knowledge-making that mobilises his concern. Exemplary, I suggest, in expos-
ing Stengers’ (2011) claims of the indifference of modern science to what it 
regards as the ‘non-scientific’, is the RCT. Without detailing the method and 
the many critical accounts that it has elicited (see for example, Michael and 
Rosengarten 2013; Timmermans and Berg 2003; Will and Moreira 2010), I cite 
one particular article that suggests the method has come to matter more than 
those whose health it claims to act for. Lead authored by Nancy Padian with a 
long list of prominent co-author HIV trialists, the article, entitled ‘Weighing 
the Gold in the Gold Standard: Challenges in HIV Prevention Research’, was 
published in the esteemed journal, AIDS (Padian et al. 2010), thus not only 
earning endorsement, but also, arguably, assisting in the cultivation of what has 
become of decided importance to clinical research and, hence, evidence-based 
research, namely, methodological success.
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Beginning with an explicit expression of concern about the failure of the 
majority of RCTs to produce statistically significant findings, over the length 
of the HIV epidemic, for assessing the efficacy of biomedical prevention tech-
nologies, Padian et al. (2010: 621) explain that only six out of a total of 37 at 
the time of their writing had achieved ‘demonstrated definitive effects on HIV 
incidence’.9 ‘Demonstrated definitive effects’ are statistical differences between 
the product and control arms, irrespective of what the effects suggest about 
the product or, indeed, the methodological design of the RCT. This exclusive 
interest in a statistical difference is made explicit in the authors’ mention of the 
trial of nonoxynol-9 gel for vaginal use. The trial is positively noted as one of 
the few to have achieved a demonstrated effect. But it is also well known – if 
not infamous – for the manner in which it did so. As the article notes, without 
additional commentary or reflection, a 50% increase in HIV incidence was able 
to be demonstrated because the intervention, nonoxynol-9, increased vulner-
ability to the virus (Padian et al. 2010: 624). Insofar as the article is explicit in 
its aim to examine ‘the design, implementation, and contextual considerations 
that may limit detection of a positive or adverse effect in HIV prevention trials’, 
some might argue that the question of harm or benefit – that is, the type of 
effect – was not relevant to its discussion. But, if so, it is not difficult to draw 
the conclusion that a demonstrated difference in numbers is what matters, and 
not the experience of the effect.
It is, however, the authors’ complaint about ethical requirements that con-
cerns me particularly, as it underscores the strange nature of what I am suggesting 
has come to matter in the logic of biomedical of science. The following quote 
from the authors poses the question of what is ethical when carrying out an 
RCT in low-and middle-income countries, while making clear that the pursuit 
of a biomedical solution supersedes other considerations:
The ethical issues of offering enhanced HIV prevention services in the 
comparison arm must be weighed against the ethical issues of lengthy 
and expensive prevention trials that provide the control group with an 
unsustainable level of prevention services that does not reflect community 
standards. Further, such trials may jeopardize our ability to identify and 
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offer participants and at-risk individuals around the world additional effec-
tive HIV prevention options […] in most [RCTs], risk-taking behavior was 
reduced in both [intervention and control arms]. Some of this change may 
be attributable to enhanced prevention services offered in the trial (Padian 
2010: 631).
In short, it is evident that caring for trial participants is seen to be at a cost to 
research findings. To put this more bluntly, the non-biomedical or relevant des-
ignated social – here, research participants – is a resource only for achieving a 
demonstrated effect. And a risky resource at that. Despite what we might assume 
to be the intended beneficiaries of medical science, in the above weighing of the 
difficulties faced by RCTs, research participants are responsibilised for potentially 
undermining the method either by: (i) those in the control or placebo arm not 
contracting HIV during the research, thereby failing to provide a comparison 
with the trial product; or (ii) by not complying with the requirements of the 
protocol which might well generate evidence achieved in a manner qualitatively 
indifferent to their HIV vulnerability.
The  Awful  and  Wondrous 
Cr eat i v i t y  o f  I n f ect ion
Having shown how the endeavour of dealing with infectious disease holds to a 
narrow conception of the social and how this provides a resource for science, I 
now want to consider whether the very notion of infection might lend itself to 
a rethinking of biomedical problem-making. To pursue this question, I propose 
to hold in suspension the desire to deem ‘infection’ a purely deductive force. 
To do so, I need to offer one final empirical example, an explanatory statement 
by the World Health Organisation (WHO 2014) on HIV/TB co-infection:
People infected with TB bacteria have a lifetime risk of falling ill with TB 
of 10%. However persons with compromised immune systems, such as 
people living with HIV […] have a much higher risk of falling ill. People 
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who are co-infected with HIV and TB are 21 to 34 times more likely to 
become sick with TB.
Although at first reading, the extract may appear to speak only of the destruc-
tiveness of the association of HIV and TB, I propose that we pause on how this 
concern follows from the manner in which these infections jointly achieve their 
destructiveness. The two different infections are said to affect each other within 
the milieu of a body that is necessary to their complex dynamic. Moreover, 
their respective differences within this milieu create conditions conducive to 
the other. To backtrack a little, their modes of entering into the milieu are dis-
tinctly different: TB by breath, HIV by bodily fluids. But nonetheless, the two 
achieve an advantage for each other as they become together as multi-morbidity, 
and with a multiplying of effects. Indeed, it is precisely the conception that the 
body-with-infection – bacterial (TB) or viral (HIV) – can be further differen-
tially transformed while retaining or holding an enduring distinctiveness of 
the other that contributes to the current patterning of drugs (their molecular 
composition) and the sequential ordering of their usage: treating first TB then 
HIV co-infection (McShane 2005).
Without discounting the complexities and problems that might be raised 
in relation to treating HIV/TB co-infection, and perhaps along the lines of 
Brotherton’s earlier comment on HIV antiretroviral drugs, we could say that 
the above description of infection effects is not so out of character with Race’s 
effort to provoke thought on the ‘togetherness’ of sex, drugs and HIV preven-
tion. To put this another way, it seems that the above description by the WHO 
of infection as a mode of ‘togetherness’ speaks, in part, to a relational conception 
of infection. Indeed, the description is not entirely at odds with Alfred North 
Whitehead’s notion of infection as integral to relationality and endurance:
That which endures is limited, obstructive, intolerant, infecting its envi-
ronment with its own aspects. But it is not self-sufficient. The aspect of all 
things enter into its very nature. It is only itself as drawing together into its 
own limitation the larger whole in which it finds itself (Whitehead cited in 
Stengers 2011: 156–57).
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Infection is, as Stengers elaborates in relation to the above quote, a ‘holding-
together’ (2011: 158) and, as such, a determinate shaping of a dynamic existence. 
It pertains, as Whitehead proposes, to all modes of endurance, including viruses, 
bacteria, dosing and bodies, as well as those we might regard as non-animate 
such as rocks but also, and no less, to human thought. All ‘prehend’ or, in less 
technical terms can be said to feel or grasp. Prehending the world is integral to 
the processes by which, for Whitehead (1978), the creativity of transformations 
and endurances happen. The success of this process is, as Stengers (2011: 158) 
states, ‘a co-production between this being and “its” environment’. Taking up 
this notion of infection, Martin Savransky (2016: 141) describes the process 
as requiring a speculative response: ‘the milieu feels [sic] the invention and the 
invention the milieu, [such] that a transformation of both [sic] might take hold 
in a way that cannot be fully anticipated [my emphasis]’. With hindsight, this 
resonates well with the unanticipated events of all four infections, and also with 
biomedical intervention: new modes of HIV transmission in the co-production 
of a milieu that involves sex, antiretroviral drugs and viruses (Auerbach and 
Hoppe 2015), emergent TB drug resistance (Zignol et al. 2012), and also the 
continuing toll on human life as a consequence of the Ebola epidemic (Clark 
et al. 2015).10
Certainly, the want of a technoscience solution of drugs, vaccines, contain-
ment and so on that presumes an infection may be brought to a finite end may 
be difficult to resist. But without disregarding what are known as biomedical 
achievements, a solution is a static affair whose closure is only possible to the 
extent to which the focus follows the threads of a labyrinth-like prevailing 
biomedical thinking. This focus may misguide us away from a productive soci-
ality to the narrowly prescribed social for biomedical intervention that I have 
criticised in this chapter.
But there is another dimension to the notion of infection made available 
by Whitehead that both Stengers and Savransky illuminate above. And this 
dimension is the crux of what I want to raise in reference to the pervasive 
work of scientific knowledge and practice. That is the prevalence of modes of 
knowing and practice that are in themselves an achievement of infection, yet 
whose possibilities for a more attentive, nuanced thinking are subsumed in the 
247
the sociality of infectious diseases
orchestration of a problem-making that all too readily becomes a problem of the 
narrowly prescribed social. To put this another way, if we accept the proposi-
tion that infection is the work of a co-adaption achieved through the situated or 
‘grounded’ prehendings of the entities involved (and these may extend beyond 
what may be observed), then the dull, detracting social of biomedicine may 
well be attributed to the lure of biomedical promise and assurances. This is a 
lure that vectorises a mode of sense-making that falls well short of a sociality 
in which all entities are active in the creativity of the future (Whitehead 1967; 
1968; 1978). Moreover, it does so by a logic that understands itself apart from 
the work of infectivity, which it claims as merely its object and not in connection 
with its process. Feeling or prehending are not merely concepts for expanding 
the logic of modern science, but for reflecting on its drawing together a sociality 
cultivated in the scientific endeavour.
Conclu s ion :  R e po s ing  th e  P rob l em
Insofar as the achievements of biomedical science are generated in the varying 
endurances and transformation of objects, the latter cannot be held distinct 
and deficient or lacking unless only contingently. If we recall the examples of 
the nonoxyl 9 trial where the unwanted and unexpected novelty of infection 
emerged in the form of a vulnerability to HIV; or where dosing compliance 
may be superseded by events of an entirely different order than those held to 
matter by biomedicine, as observed by Race (2013), the problem is not fore-
most deficiency or lack. Rather it is the contribution of other elements that have 
come into existence with a differential degree of co-adaption or togetherness. 
Such events are not absences; on the contrary, they are creative and demand a 
response that remains attentive to what they bring forth.
In sum, it is not the infectiousness of viruses and bacteria alone that make for 
a social conceived as necessarily subject to biomedical intervention. Rather, we 
might say, it is also the infectiousness of scientific thought orchestrated through 
a host of uncontested events, all too briefly sketched here: authoritative media 
reporting; conference circuitry whose triumphal accounts of biomedicine mesh 
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well with the want of spurious promises about the future; high-ranking scientific 
journal publications; and, not least, lauded methods of inquiry indifferent to 
the ‘non-scientific’. While viruses and bacteria are doing well to achieve a ‘hold’ 
or ‘co-adaptation’, so too, it can be said, has biomedicine achieved, through an 
infection of ideas (and, therefore, analogous to its viral and bacterial objects), 
a hold that constitutes a social made insubstantial as the site and source of no 
more than a given or potential deficit.
This hold of biomedicine remains delimited in its grasp or feeling for other 
modes of ‘holding together’, modes that might otherwise be considered for the 
possibility of more preferable consequences of health and medical intervention. 
In contrast to the current mode of biomedical problem-making, if the aim is to 
intervene in the consequent killer effects of infectious disease and, as I suggest, 
resist analogy with the feeding of human flesh as the solution to cancer, the 
notion of infectivity may have something to teach us. By not posing it as a given 
problem of a social or, indeed, a biological/biomedical object, distinguished 
as these are along disciplinary lines within health and medicine approaches, it 
might be that new territory for thinking about infectious disease may be availed.
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Note s
1 Although living flesh could be said to refer to the use of stem cells, my reading is based 
on a more commonplace understanding of flesh as human life.
2 For an account of the contributions of Alan Brotherton, see Race and Stephenson 
(2016).
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3 Elaboration on this claim is provided in a Wellcome Trust report (see Wellcome, 2017).
4 For details of this damage, see CDC Report on Microcephaly & Other Birth Defects 
(no date).
5 Since the Ebola epidemic in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) has reviewed its response process and the need to consider better 
humanitarian approaches. The WHO Secretariat’s response to the Report of the Ebola 
Interim Assessment Panel August 2015 (WHO 2015) serves as one example, although 
considerably more is offered by the anthropologists who raised key concerns about the 
Ebola response during the epidemic (for detailed commentaries during and postDESCRIB 
the epidemic see Somatosphere <http://somatosphere.net/tag/ebola> [accessed 3 May 
2018].
6 See Epstein’s account of how difficult it was to raise the spectre of an unusual disease 
that came to be known as HIV until it had been laboratory evidenced.
7 See McGoey (2015) for a complex study on the influence of philanthropic funding 
and the scientific bias of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.
8 See Johnson (2012) for an account of Clinton’s speech.
9 A detailed discussion of this method can be found in Michael and Rosengarten (2013) 
and Savransky and Rosengarten (2016).
10 Reports of a host of effects are now being reported. These include, for example, painful 
and mobility limiting arthritis, vision-threatening eye inflammation (uveitis) and mental 
health difficulties, all transmitted through the fluids of semen and breast milk (Beeching, 
Fenech, and Houlihan 2014; Vetter et al., 2016: e8s).
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SOCIAL MEDIA AS 
EXPERIMENTS IN SOCIALITY
Noortje Marres, Carolin Gerlitz
I n troduct ion
What does the ‘social’ in social media refer to? This question has been much 
debated in recent years, and the range of answers provided is impressively wide 
(Coleman 2013; Van Dijck 2013; Davies 2015). Some argue that today’s social 
media are not that special, as media technologies have always been social: older 
incarnations like the telephone and the radio equally depended on their uptake 
in social life for their functioning and success, and earlier internet applica-
tions like email and online discussion forums facilitated many of the forms of 
social connection and exchange that are today associated with popular online 
platforms dubbed ‘social media’ (Coleman 2013; Papacharissi 2015). Others 
have countered that we shouldn’t just go along with the designation of online 
platforms as ‘social media’, as this is to confer legitimacy, or ‘street cred’, onto 
them: we should in fact criticise this very label. Thus, Couldry and Van Dijck 
(2015) argue that the ‘social’ in social media lacks a referent: in their view, and 
contrary to popular opinion, online platforms are not social but anti-social, 
as their mode of operation goes against many long-held norms and values 
regulating social life, such as the ideal that sociality should serve no other 
end than itself. In sharp contrast to this, many platforms frame sociality as an 
instrumental activity that serves other objectives such as gaining influence or 
attention, or of generating metrics and data. Finally, according to yet others, we 
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should not so readily dismiss the possibility that a special relationship exists 
between the digital technologies known as social media and sociality. For one, 
popular platforms such as Facebook and Twitter are remarkably well-aligned 
with sociological understandings of social life, such as the idea that people form 
‘social networks’ or ‘perform’ the self in everyday life (Thielmann 2011; Hogan 
2010; Healy 2015).
In this chapter, we seek to contribute to this debate about social media 
technologies by offering a fourth, different answer to the question of what 
makes social media social. On online platforms, we propose, sociality becomes 
the subject of experimentation. An outstanding feature of social media is that 
they not only facilitate existing social activities, practices, and relations, but 
also encourage the creation of new ones, allowing for what some have called 
the ‘enhancement’, ‘augmentation’ or ‘elaboration’ of sociality (Healy 2015; 
Bucher 2013). In this article, we want to make the case that this has important 
consequences for our wider understanding of the relations between media 
technologies and sociality in our age. Specifically, it follows from the above 
that we should not treat mediated sociality as a given attribute of existing media 
technological infrastructures, arrangements, and practices. Instead, we must 
treat the sociality of social media as an experimental accomplishment: whether 
or not sociality is successfully realised with these technologies depends on 
how digital infrastructures, devices, and practices are configured, more or less 
deliberately so. We should, then, not only be debating whether social media are 
social or not – whether in and of themselves these technologies support social 
connections, expression, exchange, reproduction, and so on. We should equally 
examine how the accomplishment of different forms of sociality depends – in 
a non-straightforward way – on how digital infrastructures, devices, and prac-
tices are assembled in practice, and the contributions that social researchers 
themselves can make to this.
In this chapter, we explore such an experimental take on the sociality of social 
media platforms in two ways: first, we situate the debate about digital sociality 
in the context of recent debates in social theory about the status of ‘the social’ in 
contemporary societies. We propose that the online platforms popularly known 
as ‘social media’ re-open a debate that many thought was closed, namely that 
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about the relations between the social and the technical. Second, we discuss 
a collaborative project in social media analysis which we developed together 
with Esther Weltevrede and others during the Digital Methods Summer School 
in Amsterdam in 2013, and in which we sought to develop an experimental 
understanding of sociality with social media technologies. This project found 
its starting point in a remark by the British sociologist Emma Uprichard, who 
during a pointed exchange in the summer of 2012 insisted, ‘Just because it is 
called social, doesn’t make it social!’ (see also Marres 2017). Adopting this 
dictum, our project took up the tools of Twitter analysis to develop a range 
of experimental answers to the question ‘what is social about social media?’ 
Finally, we draw on this pilot study to argue that digital platforms enable a 
distinct type of of ‘arte-factual’ sociality, one that invites or even requires the 
development of new, experimental research strategies for understanding social 
life with social media.
What Social Media Can Tell Us About ‘The Social’: 
It’s Back but it Hasn’t Returned
Arguably, social media can be considered part of a bigger family of what social 
theorists have come to refer to ‘the new socials’. Mike Savage (2009: 171)1 has 
noted that digital arrangements affect the everyday organisation of society as 
an object of knowledge, as ‘ordinary transactions, from websites, Tesco loyalty 
cards, CCTV cameras in your local shopping centre etc., are the stuff of the 
new social’. Will Davies (2015) has commented on the proliferation in the last 
decade of neologisms such as social enterprise, social technology, social design, 
social marketing, social innovation, social analytics, social bonds, social jour-
nalism, and so on. These ‘socials’ can be called ‘new’ insofar as these arrange-
ments and labels can be contrasted with ‘old socials’ associated with an earlier 
era of progressive investment in the planned society, such as social policy, 
social housing, and perhaps indeed, social research. Thus, while many of the 
‘old socials’ are connected with the welfare state, the new socials signal efforts 
to bring economy, culture, and politics together under a regime of innovation 
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that no longer depends on centralist planning. The advancement of new socials, 
furthermore, often involves efforts to bring technology and society into closer 
relation, where the former is no longer considered antithetical to the human 
bond, but somehow generative of community, togetherness, and related values – 
a capacity especially ascribed to digital technologies. It has for instance been 
argued that what makes the digital economy different from other economies 
is its relation to ‘the social’: Will Hutton opposed the social entrepreneurship 
of Palo Alto to the ‘anti-social’ economy of austerity Britain (Marres 2017).2 
We can even observe a recent tendency to claim that the digital has the capaci-
ties to make any sector, arrangement or practice ‘more social’: social media 
technologies allegedly enable companies to be more engaged, responsive, in 
touch, aware, and so on. However, this introduction of digital devices into 
social practices remains a largely instrumental operation, mainly serving the 
aim of understanding audiences (through monitoring), cultivating markets 
(social branding), and/or extracting data and value. As such, the new ‘socials’ 
mostly do not refer to anything that sociologists call by that name, but rather 
invoke conceptions of sociality that have been prevalent in marketing, audience 
research, and strategy where informal exchange and mundane interaction have 
long been recognised as a valuable conduit for the cultivation of brands and 
markets (Moor and Lury 2011).
However, this is not all there is to recent invocations of the social. To begin 
with, it is not the case that labelling online platforms as ‘social’ operates on the 
level of ‘sloganeering’ or ‘labelling’ only. Many online platforms also implement 
versions of sociological theory and methods (Bucher 2013; Healy 2015). Take 
‘People You May Know’, the algorithm developed by the professional networking 
site LinkedIn and subsequently implemented by Facebook, where it is used to 
suggest users to connect with (to ‘friend’). As LinkedIn itself proclaims on the 
company blog, this algorithm implements a concept developed by the sociolo-
gist Georg Simmel, namely his principle of triadic closure, the phenomenon 
that if one person knows two people, these people are likely to know each 
other.3 As such, it could be argued that social media enable the ‘materialisa-
tion’ of sociological methods and concepts across organisations and social life, 
as their uptake across settings results in the partial reformatting – and perhaps 
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to an extent also the re-organisation – of social life as analysable phenomena: 
as social networks, social trends, and so on. Partly for this reason, we think it 
would be a mistake to assume too strict an opposition between ‘the new socials’ 
advanced with the aid of digital technologies and ‘the social’ as conceived in 
social theory and social research.
Furthermore, the uptake of social concepts in contemporary technological, 
creative and organisational contexts can be understood as posing a wider chal-
lenge to debates in social theory about the fate of ‘the social’ in technological 
and knowledge-intensive societies. From the 1980s onwards, social theorists 
announced ‘the end of the social’: in this period, Bruno Latour (1993), Nikolas 
Rose (1996), Karin-Knorr Cetina (1994) and Jean Baudrillard (1988) developed 
different versions of the claim that we were moving beyond ‘society’ and enter-
ing a post-social epoch. While their interpretations of this general idea differ, 
each of them argued that the ideal conception of society as a homogeneous 
whole directed from a position outside it was losing plausibility in our time, 
either because of the demise of the ideal of a socially engineered society and 
the welfare state (Rose 1996), or more positively, because of the emergence of 
a different ethical and political proposition for the organisation of society, such 
as that of heterogeneous collectives (Latour 2005), in which not just humans 
but also non-humans participate. This latter approach presented society and 
post-society – or rather non-society – as mutually exclusive: either we continue 
to adhere to classic understandings of human society, or we affirm the existence 
of heterogeneous collectives, and being for society meant being against the 
recognition of non-humans as participants in social life.
Seen against this backdrop, digital media present social theory with a usefully 
heretical proposition: they combine both positions – society and heterogeneity – 
in remarkably successful and unsettling ways. In the case of online platforms, 
it is perfectly possible to specify a given formation as both heterogeneous in 
composition and social in form and orientation. These platforms present us with 
a Janus face: they constitute a socio-technically heterogeneous phenomenon 
made up of technical and social entities and they enable the organisation and 
analysis of classic social formations such as community and society (Marres 
2017). How to account for these Janus-faced, heterogeneous socials?4 It is 
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important to recognise that the approximation between sociological methods 
and concepts and technological infrastructures that is so clearly observable in 
the case of social media technology, is not ‘new’ as such. Sociologists have long 
drawn attention to this very phenomenon in discussions of historical devices, 
infrastructures, and practices of social organisation and knowledge: in particular, 
social research instruments such as the survey, the opinion poll, and the focus 
group have been characterised in terms of their double function as serving both 
as a tool for the analysis of societies and as an instrument for intervention in 
public, economic, and social life (Didier 2009; Osborne and Rose 1999; Lezaun 
2007; Law and Ruppert 2013). As such, social media reactivate sociological 
debates about the necessarily reflexive quality of social life and social research, 
as theorised for example by Anthony Giddens (1987) in his work on the double 
hermeneutics that make ideas circulate between sociology and social life, and 
by Aaron Cicourel (1964), who famously argued that social methods are only 
applicable to social life by virtue of the uptake of the categories built into these 
methods across social life. Social media platforms invite us to explore these ideas 
anew, but we propose that they also disrupt some assumptions associated with 
concepts of the ‘reflexivity’ of social life and social analysis.
To see this, there is a further point that requires attention: social media 
technologies highlight the ‘arte-factual’ quality of digitally mediated sociality. 
The social activities, practices, and relations enabled and made visible by social 
media are not necessarily representative of society at large, partly because they 
are informed by media technologies themselves. Both expert and popular debates 
increasingly recognise that social media are biased towards certain forms and 
types of sociality (Gerlitz and Helmond 2013). One way in which this bias 
became clear is when we visualised students’ Facebook networks in a classroom 
setting: these networks often told us much more about how Facebook works 
(‘the platform encourages the accumulation of friends’) and about Facebook-
specific behaviours (‘he is a very active Facebooker’) than about people’s social 
relations. Social media platforms are designed for ‘social enhancement’, and the 
sociality they enable and make visible often does not exist before or outside the 
platform. Sociality enabled by social media, then, resists naturalization: it is 
demonstrably an arte-factual accomplishment. We find this is among the most 
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interesting and important provocations of social media to our understandings 
of sociality, one that has the potential to translate into a wider ‘experimentali-
sation’ of the social, which would mean that the forms of sociality enabled by 
these and related socio-technical infrastructures are not given but ‘curatable’ 
and potentially open to reinvention.
To better understand this potential (re-)qualification of the social in digital 
media environments, we need to take a step back and consider whether and how 
this idea of ‘experimental’ sociality relates to another, better-known concept, 
that of the ‘performance’ of social life, which has been used by social theorists 
to demonstrate that social life is not a natural or given phenomenon but staged, 
produced, and realised deliberatively and effortfully (see the introduction to this 
volume). A performative account of society suggests that there is no such thing as 
an ‘independently existing’ social order, and sociality must instead be understood 
as – to use Harold Garfinkel’s terminology – an ongoing accomplishment. Social 
media have granted empirical plausibility to this understanding of performed 
sociality, as they are designed to enable both distinct (and often economically 
valuable) performances of the ‘self ’ through profile pictures, tag lines, walls, 
and so on, as well as the performative demonstration of social formations such 
as social networks and collective dynamics, with the aid of network maps and 
trend lists (Ruppert, Law and Savage 2013). Drawing on Harold Garfinkel’s 
ethnomethodolgy, the German media scholar Tristan Thielmann (2011) has 
pointed out that online platforms enable everyday actors to produce ‘accounts 
of social life as part of social life’. Platforms from Facebook to Instagram prompt 
users to generate reports of mundane occurrences (Where did you have dinner? 
With whom?). As such, social media appear to realise Garfinkel’s ethnometh-
odological idea that social life ‘accounts for itself ’: they enable the proliferation 
of accounting devices that render mundane moments and informal interaction 
recordable, analysable, and curatable for practical purposes – and this by way 
of data formats defined and made available by the media themselves, such as 
like shares, status updates, friend requests, and so on.
However, in other ways, today’s social media platforms also precisely go 
against this kind of sociological understanding of social life as an object of 
knowledge. For Garfinkel, highlighting the performative quality of social life 
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was a way of dismantling the status of sociology as an independent discipline. 
If social life can account for itself, this would make the development of distinct 
methods for sociological inquiry obsolete. But today the intensification of the 
accountability of social life is accompanied by loud reassertions of ‘the social’ as 
a distinctive form of organisation, and of the need for a new ‘science of society’. 
The head of the Facebook data science team not so long ago referred to himself 
as a ‘digital sociologist’ (Simonite 2012). Social media, then, present sociology 
with a paradox: the infrastructures, devices, and practices that are associated 
with ‘the new socials’ equally exhibit features that sociologists associate with the 
‘end’ of the social. Another way of putting this is to say that, from a sociological 
perspective, social media platforms appear to be methodologically and concep-
tually promiscuous: they exemplify insights from performative sociology but 
equally support a realist science of society. Indeed, is it not partly because social 
media platforms come with various in-built ‘performative’ devices that elicit the 
‘accounting for social life as part of social life’, that they enable the proliferation 
of rather ‘conventional’ sociological measures and methods?
The easiest, most feasible way of conducting social research with social 
media is to take up popular free online data tools which facilitate things such 
as the analysis of personal (human-to-human) networks, or the measurement 
of reputation and influence – all forms of sociological analysis that have been 
part of the sociological repertoire since at least the post-war period. In some 
ways, social media radicalise these forms of analysis. One could say that eth-
nomethodologists held on to a certain idea of social life as given, insofar as 
that ‘performative’ quality of social life was for them an un-changing attribute, 
an ontological truth. Also, while the performative sociology of the 1960s had 
assumed that the formats for accounting ‘for everyday life as part of everyday 
life’ were mostly readily available in and as social life, today these formats have 
become the object of rather intense efforts to design, innovate, and domesticate 
‘new’ devices of social accounting.
The work of information theorist Philip Agre (1994) is relevant here: in his 
studies of employee management, Agre proposed the notion of ‘grammars of 
action’. This notion recognises that the production of ‘accounts for social life as 
part of social life’ involves instruments and the configuration of infrastructures, 
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whilst also attending to the design efforts involved. Employers devise these 
grammars as predefined sets of actions – such as conversation scripts in call 
centres or step-by-step guidelines for dealing with customer complaints – that 
immediately enable their own datafication, rendering them recordable and 
analysable. The distinction between actions and their capture collapses in the 
process of grammatisation, and both are subject to intensive design, standardi-
sation and formatting. In the context of social media platforms, pre-structured 
platform activities such as liking, tweeting or replying can be considered as 
examples of such grammars, which are offered by platforms and realised by 
users. However, these grammars can only standardise the form of action and 
data, not its interpretation by users and other stakeholders, who, to a certain 
degree, can inscribe their own practices and meaning into the grammars pro-
vided, taking advantage of interpretative flexibility (Pinch and Bijker 1984; 
Paßmann and Gerlitz 2014).
As such, social media, and possibly other new socials too, do not quite 
comply with a performative understanding of social life. They present us with 
a further ‘experimentalisation’ of the social: it is today not self-evident what 
forms of sociality, what theory of society or of social life, will be realised as 
a consequence of the proliferation of devices for ‘accounting for social life 
as part of social life’. There are myriads of possibilities: for example, will the 
paradigm of incentivising and nudging by way of social media buttons trans-
late into the invention of a behavioural society, one constituted of more or less 
atomistic individuals defined by their actions? Or will organic forms of society 
be reinvented in the sense of a return to the imagination of a collective body 
that transcends the individuals that make it up? While theorists of the ‘end of 
the social’ in the 1980s and 90s considered this debate more or less closed (in 
favour of the former), we consider it reopened: ‘the social is back’ as an issue to 
be grappled with. And this return does not necessarily present a return to the 
familiar: today’s situation signals a possible experimentalisation of the social. 
We face a paradoxical situation, one in which sociality figures as an intense 
object of design, engineering, and analysis, while the theories of sociality that 
are deployed towards this end tend to conceptualise society in terms of a human 
population or community. The rise to prominence of ‘social media’ correlates 
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with increased levels of ‘artifice’ involved in the making of sociality, but at the 
same time the claim that social data enable an ‘unfiltered’ understanding of a 
given society is widely endorsed. It is in order to hold on to these paradoxes 
that we insist that today we are facing a ‘not quite’ return of the social. And it 
is this ‘not quite’ that we seek to specify, by approaching social media as a site 
for the ‘(re)invention of sociality’.
Methodology :  How to  S tudy  N ew 
Soc i a l s  w i th  Soc i a l  M ed i a
We are struck, then, by the odd confluence of ideas, devices, and imaginaries 
of sociality in social media, at least some of which seem mutually incompatible 
or in tension with one another. This situation can be investigated by different 
means: it can be engaged theoretically, for example by tracing genealogies of 
the concept of the social (Halewood 2014), or it can be analysed empirically, 
through case studies of particular social media technologies, such as buttons or 
flags, to specify their role in the performance of mediated sociality (Helmond 
and Gerlitz 2013; Crawford and Gillespie 2014). But in what follows we adopt 
not so much an empirical but an experimental approach: we do not just ask 
what definitions of sociality are being advanced through social media, which 
would be a way of delegating the definition of sociality to our empirical object. 
We also do not attempt to locate sociality in the technical features of social 
media platforms and the possibilities they offer for interaction and connectiv-
ity (Boyd and Ellison 2007), in the content created by users (which invites 
spreading) (Langlois 2014), in the context of use (Slater 2002) or in the data 
they render available, such as social network connections (Gerlitz and Rieder 
2017). Instead we would like to engage with social ontology as something that 
is collectively accomplished in social media environments, and approach this 
accomplishment as something in which we – as social media researchers and 
theorists – actively participate.
We thus approach the social as a ‘happening’, to take up the concept offered 
by Nina Wakeford and Celia Lury (2012): a distributed accomplishment of users, 
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technicity, data, practices, methods, measures, and other yet to be determined 
elements, of which the collective effect is fundamentally uncertain. We then 
approach the question of ‘what’s social in social media?’ in an open-ended way: 
rather than conceptualise the productive capacities of methods and devices in 
terms of enactment, we think of them in terms of participation. In doing so, 
we also take our cue from Michel Callon (2006), who insists that empirical 
sociology must be willing to derive its classifications from the case at hand. In 
his discussion of how to analyse large numbers, Callon suggests that ‘[o]ne way 
of testing the relevance and robustness of a proposed categorization is to allow 
the entities studied to participate in the enterprise of classification’ (2006: 8). In 
our view, such attention to actor-defined categories is significantly complicated 
in digital research, as it is not just the actors (that is, the users, the platforms, 
or associated developers), but also contexts of interpretation, tools for data 
analysis and their settings, the issue at hand, visualisation strategies, and so on, 
that play a role in establishing the (ir)relevance of particular classifications and 
assumptions over others. The task of experimental social inquiry is to formulate 
research strategies that render such participation methodologically viable.
To give some concrete examples of this experimental strategy in social inquiry, 
we will discuss a group project that we initiated during the Digital Methods 
Summer School 2013 to address the question of ‘what makes social media 
social?’5. The Digital Methods Summer School is an annual postgraduate event, 
initiated by Richard Rogers and hosted by the University of Amsterdam, which 
introduces students and scholars to digital media research through participation 
in collaborative research projects. Small-scale projects are designed, realised and 
presented within a week. The aim of our project was to use digital methods for 
practice-based social research (Rogers 2013). For this particular edition of the 
summer school, we collaborated with Esther Weltevrede to pitch a project called 
‘Detecting the Social’, and developed it together with around twenty scholars, 
designers, programmers, and activists, bringing together expertise in media stud-
ies, sociology, computing, design, and science and technology studies (STS). In 
what follows we will narrate selected findings of this project in order to illustrate 
the range of ‘socials’ that we found to be ‘in play’ in social media, and to discuss 
what an experimental approach to new socials might look like.
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Starting with the idea of the ‘happening’ of the social (Lury and Wakeford 
2012), we abstained from preconceived accounts of sociality and explicitly 
recognised the heterogeneity of social concepts, methods, and forms that are 
designed and practised in digital media environments, and the participation of 
our methodological apparatus in them. To structure the project, we divided our 
group into three sub-groups, each of which was tasked to explore a different ‘way 
into’ the social: interaction (Gerlitz), the non-human (bots) (Weltevrede), and 
content (Marres). Our aim was to produce an overview or ‘mapping’ of different 
happenings of sociality that are ‘detectable with social media’ (see for a similar 
approach, Kelty et al. 2012). In line with the prevalent approach adopted by 
the Digital Methods Summer School (Rogers 2013), we limited ourselves to 
using methods of online data analysis and visualisation, and focused on one 
platform only, namely Twitter. It is important to note that relying on platform 
data in this way offers a highly partial view, one which does not account for 
user interpretations and practices, or socio-material and organisational features 
of social media infrastructures. However, this narrow focus seemed to us well 
attuned to our wider methodological project of studying the ‘happening’ of the 
social: we could account for the sociality enacted in and with Twitter ‘from the 
inside’, and examine a range of forms of sociality with the same data set: user 
interactions, content dynamics, and the composition of collectives (humans 
and non-humans).
Twitter was chosen as a site of experimentation as the platform is known 
for the relative ease of data access, the diverse character of at least some of its 
content, and its explicit yet limited grammars of action and interaction (tweets, 
@mentions, retweets, user accounts, hashtags, and so forth). To account for 
media and content dynamics, we settled on a topical dataset containing tweets 
relating to the topic of ‘privacy’, as captured with the Digital Methods Twitter 
Analysis and Capture Tool (TCAT) (Borra and Rieder 2014). These tweets were 
posted between 23 May 2013 and 15 June 2013.6 During this period, the news 
of Edward Snowden’s data leak broke, an event which operated across a variety 
of registers, including journalistic, activist, tongue-in-cheek, and geo-political. 
This broad scope of the event seemed helpful for our project of capturing dif-
ferent modalities of interaction and collective expression on Twitter.
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Each of the three groups examined the sociality of Twitter from a distinct 
angle, namely interaction, non-human activity, and content or hashtag dynam-
ics, and issue composition. We were aware that by choosing this approach we 
aligned ourselves in various ways with dominant measures built into Twitter 
and Twitter analysis. The platform is famously biased towards particular forms 
of sociality, such as popularity (trends), celebrity (star users) or viral dynamics 
(memes). However, our own preoccupations – with interaction, non-humans 
and issue formation – in this project have a clear sociological signature, as 
each is associated with more or less established sociological approaches such 
as interactionism, Actor-Network Theory (which has introduced the con-
cept of the non-human), and issue mapping (Marres and Rogers 2005). Our 
commitment to ‘detect’ sociality certainly does not imply that we adopted 
a ‘blank’ attitude (Mackenzie 2012): we did not only invite the medium to 
tell us what makes it social, but rather attempted to deploy social research 
methodology in order to detect happenings of sociality that do not derive 
from platform features.
Soc i a l  1 :  U s e r  I nt e ract ions
To get at forms of sociality enacted with Twitter, the first group focused on fea-
tures or grammars that Twitter makes available for users to interact with other 
users, namely tweets, @replies, retweets, and interaction chains. In doing so, 
this group sought to attune its method to the medium by exploring how Twitter 
features are instantiated in Twitter use, with a focus on detecting interactional 
patterns in the data. Aware of Twitter’s own focus on the most popular or fre-
quently occurring (top trends, popular users), we started by identifying peaks 
of activity and interactivity. Starting from the pragmatic assumption that the 
more active a user is, the more likely the disclosure of interactive patterns, we 
identified the twenty most active and interactive users. The group manually 
categorised these top users, generating a range of user categories (journalists, 
celebrities, and so on) in the process: Figure 11.1 shows the resulting categories, 
with number of tweets on the left and received mentions on the right.
 Fig. 11.1  Top twenty most active users based on tweets and mentions 
(created by Stefania Guerra)
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As a first pattern, we noted the wide gap between those users who are most 
active and those who are referred to most. Accounts with many mentions 
mainly included journalists, media and news outlets, celebrities, politicians, 
and (unavoidably) pop singers – that is, accounts that thrive on existing media 
exposure and popularity beyond Twitter. Among the most active users on the 
other hand, we mainly found automated accounts – which we categorised 
as bots, although we later came to problematise this category. Bot activity 
includes software-supported automated tweet production, or cross-syndication 
of content from other media sources. These bots receive few mentions, but 
output comparably high volumes of tweets. We speculated that the category 
of the individual user may not necessarily map well onto that of a social media 
account, as many of these accounts cannot be linked to a single agentive indi-
vidual, but rather express potentially distributed professional activities (news 
outlets or celebrities may employ social media agents) and varying degrees of 
software-supported tweeting. These findings further elicited discussions about 
the usefulness of frequency-based measures for detecting the social, as those 
who speak most loudly on Twitter are not spoken back to, and vice versa. It 
appeared that focusing on the top frequency layer of social media data, at least 
in this case, means to value currency and liveness more than interaction, lead-
ing to a highly partial view.
Our initial exploration of the data produced, then, in Callon’s (2006) 
expression, a moment of objection, in which our findings confronted us with 
the limits of our own measures and assumptions. We therefore decided to 
change our focus to users that are both active and mentioned, most of which 
can be found in a mid-level frequency tier of users who tweeted between 100 
and 300 times, and who achieved at least twenty mentions. Focusing on the 
120 most inter/active users, we again manually categorised their accounts and 
compared their tweets and mentions (Fig. 11.2). The majority of these inter-
active users, we found, were activists and issue-focused journalists, engaging 
in mutual interactions. The exercise showed us that whilst it is tempting to 
focus on top-tier frequencies to ‘sum up’ a data set, its highly partial perspec-
tive exemplifies the importance of adjusting our measures to our data, in light 
of our question.
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In the last leg of Group 1’s work, we moved from users to patt erns of inter/
activity. We traced reply-chains, that is tweets followed by at least one or more 
replies (Fig. 11.3), and found that the majority of chains only consist of two 
elements – that is, a tweet by user A and a response by user B (not followed 
by another response by user A), rather than taking the more lively form of 
mutual tweets and replies. Th is fi nding seems in line with the discrepancy 
between active and mentioned users noted above, as the majority of users 
that are being replied to do not reply back. Overall, we found three types 
of interaction prevalent in our dataset: (1) the chain, in which one tweet is 
followed by a number of mutual replies, (2) the star, in which a user receives 
multiple replies to their tweet but does not respond back (the most promi-
nent formation in our data set), and (3) other forms that mix star and chain 
elements, in which some replies are answered. Chain-like conversations can 
mainly be found among users who have similar follower numbers. Within star 
constellations, the respondents mostly have signifi cantly fewer followers than 
 Fig. 11.2  Interactive users (fragment of a visualisation created by Gabriele Colombo)
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the originator. This indicated to us that mention activity does not necessarily 
point to interactivity.
To sum up, the work of Group 1 demonstrated to us the well-known methodo-
logical point that methods and measures participate in the specification of the 
phenomenon under study: by taking up tools of social media analysis, atten-
tion is initially drawn to dynamics favoured by the device (Twitter), such as 
celebrity and popularity, at the expense of interaction. However, in engaging 
proactively with this point during data exploration, we also moved beyond this 
observation: we adjusted our focus in order to bring into view dynamics that are 
less prominent but no less relevant. The notion of the performativity of social 
methods is rather asymmetrical, as it attributes the capacity to structure the 
phenomenon it is supposed to render observable to the device. By contrast, the 
procedure of the mutual adjustment of data, methods, and concepts we followed 
in our experiment allowed for a more symmetrical form of ‘participation’: our 
methodological operations allowed Twitter data to participate in the produc-
tion of accounts of social interaction online, rather than focus solely on the 
demonstration of ‘device effects’ (Gerlitz and Lury 2014). Indeed, we actively 
sought to reduce specific reactive effects7 that contribute to the enactment of 
some forms of sociality over others on Twitter.
Soc i a l  2 :  ‘ Automated ’  Soc i a l i t y
Our exploration of Twitter interaction above has already highlighted that 
humans can only account for part of this activity. In the context of social media, 
other-than-human activity is often labelled ‘bot activity’, as it involves the use 
of predefined, automated scripts of different sorts (Wilkie et al. 2014; Niederer 
and van Dijck 2010). Bots tend to be associated with spammy, promotional, 
and malicious behaviour, and as such they have been understood as threats 
to online sociality, undermining the general quality of online interaction and 
the quality of data (Hargittai and Sandvig 2015). However, Group 2 was not 
so much interested in taking a normative position towards the role of bots, 
but rather wanted to see whether and how ‘bot activity’ online was analysable 
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in social terms ( Jones 2015). After all, there is a significant legacy of non-
social methods for identifying bots, of which the mentalist method of the 
Turing Test is the best known. This group, then, was interested in taking the 
term ‘social bot’ literally, to develop an account of the role of technological 
agents in social media environments that did not so much rely on mentalistic 
conceptions of what a bot is (‘artificial intelligence’), or normative assump-
tions about whether it is good or bad, but rather considered the habits and 
practices of automated accounts. To do this, Group 2 began by dropping the 
term bot and taking up the idea that online sociality is automated to varying 
degrees. We favour the term automatisation over the discrete notion of bots, 
as the former allows for a more nuanced and inclusive conception of more-
than-human activities online.
Research by Gerlitz and Rieder (2017) has noted the growing and varying 
degrees of software-assisted tweeting. Analysing a random Twitter sample, the 
authors identified the range of sources from which users tweet, each of which 
support different degrees of automatisation, such as button-supported tweets, 
cross-syndication of content from other platforms, in-app or in-game tweets, 
scheduled tweets, automated retweets based on keywords, hashtag or user 
mentions, fully automated accounts, account networks and retweet cartels. 
Mobile devices and clients are found to be taking over the Twitter web client 
as the main access point to Twitter, and this proliferation of sources and their 
features asks for a more fine-grained notion of automatisation. Rather than 
viewing the couple ‘human and non-human’ as a binary, then, we approach it 
as a continuum or spectrum based on activity patterns.
As a first step, Group 2 identified the sources from which users tweet.8 
In our dataset, tweets were sent from 4267 different devices and sources; 
Figure 11.3 shows the top fifteen. Twitter for Web, iPhone, and Android are 
among the most used, followed by a set of sources which support different 
degrees of automatisation. Tweet Buttons make it possible to send web content 
directly to Twitter. Twitterfeed, Tweetdeck, and Hootsuite are clients that 
allow users to access, organise, and post to Twitter, offering extended analytics 
on reach, engagement, interaction, and scheduled tweets.9 Importantly, the 
majority of tweets are produced outside the interfaces provided by Twitter 
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itself, which suggests that the ‘degree of automation’ is subject to a multi-
faceted information ecology, of which Twitter is likely to form only one part.
The question is whether and how we can characterise this spectrum of 
differently automated accounts in social terms. To address this question, we 
explored the possibility of categorising automated accounts in terms of activity 
patterns. This proved relatively straightforward, as many automated accounts 
were remarkably mono-manic in their social media habits – they tend to send 
a disproportionately high number of tweets featuring specific selections of 
contents or hashtags. We reached this conclusion by tracing which hashtags 
are being used in tweets sent by specific sources. In the context of our privacy 
dataset, we discovered at least two orchestrated high-frequency promotional 
efforts. First, tweets sent from ‘U tweet deals’ mainly appear with the hashtags 
#home and #surveillance, and send users to ebay.com. Second, tweets using 
a combination of hashtags (#free, #blog, #photos, #websites, #videos, #mp3, 
#videochat and #emailblas) were linked to Mysavemedia.com. Interestingly, 
these tweets were not sent by a tweet automator, but via the Twitter web 
Fig. 11.3  Devices used to send tweets (created by Allessandro Brunetti)
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interface. Digging deeper, we found that most Twitter widgets, including 
Twitter buttons, are routed via the Twitter web interface and thus also appear 
in the dataset as sent from Twitter web. So even sources that seemingly point 
to manual practices have to be treated with care and can be the result of 
automatisation. In both instances, automated activity takes advantage of the 
relative popularity of the topic (privacy) to create and broadcast to an audi-
ence as a promotional effort. Faced with this, we sought to discover whether 
we could plot automated Twitter activity along a spectrum that goes from 
broadcasting to more interactive forms of publicity. Are some bots more 
social than others?
To explore this, we produced a cascade visualisation (Fig. 11.4), which lists 
users on the y axis and plots their activity along the x axis, where each tweet 
marks a dot (grey: tweet, green: mention, blue: retweet). As tweets are depicted 
chronologically, the x axis also marks a timeline. Taking up the user categories 
proposed by Group 1, we coloured red those accounts that we identified as 
automated in some form. Our initial assumption that automated tweeting 
follows a fairly stable, high-paced pattern was confirmed, but the Figure also 
helps to further specify this claim: among the automated accounts we found 
clusters of retweeting – the purple s-shaped dongles going up and down – 
which suggests that automated accounts do attempt to generate interactive 
behaviour. Automated activity, we suggest, can also blend into and mimic 
popular social media dynamics, and perhaps, indeed, it is exemplary of the 
reactive dynamics we noted above, reinforcing what is considered valuable 
sociality on Twitter.
Soc i a l  3 :  How Soc i a l  i s  a  Ha shtag ?
While Groups 1 and 2 investigated the interactivity and activity associated 
with different kinds of Twitter accounts, Group 3 focused on the dynamics 
of content in our dataset of tweets on ‘privacy’. This group asked to what 
extent we can ascribe sociality not only to actors that are active on Twitter, 
but to the objects (content) with which they engage? This question draws 
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on object-oriented approaches to social life developed in social studies of 
technology and related fields (Latour 2005; Lash and Lury 2007), in order 
to investigate the capacity of social media objects to organise sociality on 
Twitter. This group’s work was complicated by the fact that the definition of 
object-oriented sociality is itself called in question by social media analysis: 
should we define a Twitter object as ‘social’ when it facilitates enduring rela-
tions between actors and entities? Or is the cultivation of happening relations 
a sufficient mark of sociality? To investigate this, the group pragmatically 
decided to focus on a Twitter-specific objectual format, that of hashtags. Twitter 
studies have taken a special interest in the capacity of hashtags to organise 
social relations around and with objects, as in Burgess and colleagues’ (2015) 
work on the hashtag as a hybrid forum that facilitates the formation of ad 
hoc publics. Focusing on hashtags also makes it much easier to investigate 
content dynamics in a large data set, but it also means adopting a partial per-
spective on the data, as only 25% of the tweets in our datasets use hashtags. 
Accordingly, we approach hashtags, not as representatives of Twitter content, 
but rather as specific devices that enable the creation of relations between 
tweets, issues, and users.
Sociality, however, cannot be considered a given capacity of hashtags, 
and much hashtag activity is marked by efforts to achieve popularity, which 
Group 3 deemed not to qualify as ‘sociality’, since popularity is about gaining 
attention, not making relations. Following this intuition, Group 3 sought to 
move beyond the recurring popularity dynamics of Twitter by taking up co-
occurrence analysis, a fairly common method in Twitter studies that applies 
measures of network analysis to words, and is used to detect the emergence 
of new relations between words or hashtags (for a discussion see Marres and 
Gerlitz 2015). Group 3 analysed patterns of co-occurrence between hashtags 
in the Twitter data set in order to see which hashtags were connected and 
how these connections changed over time. We divided our data set into four 
intervals, two before and two after the initial Snowden leak,10 and found a 
large number of promotional hashtags among the most connected terms.11 The 
group speculated about the ‘prize of success’. Where there is a broad uptake of 
a given term (such as ‘privacy’ after the Snowden leak) and accordingly a great 
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potential for new relations, the consequence on Twitter is that the overall space 
of relationality degrades: generic, uneventful terms or promotional efforts take 
over, and these possess little apparent capacity to produce either enduring or 
happening relations.
A second answer to the question ‘how is a hashtag social?’ suggests itself in 
the form of hashtags containing phrases and jokes (e.g. #overlyhonestmethods; 
#igetannoyedwhenpeople, #markmywords). These hashtags indicate non-official 
uses of Twitter, and as such may be taken as an index of social activity, treating 
user invention as a marker of the social. To produce an overview of inventive 
hashtags, we considered the top fifty hashtags on each day of our selected period, 
retaining only those hashtags containing such invented language or neologisms. 
Fig. 11.5  Neologisms associated with #privacy (fragment of a visualisation created 
by Carlo De Gaetano)
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Figure 11.5 plots the occurrence of such invented hashtags over time, with the 
colours indicating four categories produced by Group 3 through a close reading 
of the relevant Twitter data: entertainment (white), politics (yellow), pointless 
babble (blue), and news (green). To be sure, these categories are not neutral: 
the category ‘pointless babble’ implies a devaluation of off- or random-topic 
commentary.12 And insofar as such off-topic commentary is common in social 
media, the use of neologisms points to medium-specific practices. However, 
at the same time, ‘pointless babble’ offers a useful contrast to political terms 
(I stand with Snowden), with the latter type becoming more prominent after 
the breaking of the scandal. It also usefully complicates our initial observation 
that newsworthiness and the widening of the topic space may translate into a 
reduction in the capacity to relate.
In a final step, Group 3 explored which hashtag relations in our data sets 
endured and/or varied over time, by mapping hashtag co-occurences in our 
data set. We speculated that hashtags more closely related to the news would 
be more ephemeral, appearing and disappearing in relatively quick bursts in 
accordance with news cycles. We thus selected a number of hashtags that 
were prominent in our data set across all the intervals and were not directly 
connected with the Snowden affair (that is, not ‘NSA’ or ‘Prism’, but ‘privacy’, 
‘Google’, ‘security’, ‘surveillance’, ‘Facebook’, ‘tech’, etc.). For each of these 
hashtags, we produced an ‘associational profile’, a bar chart figure that shows 
with what other hashtags a hashtag co-occurs across intervals (e.g. Fig. 11.6, 
Fig. 11.7). We found that several hashtags’ associations remain relatively stable 
over time (coloured lines), with new associations coming in but not displacing 
these enduring associations in the third interval, when the Snowden revelations 
first broke (in grey).13 Exploring the distribution of enduring and emerging co-
hashtag relations then led Group 3 to formulate two partly opposed indicators 
of sociality: firstly, the proliferation of neologisms, that is the re-appropriation 
of issues into everyday discourse, and secondly, enduring content relations 
which are not affected too much by news events and thus signal stable, insti-
tutionalised associations.
 Fig. 11.6  Associational profi le of #security (created by Carlo De Gaetano)
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 Fig. 11.7  Associational profi le of #tech (created by Carlo De Gaetano)
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Conclu s ion
Our summer school project moved from the definition of digital platforms as 
‘social’ media to the experimental description of the forms of sociality one such 
platform, Twitter, enables. Our inquiries took as their starting point a sociological 
idea, namely the understanding of sociality as a distributed accomplishment, 
as something that happens among a variety of entities, and cannot be reduced 
to any singular entity, be it a collective of users, the platform or the content, or 
a singular conception of the social. This approach led us to produce what some 
may regard as rather artificial, counter-intuitive accounts of what is social about 
social media, as we produced the following list of potential indicators of sociality 
in social media: interaction, activity, creativity, and endurance. We do not claim 
that anything we detected on Twitter qualifies as the social, as we observed a 
series of competing, overlapping, and complementing socials. Our methods did 
not merely render them visible, but participated in their enactment.
However, our exploration of these proliferating socials did allow us to advance 
on the ‘problem’ with the ‘social’ of social media in two ways: first, it allowed us 
to elaborate a claim we presented at the beginning of this chapter, namely that 
social media are in line with the performative understanding of social life in some 
respects, but in other respects clearly go against it. In documenting patterns of 
interactivity, plotting automated accounts along a spectrum from human to non-
human, and by tracing the happening of ‘content’, we produced what might be 
called ‘methodological stories’, that demonstrate how specifically social forms 
of life may be enacted in and with heterogeneous settings. We also formulated 
a problem with the sociality of social media of our own: one of the recurrent 
findings of our experimental exercise was what might be termed ‘frequentism’: 
we constantly faced the question of how to evaluate – and possibly adjust for – 
effects of volume. What to do with the ‘power users’ whose ‘size’ – in terms 
of followers, tweets, or mentions – crowds out and overshadows others? And 
what to do with the widely used hashtags that surface in our content analysis as 
a consequence of ‘bursts’ in retweet activity, not infrequently associated with 
automated accounts? Our heterogeneous group voiced different responses to 
such frequentism. According to some, ‘volume effects’ like the above obstructed 
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our ability to detect sociality with social media. For others, however, ‘frequent-
ism’ points to the heart of sociality in social media. It is what social media is 
all about: a new way of reaching and interacting with wider audiences without 
needing to pass via established gatekeepers (‘the media’). Automated tweeting 
raised similar tensions. Some proposed that automatisation could add to the 
accomplishment of sociality, enabling the creation of more diverse human-
non-human relations, whilst others argued that automatisation undermines the 
possibility for social interaction and exchange in social media, as for instance 
in the case of promotional hijacking of popular hashtags.
Insofar as many of these empirical effects cannot be affirmed, but must be 
actively – and creatively – countered in digital social research, this form of analysis 
invites us to move beyond ‘empiricisation’ towards an ‘experimentalisation’ of 
the social. Such an approach makes the participation of social research meth-
ods in the making of sociality explicit: its task is to formulate methodological 
strategies that enable us to affirm the role of social research in the generation 
of its object of inquiry (Brown 2012). Instead of adopting a purely prescriptive 
position, that allows us to pass conclusive judgement on social media (‘this 
is not the social’), we see it as our job to participate in advancing alternative 
configurations of social media, and to specify alternative modes of digital 
sociality, ones that we deem more productive, caring, demanding, desirable, 
and so on. Social media ask us to move beyond prescriptive and descriptive 
forms of knowledge and to test alternative, more experimental forms of inquiry. 
Different forms of sociality cannot be held separate as easily here as in other 
contexts. As a consequence, social media lure us into asking questions we 
haven’t been trained to ask, questions that refuse a strict opposition between 
social realism and performativity, between independently existing societies and 
enacted heterogeneity (Mutzel 2009). How do bots participate in the society? 
Is automation – of all things – undoing the Thatcherite ‘there is no such thing 
as society’? Could social networks really help to organise heterogeneous collec-
tives? Critical and creative approaches to social research and social theory, we 
argue, should do more with the ‘experimental’ capacities of the online platforms 
dubbed ‘social’ by looking for ways in which their methods could participate 
in the reinvention of the social.
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Note s
1 Savage (2009: 171) notes: ‘the social sciences, where mundane descriptions, evoking 
ordinary transactions, from websites, Tesco loyalty cards, CCTV cameras in your local 
shopping centre, etc., are the stuff of the new social. In these environments, the issue 
(to again evoke Walter Benjamin) is the mechanical reproduction of social figures, what 
might be seen as ‘the diagrammization of society’ which is the terrain on which sociology 
should now operate. The task of sociology might not be that of generating exceptionally 
whizzy visuals, using the most powerful computers or an unprecedented comprehensive 
database, so much as subjecting those which are routinely reproduced to critique and 
analysis. This involves making the deployment of these devices a subject of social science 
inquiry.’ Building on this performative analysis, we here argue for the need to engage, not 
just in empirical description, but also in experimental re-specification of sociality with 
digital technologies.
2 Successful entrepreneurship, Hutton claims, is about using frontier technologies to 
address human need and ambition.
3 Ryu, Janet (2010) ‘People You May Know: Helping you discover those important 
professional relationships’, <https://blog.linkedin.com/2010/05/12/linkedin-pymk> 
(accessed May 27, 2016).
4 Here we respectfully disagree with William Davies, who affirms the return of the social, 
but does not seriously consider its heterogeneity.
5 For a full description of the project, see https://wiki.digitalmethods.net/Dmi/
DetectingTheSocials
6 This dataset comprises 919.234 tweets produced by 482.195 unique users. TCAT 
allows the creation of collections of tweets, and offers various of means of querying 
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and analysing these datasets. It is available as open source tool on https://github.com/
digitalmethodsinitiative/dmi-tcat
7 Reactivity is the term that economic sociologists Espeland and Sauder (2007) use 
to refer to the self-fulfilling prophecies that devices may produce when assessed entities 
reflexively adapt to their criteria of evaluation.
8 This information is provided via the Twitter Streaming API, and captures the software 
from which a tweet was send as named by the source or app creator.
9 In social media settings, the boundary between manual and ‘automatic’ is a fluent one. 
Services such as dlvr.it or U Tweet Deals allow for a broad array of automated actions, 
from automatic detection of trending hashtags, automatic replies or retweets based on 
keywords or hashtags, to automated account generation and more.
10 Interval 1: 23/05-30/05; interval 2: 31/05–05/06; interval 3: 06/06–12/06; interval 
4: 13/06–15/06
11 Namely, the hashtags identified by Group 2 as stemming from automated behavior.
12 The entertainment category contains media entertainment and celebrity news (example: 
‘it’s so sad that justin can’t even have privacy at his home #givejustinhisprivacy’). Politics 
comprises political topics and concerns (example: ‘#IStandWithEdwardSnowden because 
I believe in the fundamental right to personal privacy.’). The pointless babble category 
summarises all tweets that are not connected to news, issues or events but refer to vaguely 
connected private concerns (example: ‘#WhatIWant - Privacy. - a lot of money. - someone 
who will love me. - my parents to be proud of me. - high speed internet connection.’). 
Tweets labelled ‘news story’ refer to news-related hashtags (example: ‘I am disgusted at the 
BBC’s invasion of privacy. There must be a judge-led inquiry! #horizon #SecretLifeOfCats 
#horizoncats’).
13 Both hashtags #security and #tech are dominated by Snowden-related topics from 
the third interval onwards; other associations endure, as #security remains connected to 
#infosec, #cloud, #tech, #internet and various social media platforms. #tech continuous 
to share co-occurrences with #security, #infosec, #technology, #news, and #data, whilst 
#Facebook co-occurs with #Google, #security and #socialmedia.
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HACKING THE SOCIAL?
Christopher M. Kelty
‘inventing the social’ revisits a debate that in soMe tiMes and places 
seems to have been settled, only to reappear once more. The vexed question of 
‘the social’ (does it exist? is it invented? has it come to an end?) remains as vital 
to social theorists as it is irrelevant to every ordinary ‘member of society’. There 
are few concepts so obviously central to everyday thinking and yet so resistant 
to compelling and convincing theorisation.
Why ‘invent the social’ then (again)? For Inventing the Social, inventing the 
social is a way of working around the problem of critique. To claim that ‘the social 
is invented’ or that it is historical, or that it is contingent, or that it is over, has 
historically been proffered in opposition to some other claim that society is some 
simple natural entity, whether that be a self-evident experience of relationality 
or a Durkheimian metaphysical commitment. Most often, critique is carried 
out in order to contest a claim of naturalness as a basis for political decisions. 
Those who claim that the social is not invented usually have something to sell, 
and most often what they are selling is a way to (re)invent the social: to solve 
social problems, to create a great society, to nudge us, control us, secure us or 
to socialise us. So it needs to be said, every so often, that the social is invented, 
and to hope that this caveat emptor will serve as sufficient warning. But the funny 
thing about critique – which has been said to have run out of steam, though new 
reserves of critique are discovered in the shale sands of PhD programmes every 
day – is that its capacity to compel people to see the problem is also not a given, 
not natural, not obvious. Such a hope relies too much on the faith that lifting 
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the veil, revealing the hidden, pointing out the contradiction, or demonstrating 
the absurdity flips a corresponding switch in readers’ brains, and perhaps by 
virtue of that, in their emotions and commitments as well. So no matter how 
sophisticated the arguments, how detailed the historical or empirical work, or 
how rigorously erudite the philosophical acrobatics, the social, like a relentless 
multi-season zombie-themed TV series, keeps coming back. We might have 
become a little addicted to critiquing the social; we might, today, have such a 
high tolerance for critique that it wears off a bit too easily.
So I suspect that here, in this volume, it is the critical account of the social that 
is under arrest, as it were, and not the social as such. One reason to invent the 
social is to propose an alternative strategy to the conventional forms of critique: 
the tired act of raising once again, in writing and in increasingly marginalised 
academic publications, a warning about the social. It would be to stop for once 
the relentless interrogation of the social, the torturing of this incorrigible crea-
ture, in favour of putting critique instead on a kind of watch-list. Let us secure 
the future by inventing the social today – this will be our new approach.
But what figure, we must ask, of ‘inventing the social’ is at work here? What 
figure makes sense of the idea that the social has been or can be invented? For 
many scholars, the social is ‘invented’ in only the most anonymous and quasi-
evolutionary way: some mixture of kings, bureaucrats, politicians, scholars, 
elites, markets and organisations encounter the social as a problem in the world, 
and ‘invent’ around it systems for controlling it, responding to it, occasionally 
enhancing it, but always being frustrated or surprised by this unruly, eternal 
thing that contains an inscrutable power to upend the desires of humans to 
control it (on the nature of the social as a problem, see Martin Savransky’s piece 
in this volume).
However, a more likely figure of invention is the engineer. As the consum-
mate Enlightenment figure, the engineer represents most clearly the desire to 
stand outside society, to calculate and plan it, to theorise and then straighten 
it into predictable lines, and to govern through it. When engineers invent the 
social they often do so from scratch – or what amounts to as much – by levelling 
whatever is in the way and replacing it with the ideal vision of a society (see e.g. 
Mitchell 1991; Rabinow 1989). The engineer (which might also include the 
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statistician, the public health expert, and sometimes the revolutionary) is at the 
heart of the entity we call ‘society’ because he calls it into being, he invents it 
through both observation and practice (Hacking 1990; Donzelot 2015; Rose 
and Miller 2008; Tresch 2012).
Whether it is an anonymous force or the result of an engineering dream, 
the invented social we live with today is the layered landscape of yesterday’s 
attempts to invent, and to engineer, the social. We don’t live in the next epoch 
of the social (post-social or some neologism-yet-to-come) but in the lively ruins 
(or decimated landscapes) of past inventions of the social: some abandoned 
completely, others partially maintained here and there, retro-fitted with differing 
levels of enthusiasm, and yet others besides. There are reinventions as well, often 
as conscious attempts to fix past failures of invention, and sometimes to simply 
forget them. The forms of society diagnosed by Baron Hausmann, Max Weber, 
Talcott Parsons, or Ulrich Beck, become the materiel and ordnance of another 
invention. But there is another figure for invention at play today: the hacker.
Consider the cases of invention presented in Inventing the Social. Many, such as 
the work by Christian Nold, Alex Wilkie and Mike Michael, or Nerea Calvillo, 
mean by invention something close to participatory design (in its current mean-
ing) – design which not only invites social relations into the process of design, but 
even takes social relations as the subject or perhaps medium of design. In these 
cases, what is designed is also intended to do two things: activate or ‘invent’ the 
social relations in question, and provide a materialised critique of those relations 
by and through this attempt to activate or invent them. So Nold’s clever experi-
ments in and around Heathrow and its sonic environment both bring people into 
relations with each other and the designer, and through the resulting designs, 
attempt to somehow change those relations. The residents are stuck in an old 
model of the social, whereas Nold sees an alternative: ‘I suggest that the airport 
opponents’ lack of success in challenging the metric [of acceptable noise levels] 
may be due to the fact that they have been unable to politicise the lack of care 
involved in the way community annoyance has been measured’ (this volume, 
p. 102). In a provocative way, Nold suggests that the social itself (labelled here 
‘the issue’) is his client – and not the council, the airport or the residents around 
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Heathrow. Others, such as the contributions by Noortje Marres and Carolin 
Gerlitz, or by Michael Guggenheim, Bernd Kräftner and Judith Kröll, mean by 
inventing the social an attention to how the social is being invented by others 
all the time – by social media users and designers, doctors and patients and 
anthropologists. As Guggenheim et al. suggest, invention here can be under-
stood as ‘a systematic transport of the breaching experiment (Garfinkel 1967) 
into practices of the self. It is a form of creating the social by lay people through 
the means of effecting systematic breaches and changes in their own conditions 
of living’ (this volume, p. 69). There is also here an exquisite attention to how 
the social and technical intertwine, and how what counts as sociality worth 
having is never simply found but painstakingly made. As Marres and Gerlitz 
put it here, ‘the accomplishment of different forms of sociality depends – in a 
non-straightforward way – on how digital infrastructures, devices, and practices 
are assembled in practice’ (this volume, p. 254). To see that assembly from the 
inside is to see its vulnerabilities and its possibilities.
Still others (see, for example, Savransky, Clark or Muniesa) remain stubborn, 
returning again to the theorisation of the social, or the meta-theorisation of the 
social, or perhaps the theorisation of the meta-social, but all with an avowedly 
inventive attitude. They participate less in an old engineering mythos of inventing 
the social from scratch – those monstrous Parsonian (or Luhmannian) edifices 
of yore – and more in the style of the provocateur, the imp, the trickster, for 
whom all attempts at naive invention demand to be poked at, teased, trolled.
In all these cases I perceive a certain desire: to invent the social here means 
to intervene in it, to invert or to trouble it, and most importantly, to be there 
with and among others, as agent, tinkerer, designer, or even simply as theorist-
agitators. For things do look different when one looks at the social as something 
to invent, to intervene in, to change and affect, to cause and to fail to cause–and 
not something to stand outside, to explain, resist, unveil, or critique. From this 
perspective, society ceases to be a problem and all of a sudden seems to be a 
resource, a toolkit, a field, a sandbox, a play (or a playhouse), maybe even a 
weapon. It involves not just a salubrious engagement with the ‘real world’ but 
the opportunity to retool social science for new environments, to engage in 
an active, creative, conviviality in places ranging from museums and cafes and 
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art galleries to basements, hospitals, restaurants, to the internet, the campaign 
trail, the countryside, the war zone, the hot zone, or the border. It seems to 
exhume scholars from within the disciplines and their bloody-minded – but 
strangely persistent – norms, and expose them to the actual and vital eventful 
movement of that which they study. To invent the social is to create actually 
existing alternatives and real choices, to lay open means and methods to view 
and to invite others to tinker with them, extend them, break them, or repair 
them.
Now picture a hacker.
No, not that one.
The problem with the figure of the hacker is often that it is hard to see 
past the simple stereotype of the hacker into the figure itself. It should be an 
ambivalent figure: white hat, black hat, Unix geek, Facebook employee, social 
engineer, GCHQ operative, hacktivist, criminal, feminist, troll, gamer, maker: 
hacking comes in an under-appreciated variety of flavours today, ranging from 
morally repulsive to ideologically blinkered to creatively progressive. Some hack 
rootkits that own a server; some hack free software that runs the server, some 
hack pointless apps that spy on other people, some organise public protests 
that galvanise a movement, some make money, and some write things intended 
to criticise the very things the others are making, because even writing can be 
conceived of as a hack (Coleman and Kelty 2017; Murillo and Kelty 2017). 
At the heart of hacking is a certain commitment to critique through making. It 
is critique in a sense far more expansive than the kind that ostensibly belongs 
to ‘critical social scientists’ – it is more in line with what Foucault described as 
a refusal: ‘we do not want to be governed like that’ (Foucault 2007). So per-
haps even more importantly, hacking is a particular kind of making – not the 
invention de novo (or creative destruction) of the engineer or economist, but 
a seeing-from-within, a making-as-exploiting, a kind of making that requires 
dwelling within precisely those ruins of past attempts to invent in order to find 
the weakness, the opportunity or the precise place to build a critique. Hacking 
is not confined to a class or a type of person, but is its own ‘style of reasoning’ 
(fittingly, see Ian Hacking 1992). It necessarily implies a collective, if not a 
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social contract (though if the social is a shibboleth, pace Muniesa, hackers love 
cracking passwords).
So picture instead a collective of hackers. Perhaps something like the latter-
day multicultural Star Trek crew of the television series Mr. Robot where the 
diverse collective society is led by a smart, savvy, female hacker, and includes 
a black felon, a young Muslim woman, a (now token) bearded white guy, and, 
tying them all together like a hoodie-wearing Spock, is a mentally ill drug 
addict. Which is to say, picture not the anti-social adolescent hacker of media 
stereotypes but a more gregarious group of friends and lovers and neighbours, 
engaged in problem-seeking and problem-solving in the face of a complicated 
world duct-taped together by big and small corporate experiments, previous 
hacks and kludges, broken technologies and a conflictual mix of expectations 
about the future and how to achieve it.
For one of the things that animates the hacker is precisely the fact that the 
existing systems (which are mostly technical, but also crucially composed of 
people, with their foibles and expectations), are complex accretions of past 
attempts at invention. Old systems, poorly maintained, full of vulnerabilities 
and human habits, are not failed inventions to the hacker, but opportunities to 
exploit, places to hang out and dwell (sometimes out of sight), and perhaps ironi-
cally, the very means to an expanded sociality, a way of being with others that, 
for whatever reason, has been denied them elsewhere. It is a way of seeing from 
the belly of beasts whose invention has been hard won and long in the making. 
Sometimes seeing from this perspective results in sabotage – the hacktivists of 
Anonymous, the trickster spirit that animates a ‘fuck-shit-up’ disruption (not a 
Silicon Valley innovator’s-dilemma-disruption) (Coleman 2014). Sometimes 
seeing from this perspective animates a specific inversion – a way of making 
technology do something it was not designed to do. And sometimes seeing 
from this perspective simply makes clear a vulnerable spot in what has been 
invented – whether that be an operating system or a social system – that can 
be exploited for gain (e.g. ransom and ransom-ware), or re-made to be openly 
available (free software), or disclosed to embarrass and improve (outing, leaking 
and doxing), or squirreled away to await the highest bidder (zero day exploits 
for sale on black markets).
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There is conviviality and competition in every hack, but it remains an 
ambivalent figure because it still contains elements of the anti-social, of a cer-
tain cynicism about progress and liberation, a certain toxic concentration of 
anomie, criminality and in some cases, a co-optation ill-fitting the name (e.g. 
Facebook – an engineer of the social par excellence – is at 1 Hacker Way and calls 
itself ‘the hacking company’). There is failure, ineffectualness, pointless pursuit 
by the authorities, in-fighting, spying, accusation and informing. There is also, 
quite obviously, a problem of sociality in hacking: that it is mostly done by men 
and that it relies on exclusion through technical virtuosity, that it engages in 
reprehensible ethical and aesthetic actions. But not all forms of hacking have 
the same problems, social or otherwise.
What’s more, hacking is ambivalent because hacks are themselves social 
problems. What can be good for some people (taking down the Sony network 
for political retribution) can be bad for others (a two-month outage in a beloved 
gaming platform) (Milburn 2015). A hack is mobile and self-contained, and 
by definition cannot be controlled by or confined to some entity or another.
I come thus not to praise the hacker nor to bury him, but to point out just 
what it is that the figure reveals today, and why Inventing the Social seems to 
me to be an emblematic expression of it. For there is something of the hackish 
impulse at work in the essays in this volume – perhaps most obviously, Andres 
Jaque’s experiment with the basement of the Barcelona Pavilion. It is a literal 
inversion, in that it opens up the view from inside and below, and by doing so 
both displays and reinvents the social space and relations of the Pavilion. A dif-
ferent artist or a different activist might have done something different with the 
inversion – perhaps focusing on an environmental problem or a labour viola-
tion in order to shame the institution. For hacks can also be purely aesthetic or 
purely criminal: it is not the politics that makes the figure of the hacker useful, 
but the way it inhabits and observes existing structures, looking for concrete, 
technical ways to change them from the inside.
Hacks can also fail productively – not unlike the story that Wilkie and 
Michael tell of the Energy Babble: a device that provokes reassessment of the 
social order of environmental activism not by doing something instrumental 
(‘solving a problem’) but by, in part, flummoxing people. There is a bit of ‘the 
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lulz’ in the Energy Babble: it is trolling environmentalists, artists, and the gov-
ernment agencies all at the same time.
Hacks emphasise the material – though that is the wrong word, since both 
software and social relations are sometimes said (mistakenly) to be immaterial. 
Hacks deal with things, but software, just like air and helium in Calvillo’s piece, 
is not immaterial, just difficult to work with. Its characteristics require investiga-
tion and experimentation, much like those of helium, and the result of doing 
so is never only about helium (or software), but also about the social, spatial, 
and conceptual relations within which it has been installed. Hacking the air, for 
Calvillo, would not be just a metaphor: it would be a very specific orientation 
towards the air and its relations, and would be quite different to engineering 
the air, or controlling the air. That we leave to builders of Zeppelins, or worse.
Or again, in the work of Nold, to take the social as client is to see it from 
the inside, both its technical constitution, and the existing, hard-won previous 
invention of the social constituted around noise levels and decibel maps. To 
hack the social, here, is to transform that previous invention into something that 
displays, reveals, discloses – leaks or breaches – in order to potentially shame or 
perhaps simply inform. The noise around Heathrow is not changed thereby – 
but the inner workings of measurement and regulation are made public, and 
this act of disclosure is itself a kind of hack, dependent on an invented social it 
works from within.
And yet. And yet, inventing the social should also come with a significant 
anxiety. The heart of this anxiety is that trying to hack – to construct, tweak, 
experiment with, tickle, tease or prod the social into being – is to join the rest 
of the world. It is to face the reality of competing on a global stage, not just 
with other experts in the social (think tanks, development agencies, education 
specialists) but with experts in the social for whom the social itself is a means 
to other ends: power and capital.
One need only consider the naturalisation of social media as a site of the 
social: Facebook or Twitter’s engineers are smug in their certainty that they now 
access ‘the social’ in huge pools and swells of data that poor university profes-
sors can only gaze at longingly from their rickety shacks on the shore. Though 
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they may well be experimentally inventing the social (as Marres and Gerlitz 
show), their power comes from falsely but convincingly asserting that they stand 
outside it, observe it, and understand it better than anyone else. In this respect 
they ascend from the position of hacker to some even more monstrous form of 
the engineer – Facebook may call itself the ‘Hacking Company’ but its preten-
sions are not to hack, but to destroy the world and re-make it in its own image. 
They are not interested in critiquing the social, they are interested precisely in 
owning and controlling it – from the myriad everyday A/B tests that observe 
whether a blue font or a red font generates more clicks, to the controversial 
experiments in manipulating the news-feed, to the secretive and unknowable 
experiments in machine learning and algorithmic AI that guide users in every-
thing from job ads to racial profiling of minorities to book-buying to driverless 
cars to, apparently, voting.
Or, for example, there is also the questionable fixing and staining of ‘the social’ 
engaged in by the elites of the bio-medical establishment, for whom the social 
is an evident problem, and where the refusal to engage with social scientists is 
both a misunderstanding of the object of their own expertise and a performance 
of their power over others – not just the sick and suffering, but those adjacent 
experts proposing other diagnoses and different treatments. Doctors do not 
‘hack’ the social: but some do find themselves inside the layered ruins of past 
attempts. The responses to Ebola in 2014, for instance, dealt precisely with the 
frustrating failures of multiple different regimes, each with its own partial view 
of what makes the social work (see, for example, Rosengarten, this volume; also 
Lakoff, Collier, and Kelty 2014).
To invent the social as hackers is to bring ourselves into direct competition 
(by other means) with those who are busy inventing the social at scale, every-
day. To my mind, this is the same problem that hackers proper have: they dwell 
inside a system of systems, tinkering, exploiting and exploring, but they do so 
against a backdrop of entities with much more money and power – who have 
the might if not the right to invent the social. To hack is to demonstrate the 
existence of alternatives to that might, and to do so through means other than 
critique and writing. And it has a greater chance of having an effect. Insofar as 
Inventing the Social aims at this goal, its clearest figure is the hacker – not the 
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engineer or the scientist, much less the scholar. It somehow seems that a demon-
stration, an experiment or an event – even a small-scale one – both holds more 
persuasive power, and seems to reveal more, than an isolated act of writing, or 
some old method strait-jacketed in norms of distance, objectivity, or neutrality. 
The disadvantage is that we (social scientists) remain comparatively outside, 
underfunded, inadequately resourced amateurs in this game. The advantage is 
that by inventing the social we can lay bare the workings of invention, we can 
demonstrate how sausage is made, and perhaps thereby make it otherwise. The 
disadvantage is that our sausage shop is a street-corner operation in competi-
tion with abattoirs of shocking efficiency and cold chains of global reach. This 
is the anxiety that should face the inventive sociologist, the hacker sociologist.
Because what should be clear from the fact that ‘critique has run out of 
steam’ is not so much that it has run out of steam for academics, but that those 
in the world who regularly ‘invent the social’ were never really listening very 
hard to such critiques in the first place. It is quite possible that academic social 
science is just now emerging from a kind of legitimacy cocoon, within which 
critique seemed to be its main product, packaged in the butterfly garb of sci-
entism or intellectual capital, and delivered to the world stage for everyone 
to gaze upon. But even if such legitimacy ever existed, that form of critique is 
in fact nearly exhausted (or perhaps more optimistically, awaiting a renewal 
from somewhere other than critique itself). What remains is for us to join 
the rest of the world, to invent the social, to build, to experiment, to make, to 
compete with the largest, the most powerful and the most extensive inven-
tors of the contemporary social. But hacking demonstrates that there is more 
than one way to invent the social, that we are not all strictly in competition to 
invent the same social in just the same way, that it matters not simply that we 
experiment with the social, but how we do so. It is now necessary to say, per-
versely, that we invent the social critically, that our way of doing the social will 
demonstrate to others the nature of the problems we face more clearly, more 
precisely, or in ways that will lead to a better world, in ways that will be more 
theoretically correct, in ways that will compel us to think otherwise, because 
we make otherwise. If we want to invent the social otherwise, how should we 
think about the social (again)?
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If the promise of inventing the social, or inventive methods, is offered in order 
to remake social science today, the figure of the hacker cannot be ignored. It is 
symptomatic of the social today, of the invented social we have inherited and 
are faced with exploring once more. But even more importantly, the promise 
of the hack is that it opens up competition to individuals and collectives with 
no power. Even though they compete with the largest, the richest, the most 
extensive – it is a figure that gives hope, even if it courts destruction as well.
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HOW CAN WE…? 
CONNECTING INVENTIVE 
SOCIAL RESEARCH WITH 
SOCIAL AND GOVERNMENT 
INNOVATION
Lucy Kimbell
in their introduction the editors argue that inventive approaches 
to social research combine ‘the doing, representing and intervening into social 
life’ (Marres et al., this volume, p. 00). They emphasise how social life – and 
research – exists in the making and foreground why inventive approaches should 
be experimental. The carrying out and assessment of such experimentation in 
doing, representing and intervening into social life is always in question. They 
argue for the value of (researchers) pursuing long-term associations and changes 
to social life. But they point to the limitations of prioritising easily traceable, 
short-term associations between social research and social action which might 
result, for example, in Das Kapital not being seen as able to demonstrate research 
impact or policy relevance.
This afterword explores these ideas in relation to two contemporary domains 
of social life in which such creative experimentation is evident. It suggests 
how inventive social research as discussed in this volume might intersect with 
developments in the fields of social innovation and government innovation. 
Social innovation is one of the new socials identified by Marres and Gerlitz 
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in their chapter, a term given to an area of practice and scholarship that aims 
to address social needs through creating strategies, infrastructures, ventures, 
products or services that involve new configurations of resources (Mulgan et 
al. 2006; Nicholls and Murdock 2011). A closely related area of government 
innovation is an emerging institutional practice within national, regional and 
local government administrations, where it often takes the form of ‘policy labs’ 
(e.g. OECD 2016; Puttick et al. 2014; Williams 2015). In such settings, diverse 
actors including governments, community organisations, funders and businesses 
conduct experiments into contemporary social life, sometimes in collaboration 
with academic researchers. In both areas, the devices and practices of ‘social 
design’ are increasingly visible as a resource to drive creativity and connect 
public servants and others with citizens and other publics, often with unclear 
results (Chen et al. 2016.; Julier and Kimbell 2016).
My aim here is to mix insights from this book with the creative practices that 
are tied up with how public policies, solutions and services are being constituted, 
researched, designed, developed and evaluated as they co-emerge in relation to 
social issues and policy agendas. In what follows I review some of the concerns 
of participants in this world of social and government innovation. I then identify 
opportunities for inventive social research to reconfigure these events, narratives 
and practices. Finally I suggest some issues that result from using an inventive 
approach in relation to social innovation and to government experimentation. 
As someone with stakes in these matters as a citizen, user, researcher, educator 
and consultant, my discussion is unapologetically interventionist and activist.1 
I take what I understand to be the possibilities of inventive social research, and 
explore how these can reconfigure devices, practices and narratives associated 
with ‘innovation’ to change how things are done in public policy contexts. My 
hope is that the academic discussion in this book, which recognises the potential 
for engagement between social research and creative practice and experimen-
tation in social life, can intersect productively with the practices of social and 
government innovation through which public issues are formed and addressed. 
However, this might present some challenges because of the emphasis in these 
worlds on demonstrating short-term achievements and easily traceable passages 
between insight and evidence and action and outcome.
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The word ‘innovation’ has gained wide currency in a context in which neo-
liberalism increasingly pushes public servants, politicians and citizens to come 
up with novel solutions to social problems. Social and government innovation 
are perhaps better characterised as invention (Barry 2001), a term which fore-
grounds the processual and performative nature of how novel solutions are 
constituted and re-made. Invention might be seen as a phase or stage within 
an innovation process, one that emphasises the reconfiguring of constituent 
elements into novel arrangements that cannot be predetermined (Garud et al. 
2013). But more than a temporal phase, the concept of invention also points 
to the logics through which new combinations of resources are assembled and 
through which new publics and issues are brought into being.
Recent developments suggest the growing visibility of activities seen as, or 
hoped to result in, innovation in relation to public administrations, with close 
alignment to related experimentation happening in business. Arguments for 
‘mission-oriented’ innovation in today’s governments (e.g. Mazzucato 2013) 
intersect with ‘agile’ software development (e.g. Government Digital Service 
2016), ‘lean’ start up (e.g. Ries 2011), ‘smart’ government (e.g. Noveck 2015) and 
new partnerships between government, business and social enterprise (Eggers 
and Macmillan 2013). Such developments have co-emerged alongside related 
activities within think-tanks and community and voluntary groups, as well as 
being informed by academic research.2 They are also shaped by neo-liberal 
drivers within some governments to promote austerity, drive commercialisa-
tion of public service provision and co-produce solutions with social actors, 
sometimes shifting the responsibility for addressing society’s issues away from 
governments to others ( Julier 2017). As a result, to differing extents, it is pos-
sible to find big data analysis, digital platforms, social media engagement and 
analysis, randomised control trials, participatory design, and social and behav-
ioural research used alongside one another to generate and explore solutions 
to policy issues (in the case of government innovation) or to address problems 
that may result from policy decisions and actions, or their lack (in the case of 
social innovation). Common to both social and government innovation are 
preoccupations with, and narratives about, experimentation, politics, participa-
tion and systems change.
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Chal l enge s  i n  Soc i a l  and 
Government  Innovat ion
Much social and government innovation as it is currently organised is tied up 
with ‘challenges’. Sometimes a challenge is simply expressed in the form of a 
summary of an issue and a question starting ‘how can we…?’3 Such challenges are 
articulations of issues that managers of public services, policy makers, funders, 
businesses and entrepreneurs, as well as universities and third sector groups, 
organise themselves in relation to, possibly with the involvement of academics 
and with academic research. Familiar topics include addressing environmental 
change, tackling obesity or improving prospects for people facing unemploy-
ment. The construction and articulation of such challenges takes a variety of 
forms depending on one’s location in relation to an issue, with varying degrees 
of agency, accountability and legitimacy. For example funders, consultancies, 
universities, think-tanks, community groups and service providers may construct 
or be invited to respond to a challenge via mechanisms such as invitations to 
tender, calls for proposals, competitions, sandpits, jams, and design briefs, with 
associated platforms, resources, networks, funding and means of assessing to 
what extent a challenge can or has been addressed. Funders, policy teams, 
researchers and managers seek to mobilise diverse resources in addressing an 
issue, including researchers, professionals, citizens, activists or ‘users’ – often 
with uncertain motivations, accountabilities or rewards and different levels of 
urgency. They may also draw upon different institutional research capacities, 
organisational routines, datasets and modes of participation. Indeed, such 
is the extent of the challenge that there is now a centre studying and giving 
guidance on organising one.4 Accordingly, in what follows I identify some of 
the current challenges within social innovation and government innovation, 
informed by my research and practice in the UK. As presented below, these 
challenges are also approaches or techniques used to address public issues. 
But they are themselves organisational issues with which public leaders and 
managers are preoccupied, in a context in which they are required to produce 
their ‘innovations’.
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The  Chal l enge  o f  Under s tand ing 
and  S e tt ing  I s s u e s
Often described as ‘wicked’ (Rittel and Webber 1972) or ‘complex’ (e.g. Snowden 
and Boone 2007), today’s problems articulated in the context of social innova-
tion or policy innovation are dynamic, multi-actor and multi-sited. Informed 
by perspectives in systems theory, futures and strategic management, there 
has been recognition for several decades that ‘transdisciplinary approaches’ 
(Bernstein 2015) are needed to address such issues. Issues such as, for example, 
the low educational attainment of white working class boys in the UK cross 
the boundaries of disciplines, organisational capabilities, sites of practice and 
scales of government, requiring actors to work together to understand the 
social world they want to change. These issues are seen as dynamic and in flux, 
and as having interdependencies, contingencies and feedback loops that make 
them hard to identify, describe or analyse. Issues co-emerge with publics; non-
government stakeholders can play active roles in enrolling others into an issue 
(Marres 2005; Hillgren et al. 2016). But despite these moves, in many cases 
policy or social problems have endured, despite the application over years of 
different kinds of expertise, analysis, investments in organisational change, 
changes in leadership, technology, and other resources, as well as fluctuations 
in collective visions about which problems matter. Different assumptions play 
out here about what counts as evidence that there is an issue, what kind of issue 
it is and for whom. Big data and behavioural research are increasingly evident 
as resources and drivers of organisational attention in the policy ecosystem 
(Dunleavy 2016). Such evidence is often tied to the capacities of corporations 
to assemble, organise and analyse large data sets providing particular kinds 
of social data. But alongside big data there are also micro-social perspectives 
from ethnography, as well as participatory approaches to exploring issues 
through workshops, events and online platforms. The growing availability of 
and interconnections between different forms of data are reconfiguring social 
and government innovation landscapes.
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The  Chal l enge  o f  G enerat ing 
and  Ex p lor ing  So lut ions
In a context in which issues are seen as dynamic, multi-sited and multi-actor, 
advocates of social and government innovation often argue for an experimental 
approach (e.g. Breckon 2015). Different kinds of experimentality emerge in 
response to different social or policy issues involving different kinds of organi-
sational apparatus. Some approaches – for example, healthcare improvement 
(e.g. Robert and Macdonald 2016) – recognise the value of allowing local actors 
who have a stake in an issue to be involved in generating and co-producing 
solutions – which handily coincides with a smaller role for government in a 
neo-liberal world ( Julier 2017). Digital platforms are often implicated in the 
work of governing. Some responses to social or public policy issues, such as 
the OpenIDEO digital platform,5 publish open challenges set by a policy team, 
foundation or corporate sponsor, and structure and enable processes that aim 
to engage people not previously connected to an issue to explore it and generate 
and iterate possible solutions. Alongside this kind of experimentation, other 
traditions have become more visible inside government and public policy. In 
particular, randomised control trials adapted from clinical sciences are promoted 
by some funders, researchers and civil servants as ways to test ideas and provide 
evidence for policy decisions about ‘what works’, often tied to behavioural theory 
(see Puttick 2012; Halpern 2015).6 As in science technology studies (STS), for 
civil servants and social entrepreneurs a persistent preoccupation is scale, not 
as an analytical construct but as an operational achievement: how can solutions 
developed and tested here, be rolled out and made effective there?
The  Chal l enge  o f  Under s tand ing  Change
Current practice in social and government innovation to some extent rec-
ognises that multiple actors are involved in constituting an issue and then 
shaping potential responses to doing something about it in order to achieve 
intended ‘outcomes’, reocognising that unintended consequences will also 
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result. To understand a problem or to generate a solution, a civil servant or 
manager in a voluntary sector organisation may be asked to articulate a ‘theory 
of change’. Such theories often foreground micro-social worlds and ‘choices’ 
made by individuals, rather than social practices (e.g. Shove et al. 2012) or are 
informed by, draw on, and deploy forms of technological determinism (e.g. 
Wilkie and Michael 2008). Some domains, such as healthcare improvement, 
allow an understanding of change that recognises multiple kinds of social 
worlds and researchers’ and managers’ participation within them, alongside the 
beneficiaries of interventions or users of services. But in other cases, innova-
tion toolkits7 and calls for proposals published by commissioners of services 
spread the idea that such theories of change can be adequately described 
in a page or two. Some funders, for example, require applicants to describe 
their theory of change underpinning a project (e.g. Nesta 2016). Elsewhere, 
methods drawing on participatory design in social or policy innovation work-
shops ask participants to materialise models of potential solutions and act out 
through role play how solutions might change a situation (Kimbell 2015). 
In describing how a desired change in a social world might unfold as a result 
of a proposed intervention, participants are asked to foreground ‘barriers’ 
to change and how these need to be addressed in implementing a solution. 
The temporal and spatial ordering of how change is constituted, experienced, 
understood, assessed and evaluated is downplayed. Discussions of who has 
agency to make change and the conditions and possibilities around this are 
often left unexamined.
The  Chal l enge  o f  Part i c i pat ion
From different perspectives, social innovation and government innovation are 
both premised on current and future relations between actors involved in an 
issue. Such practices foreground human actors – such as ‘users’, ‘citizens’ or 
possibly ‘beneficiaries’ – who are often already identified as involved in an issue 
and having particular ‘needs’ or ‘capacities’. In social innovation and government 
innovation practice, emerging activities include generating insights about what 
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is happening in a social world from the perspective of such actors; identifying 
and mobilising emerging practices; identifying non-obvious actors in an issue; 
and engaging actors in generating and possibly co-producing solutions. In 
the case of caring for older people, for example, human actors might include 
people directly experiencing the social or policy challenge (e.g. older people 
and their families, friends or neighbours), professionals (e.g. social workers, 
health visitors, nurses), service providers (e.g. carers working for municipalities 
or commercial firms), businesses (e.g. entrepreneurs or local shops or utili-
ties), researchers (e.g. social or healthcare researchers, but also data analysts), 
and voluntary or community groups (e.g. those working with older people or 
carers). A perspective from STS would also emphasise the non-human actors 
that co-constitute adult social care, such as assistive technologies, particular 
kinds of housing arrangement and layout, concepts such as ‘ageing’ and ‘caring’, 
and financial models for care services. For people self-identifying as social or 
government innovators, the desire to acknowledge and engage a wide array of 
actors may be driven partly by openness to emergence and democratic ideals. 
Nonetheless, existing and future levels of agency and power relations may be 
under-examined. For innovators inside government, participation has a compli-
cated relationship to formal democratic structures and processes, party politics 
and the media. For example, inviting responses via an online consultation or 
through participation in a policy workshop can privilege some contributions 
over others (e.g. Fortier 2010).
Opportun i t i e s  for  I nv ent i v e  A p p roache s
These brief summaries of some of the challenges facing those involved in social 
and government innovation have highlighted concerns that resonate with inven-
tive social research. While some readers may object to my emphasis on relatively 
short-term, easily-traceable intervention, I want to explore what inventive 
social research has to ‘offer’ service managers, delivery partners, policy makers, 
funders or communities entangled with these challenges. How might inventive 
social research express and connect social phenomena in the settings I describe, 
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resulting in changes to how things are done, as well as in new insights? How 
does it challenge dominant notions of innovation in government and society? 
The things that inventive social research might offer or provoke, however, are 
not necessarily what these actors want, value, or have the capacity to engage 
with – a topic to which I will return later.
Chal l eng ing  th e  Chal l enge
As indicated in this book, a core characteristic of inventive social research is how 
it problematises an issue. Instead of taking up a challenge as initially articulated 
or framed, inventive social research starts with a query into a domain. It does 
not take as given the constituents of an issue. Through such research, a social or 
policy innovation challenge is likely to be reconfigured. This may allow identifi-
cation of specific aspects that need to be addressed, or acknowledgement of the 
involvement of different actors from those originally thought to be part of the 
issue, or a shift in location, scale or timeframe. For example, in his chapter on 
making interventions to the Barcelona Pavilion, Andrés Jaque, by temporarily 
recomposing the constituents of the Pavilion, reveals the material practices, 
objects and materials associated with its maintenance and management. For 
social or policy innovators, inventive social science draws attention to the pos-
sibility that the challenge motivating their work is composed differently than 
they originally understood, which can be revealed through creative intervention. 
The actors or publics involved in constituting the challenge might not be the 
ones initially assumed to be part of it, and their capacities might also be other 
than originally understood (Stilgoe and Guston 2017).
S en s i t i s i ng  Part i c i pant s  to  th e 
‘ Soc i a l s ’  B e i ng  Enact ed
Inventive social research does not take the ‘social’ as a given but performs 
an emerging understanding of particular socials through experimental 
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co-articulation – offering an ‘experiential togetherness’, as Savransky observes 
in his chapter. By intentionally modifying settings or prompting actors to express 
themselves or to perform differently, social phemomena become visible in new 
ways. Inventive research reveals the agencies and different kinds of social which 
may co-exist and interact with one another. Being able to identify, bring into view, 
or analyse these within a project can enable those working in social innovation 
or government innovation to develop and continually revise their understand-
ings of the policy domain and how potential solutions are reconfigured. This 
can help them think through the ways in which the problem might change as 
experimentation proceeds – and draw attention to how a project’s activities are 
implicated in articulating particular socials.
Generat ing  In f ra s tructur e s / P ract i c e s 
that  Const i tut e  an  I s s u e  or  Pub l i c
The versions of inventive social research that combine design and STS resem-
ble some contemporary activities within social and government innovation. 
Expertise which bridges research and practice is now being developed as 
capabilities inside government teams and social innovation networks. For 
example, civil servants in the UK government are using creative approaches 
that combine the doing, representing and intervening in policy development 
(e.g. Kimbell 2015). By combining different kinds of research, materialising 
models of potential policies and organising participatory workshops, multiple 
understandings of the policy issue and potential interventions are brought into 
view, changing the issue and the institution of government, not just represent-
ing the issue. For social or policy innovators, adopting an inventive approach 
would allow them to better understand how policy agendas, devices, work 
programmes and publics are configured relationally. It would allow such prac-
titioners to recognise and reflect on their roles in doing infrastructuring work 
by providing resources, designing work programmes and producing devices 
such as models, frameworks, guidelines and criteria (e.g. LeDantec and Disalvo 
2014; Hilgren et al. 2016).
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Enab l ing  Att ent i v en e s s  to  Sca l ing
Scaling and the distribution of agency are long-standing concerns within STS 
and are evident in inventive approaches to social research. For example, Nold’s 
macro and micro prototypes connect the issue of noise annoyance at Heathrow 
and publics within new configurations. Wilkie and Michael’s chapter shows how 
the situated performances of the networked Energy Babble disrupted research 
funders’ assumptions about ‘community’ and policy framings about the usage 
of information from smart meters. Inventive research in social innovation or 
government innovation contexts can highlight how scale is performed, rather 
than pre-existing, assumed or given. It has the potential to generate new pos-
sibilities enabling intended outcomes to be identified, assessed and revised, 
while being open to recognising how novel configurations and consequences 
unfold in practice.
Open ing  u p  th e  Work  o f  R e s earch ing
Inventive social research draws on traditions that highlight the distribution of 
agency across human and non-human actors, and the translations involved in 
producing knowledge and achieving technological change. Marres and Gerlitz’s 
account of a collaborative analysis of a dataset from Twitter showed how catego-
ries such as ‘frequency’ or ‘volume’ got in the way of detecting the sociality of 
Twitter, which led to the research team refocusing their attention on develop-
ing other means to access dynamic interactions between Twitter accounts. In 
their chapter, Guggenheim et al. combine objects, situations and pressure to 
demonstrate the (creative) work that goes on in researching an issue. Bringing 
these orientations into social and government innovation draws attention to the 
material practices, events and actors involved in doing and representing research 
and intervening into an issue. Instead of analysing and reproducing ‘what works’ – 
a contemporary preoccupation within social or government innovation – this 
approach can highlight both what is required for a solution to ‘work’ and the 
practical accomplishments of doing research in social and government settings.
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In short there is potential for inventive approaches to engage directly with 
social innovation and government settings. By ‘directly’ I mean by academic 
researchers working experimentally in collaboration with people (who may 
have research training) in local or central government, community and volun-
tary groups, think-tanks, service providers, entrepreneurs, activists or others 
in the policy ecosystem who are engaged in understanding a problem domain 
and intervening into it. Some of the challenges such individuals or teams face 
in doing the work of social or government innovation present opportunities 
to enact novel kinds of doing, representing and intervening in social worlds. 
While on the one hand this may be driven by, and result in, the prioritisation 
of short-term, easily traceable associations, on the other there is also potential 
for inventive research to also intervene in the institutional practices, devices 
and narratives that drive this short-termism.
I m p l i cat ions
Inventive social research can problematise accounts of policy issues and potential 
solutions developed in relation to them. It can propose modes of doing research 
by opening up theories of change, identifying how scale operates, acknowledging 
human and non-human constituents and agency, and examining the governance 
and styles of participation enacted in a project. In so doing, new possibilities 
will emerge. By engaging experimentally in reconfiguring projects that aim to 
address social or public policy issues, researchers may help articulate and detect 
new socials, develop new devices, infrastructures and methods, and produce 
understandings of their genealogies, possibilities and limits. They may also be 
able to situate themselves more closely in relation to some of the challenges that 
service providers, policy makers and activists are involved in by co-producing 
‘change’ as well as ‘knowledge’ (Facer and Enright 2016).
With the possibility of closer engagement between inventive social research 
and social and government innovation come a number of matters that need 
further consideration. The first is the different temporalities that come into 
play in the worlds of academic research, which may not be aligned with those of 
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social innovation and policy experimentation. Academia has its own temporal 
intensities that emerge, for example, when applying for funding, doing research, 
presenting at workshops or conferences, and writing papers or books, as well 
as moving between jobs or institutions. Some of these take place over days or 
weeks, some may take place over several years. Within social innovation and 
government innovation, timescales are equally varied and intense. Invitations 
to tender may have deadlines of weeks or months, research undertaken to shape 
policy making may take months, while efforts to research, develop and rede-
sign a service might take months or years. In contrast, a minister might want 
a policy recommendation to be produced in a matter of days; a campaign to 
change regulations or the law might take years. Aligning the perspectives and 
resources of researchers in relation to organisational routines and resources 
inside public administrations and the organisational ecosystems around them 
is not a trivial matter, but, as Guggenheim et al. argue, the application of pres-
sure may be productive.
A second and related issue is the accountabilities held by different actors 
involved in an inventive collaboration. Academics might hold themselves 
accountable to colleagues, current or future students, their institutions, funders, 
professional bodies or partners from civil society, business or the public sector. 
Managers, volunteers, activists or civil servants have other accountabilities, for 
example to colleagues, professional bodies, service users or residents, funders 
and donors, organisational partners, codes of practice, or to public bodies such 
as parliament. Bringing into view and articulating distinct accountabilities at 
different levels of institutionalisation and formality, recognising that these 
accountabilities may continue to change, requires attention and reflexivity.
A third issue is the jostling for power and negotiations between different 
kinds of expertise required to do inventive social research, which also emerges 
in other kinds of applied academic research. In their chapter, Guggenheim et 
al. propose that experts ‘accompany’ a lay person along an experimental path. 
Doing inventive social research in the context of social or government innovation 
requires awareness of different kinds and sites of expertise and the infrastructures, 
practices and devices that enable this. In different ways, the contributors to this 
book reveal some of the skills and knowledge required to undertake inventive 
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socio-material and aesthetic experiments. As the connections between social 
and government innovators and creative practices continue to intensify, new 
patterns of expertise will emerge within inventive research. More intersections 
between the kinds of academic research discussed in this volume and the prac-
tices I have described will lead to the development of new tools, bureaucratic 
relationships and systems of valorisation and governance.
Each of these issues shapes the material practices, devices, infrastructures and 
processes of doing inventive research in the contexts of social and government 
innovation. By being attentive to temporalities, accountabilities and expertise 
as constitutive of inventive research, such experimental collaborations will play 
out differently.
To conclude, this sketch has suggested how inventive social research might 
engage with current preoccupations and practices in social innovation and 
government innovation. Shared concerns include experimentation, systems, 
participation, and the reordering and reconfiguring of a social world, and the 
politics of so doing. By drawing attention to the processual reconfiguring of 
resources and relations through a change process, inventive researchers and their 
collaborators in social innovation and government settings may add nuance, 
critical appreciation of, and insight to the claims made for and about innovation. 
My hope is that my description of the challenges I see in social and government 
innovation, and my brief outline of how this could unfold, will spark new engage-
ments. At the very least, this account may prompt interest among researchers in 
some of these settings in more inventive doing, representing and intervening.
Note s
1 I have been involved in different ways within these developments for over a decade: as 
an educator teaching design thinking to MBA students and social entrepreneurs; as former 
head of social design at The Young Foundation; as a researcher studying the emergence 
of social design for the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC); as a researcher 
embedded for a year in Policy Lab, a team in the Cabinet Office of the UK government 
via an AHRC fellowship; as a consultant helping government bodies develop design 
capabilities; as a user of public services; and as an activist where I live.
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2 There is a long tradition in the UK of think-tanks and other policy ecosystems that carry 
out research and undertake experiments in relation to social issues that are sometimes 
translated into public policy. An early example was the Institute of Community Studies, set 
up by Michael Young in 1952. Through his writing, work on the Labour Party manifesto 
in 1945, involvement in the creation of institutions such as the Open University, Young 
has long been recognised as an early social innovator whose expertise bridged social 
research, public policy and organistional action (Young Foundation 2017).
3 An exercise in which participants note down and then share challenges in the form 
‘how can we…?’ is common in the work of Policy Lab, a team in the UK government’s 
Cabinet Office. See https://www.slideshare.net/Openpolicymaking/policy-lab-slide-
share-introduction-final [accessed 11 June 2016].
4 The UK’s innovation agency Nesta set up a Challenge Prize Centre in 2012 to study 
and promote ‘challenge-based’ innovation. See http://www.nesta.org.uk/challenge-prize-
centre [accessed 11 June 2016].
5 International design consultancy IDEO’s platform partners with foundations, corporate 
sponsors and government bodies to set challenges for its users to respond to. See https://
openideo.com [accessed 11 June 2016].
6 A leading example here is the UK-based International Behavioural Insights Team, 
originally set up in the UK government’s Cabinet Office, which it now co-owns with the 
UK innovation charity Nesta and the senior management team. See the account of its 
chief executive David Halpern (2015). Such approaches are not without criticism.
7 See for example the Development Impact and You Toolkit, aimed at people working 
in development contexts, produced by UK innovation agency Nesta and funded by the 
Rockefeller Foundation. Available at http://diytoolkit.org [accessed 11 June 2016].
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1 4
INVENTIVE TENSIONS: 
A CONVERSATION
Lucy Kimbell, Michael Guggenheim, Noortje Marres, 
Alex Wilkie
the scene: the fourth floor of 1 granary square in kings cross, 
London, and the home, since 2012, of Central Saint Martins, one of the con-
stituent art and design colleges of the University of the Arts London. Lucy 
Kimbell, the host, takes the visitors – Michael Guggenheim, Noortje Marres 
and Alex Wilkie – on a tour of the building and then invites them into a small 
room where a conversation ensues, the transcript of which has been edited by 
all four contributors.
LK: Welcome to this art and design school. Our building is full of people 
designing, making, creating, generating, exploring, performing, building, know-
ing and doing. There are students, staff and visitors whose work practices are 
intimately connected with investigating, proposing and enacting social arrange-
ments, although they might not talk about it that way. Thinking of them as one 
audience for your book, I want to start by asking, why this book and why does 
it matter now?
NM: What has been interesting in making this book is that each of the 
editors has a different take on this. Some of us, I think, are quite okay with the 
rather sensational claim that ‘the social is back’ after it seemed to have disap-
peared for some time. You had a period in social theory, and arguably in public 
discourse – roughly speaking, during the 1990s – where ‘society seemed to have 
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disappeared’.1 Today, by contrast, the social seems once again to be playing a 
central role in culture, the economy, science, politics – think of social innovation, 
social enterprise, social media, social design, social data. One of the questions 
then is how we approach this return of the social. What I think we’re doing in 
this book is showing how these returning socials are different from how ‘the 
social’ has traditionally been defined and understood. These new socials are 
often about introducing technology and creative methods into other kinds of 
professional sectors. However, in the book we say ‘Let’s not be immediately 
dismissive of these new, creative uses of the “social” as a label, let’s see what they 
are about, and what can be of interest in going along, at least initially’. That also 
means we don’t simply want to criticise or reject the fact that sociality is today 
more closely inter-articulated with the technical and the creative. So that’s one 
opening.
AW: Another way to think through the return to the social is to ask who 
or what decides what the social is? Here, and crucially, what counts as the 
social is being done in a myriad of ways outside, and irrespective of, the 
social sciences and other centres of expertise charged with determining the 
social. In other words, the disciplines that are conventionally sanctioned 
and obliged to proclaim ‘this is the social!’ This gives rise to both theoretical 
and practical concerns around how the social is conceived, composed, made 
and accomplished once the presumption of an extant social as pre-given and 
singular has been abandoned. Our attention, then, as social scientists, and in 
my case as a designer too, turns to sociality as process and multiplicity includ-
ing the inventiveness and becomings of socials – where the s is underscored, 
meaning there is not one definition of the social, but a plurality of societies. 
It follows, then, that this implicates questions of methods and techniques 
and modes of doing research, as the ‘practical’ above indicates. So, in a sense 
there exists a multiplicity of concrete and possible socials that we and others 
are starting to recognise and locate, and this includes an appreciation of the 
situated role we play – as analysts and makers – in the emergence and pat-
terning of socialities. Arguably, this requires an interdisciplinary engagement 
or an engagement that speaks outside the social sciences as well as inside 
them. The field of design is interesting in this regard, since its practitioners 
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are accustomed to shaping and redefining the composition and compos-
siblity of socialities.
MG: The word ‘social’, sozial in German, has always had this confusion; in 
everyday parlance, sozial means something like ‘just’, or ‘equally distributed’. 
There’s also the notion of something being ‘unsocial’, meaning it’s unjust. And 
basically, as a sociologist speaking German, you continually have to fight for 
this distinction that for sociologists there is no such thing as a non-social policy 
or whatever. Using social in this way isn’t a discourse coming from the right, 
similar to the Thatcherite claim ‘there is no such thing as society’. It’s actually 
mostly a leftist use of the term social. As a sociologist, I’m tired of dealing with 
these confusions – they’re not very productive. For me, the volume is really 
about what it means to invent the social. This is where there seem to be a lot 
of changes, which are mostly changes in the practice of social scientists, and in 
the way that social scientists now cooperate with people from other disciplines 
and away from academia.
LK: Colleagues and students here are involved in researching, designing 
and participating in some of these new ‘socials’, through their work inside the 
studio, and outside in bars, offices, clubs, prisons, galleries and online. I suspect 
they’d be comfortable with your ideas of multiplicity and becomings and would 
feel they have something to say, or show, about being inventive. But they don’t 
necessarily want to be the objects of study for social scientists, which is what 
you are hinting at. As well as engaging artists and designers, who else are you 
addressing with this book?
NM: To recognise that the ghost of ‘the social’ is out of the bottle, that it 
doesn’t necessarily comply with understandings of the ‘social’ that sociology 
has taught us, gets us into all sorts of trouble. For one, it is a highly sobering 
experience. For many, data science is the new social science and they are willing 
to accept that computing, physics and other sciences will provide the ontology 
for the social (think of contagion models for digital communication, where mes-
sages are assumed to spread like viruses). Design and art are today favoured by 
many as methods for representing society to society. There seem to be important 
shifts in the air, in terms of what are recognised to be the most valuable and 
effective instruments for knowing society, representing it, intervening in and 
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engaging with it. To be sure, these various disciplines are critical participants in 
the doing of what we may want to call sociality, but I also think there are a lot 
of misunderstandings about their capacity to grasp the specificity of the social. 
If we say, to give only two examples, that an organisation is just like a neural 
network, or that making a painting can be the same as doing a survey (but 
better), then we’re likely to be misunderstanding something about sociality. 
This is why it is important both to broaden who can participate in the doing and 
articulating of the social, but also to remain very critical about how it’s done. 
In that sense, I have a possibly quite megalomaniac idea about who or what 
we are addressing, because I think we are addressing interested parties from 
these various backgrounds, whether it’s computing, design, art, data science, 
sociology, architecture; they each have a stake, many of us have stakes in the 
reinvention of sociality.
LK: Today, it’s as if nearly anyone can do social research and everything can 
be viewed as social. Design agencies offer ethnographic insight to spark innova-
tion projects; managers and civil servants map the journeys of users and citizens 
engaging with their services to learn how to change them; artists create ways 
for people to visualise and play with data. There’s a whole emergent field that, 
unfortunately, calls itself ‘social design’ which some funders and commissioners 
hope will enable design researchers to have academic impact, make designers feel 
useful to society (and not just capitalism), and lead to new solutions to policy 
challenges (Armstrong et al. 2014). For me, your book is valuable because it 
poses questions about what makes up the social, who defines and articulates 
it, the contexts for doing research into and inventing the social, the practices 
through which the social is made, and it sets this against the literatures of soci-
ology and their histories. But I am left wondering how many data scientists or 
designers will engage with it? I want the book to open up to the people who 
are not yet critically aware of the socials they are co-constituting in their work.
AW: Part of the context is how sociology itself responds to the idea of its 
coming crisis, a predicament raised by Mike Savage and Roger Burrows (2007) 
about the efficacy, relevance and utility of sociology in the face of large-scale 
empirical research conducted on behalf of public and private institutions and 
made possible by new computational technologies of data production and 
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analysis. Their response, however, is a lurch back into seemingly conventional 
ways of doing sociological description by way of combinations of existing 
empirical research techniques – a somewhat disappointing riposte, echoed by 
John Law’s (2004) ‘method assemblage’, which entails a re-mixing of the disci-
pline’s existing methodological repertoire, and which, perhaps, the mutability 
of ethnography, for instance, has been well disposed to in any case. This book, 
alongside others, is trying to provide an alternative by saying, ‘Well, actually 
there are other ways to respond’, and these responses involve both theoretical 
novelty and methodological adventure, as well as a change in what might count 
as description – knowing that our descriptions, techniques and constructions 
add to the composition of the world. For my part, then, and having been 
committed to teaching novel empirical research skills to designers in order to 
resource and diversify their practices, this book can be used as an additional 
aid in the pursuit of equipping designers to develop their own explanations 
of situated design settings without relying on pre-fabricated explanations or 
methodologies.
NM: A lot of the excitement around social media has to do with the fact that 
they render recordable and traceable all these colloquial, semi-natural forms of 
interaction. As such, contemporary practices of recording have something to 
do with the methods of social research: sociologists and ethnomethodologists 
have long emphasised the value of analysing interactions and conversations ‘in-
the-wild’ for understanding social life. However, today’s interest in the social 
entails loads of other definitions, for example the social (engagement) as a 
placeholder for marketing, or the social as a placeholder for ‘let’s not use any 
government resources but free labour’. Having said this, they are also about the 
kind of socials that makes sociology exciting.
MG: But this excitement is somehow forty years too late, no? There’s a 
great article by Mike Lynch and David Bogen (1994) about the excitement of 
conversation analysts in the 1960s now that they had these new tape recorders 
with which they could precisely record what was talked about and achieve what 
they thought was a natural science of the social. I think this was the decisive step 
in terms of being able to record so-called ‘natural’ interaction, and ironically, 
it seems to me, the new forms of treating these new data are in many ways less 
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sophisticated than the practices of conversation analysis, and sociologically 
less interesting.
NM: I think social research is becoming more participatory today, and 
that is one of the big changes. One of the examples I like a lot is hetexted.com 
which is mostly young women posting screenshots of their SMS exchanges 
with mostly boys, and doing collective interpretations of these texts, like ‘Is 
he dumping me here or not?’ It’s a wonderful spectacle of attempted com-
munication across the gender divide, and my sense is that such experiments 
in interpretation open up possibilities that those sociologists of the 60s and 
70s who invented conversation analysis weren’t necessarily attuned to. But 
also, this is about the invention of a particular device, or dispositif, that enables 
a participatory form of social analysis. Here, recordability is not separate from 
interpretability, which is a mistake that some versions of data science make. 
It’s the invention of a practice where recordability, interpretability and interac-
tion all come together, and it’s a very particular social, technical, material and 
aesthetic practice. There are many such moments of invention occurring today, 
and I do think there are different opportunities for understanding opened up 
by hetexted.com in terms of the politics of knowledge and politics of invention, 
as compared to the mostly gentlemen social scientists in the period of Sacks, 
whose aim was still to provide the authoritative account of interactional order, 
of what’s happening in a pause.
LK: Given these developments, and the methods crisis within the social 
sciences, what are you adding to recent work on inventiveness?
AW: If we formulate the view that it’s not just social scientists but also others, 
such as designers, architects, computer scientists, and so on, doing inventive 
social research, one approach, such as Lury and Wakeford’s (2012) Inventive 
Methods, as well as the work Mike Michael and myself (2015) have been involved 
in, is looking back and asking what’s interesting or who has done interesting 
work around expanding or adding novelty to the repertoire of empirical tech-
niques that may be adopted (or not, as is more likely the case) and developed. 
For this book, however, I think how we’ve asked contributors to work is to 
think through the view that inventiveness is distributed and not the privilege 
or responsibility of a single actor. So it’s not just a question of how methods 
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in themselves are inventive (if at all) but also how the methods themselves are 
being deployed in order to understand inventiveness, and that’s something that’s 
distributed. I think this book acts as a kind of lure to researchers to think about 
how they themselves might take up some of these commitments in relation to 
their problems, their questions, their areas of interest, how the social pushes 
back at them and their work. In other words, rather than being inventive simply 
by taking up novel methods or describing the inventiveness of others, we are 
arguing for some kind of double capture where invention requires and begets 
inventive techniques and description.
MG: For me, part of the interest of the book is what follows from this for our 
practice as social scientists. Just to stick to the conversation analysis example, 
we would say ‘okay, what is left for conversation analysis’? What is left for social 
statistics in Savage and Burrows’ case, mentioned by Alex earlier? What is left 
for ethnography when there’s all these examples of proto-ethnography? Shall 
we simply insist that we do these things somehow better, or more thoroughly? 
And I think that’s mostly the answer that we are giving, but it’s probably neither 
a really interesting answer, nor one that will make a lot of sense in the long run. 
Here, what the book is trying to explore is better, more interesting answers to that 
problem of reinventing social scientific methods in the face of all these changes.
NM: Besides the question of what is distinctive about social enquiry, there 
is also the question of how we participate in it. In the traditions we’re referring 
back to, like the ethnomethodology and conversation analysis of the 70s and 
80s, you could say there was a kind of a death drive present in them. Broadly 
speaking, their argument was that if social methods are being deployed across 
social life by social actors, and if methodologically accounting for social life is 
already part of how society operates, then we don’t need sociologists anymore. 
I think that kind of approach was very much animated by this legislative and 
sovereign conception of what it is to do social enquiry, so it had to be completely 
distinctive and completely different from what was already going on, otherwise 
it didn’t have a right to exist. We’re now in quite a different context where the 
question is not ‘Are we going to kill that big beast or let it live?’, or if it can sur-
vive, ‘How to secure a legislative space where sociology is in charge?’. To shift 
away from this is a risky move but one worth attempting. The question to ask 
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here is, ‘How do we participate in these wider processes?’. I think there’s actually 
plenty of work for us to do when I look at other practitioners getting a taste for 
the social, for example the ways in which artists and designers working with 
found materials or found footage show a way into documenting social (dis-) 
order and social change. I also think there is a lot that social researchers and 
sociologists can bring to those practices: how does this work, how do we elicit 
sociality, how do we render social problems detectable in everyday settings? 
So, the question is how can we participate and how can we make this kind of 
contribution without any of us getting tricked into reducing our engagement to 
an issue of authority of who can legislate the social. You can’t just say ‘we’re not 
playing that game’, because the social is at stake and these are political issues. 
But still, asking how we can participate effectively, for me, is a more productive 
question than asking what’s the little piece on the allotment where we still have 
absolute sovereignty as sociologists.
AW: It’s slightly ironic and revealing that we’re sitting here in an art school 
where there is a pronounced preoccupation with the role of aesthetics grounded 
on adding things to the world and the concreteness of what gets made here – and, 
of course, how the school publicly stages this style of invention and innovation 
to visitors and members alike. This is very much foregrounded here, and yet 
amidst all this we’re fixed on an altogether different register – the problems of 
relevance and effectiveness facing the social sciences, but very much formulated 
as part of internal debates and problems rather than the new demands being 
placed on social science, which all this new stuff surrounding us incites.
LK: On reading the book, I was left grasping for the answer to the question 
‘What does this mean for me?’, in my domain of design. What does it mean 
for the civil servants I know grappling with how to do experiments to pro-
vide answers to policy questions, who may not be able to engage deeply with 
sociological accounts that problematise their work, such as Ben Williamson’s 
(2015) writing on policy innovation labs? What does it mean for funders and 
commissioners of arts venues or projects? We are sitting here in a recently-built 
art school, where the former head of college who commissioned this building, 
the architecture firm, the university administrators, the staff and students, the 
local government planners, and various others involved, were constituting an 
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imaginary of a higher education institution, which is now continuously being 
re-articulated in the everyday practices of all these people and things. I doubt 
they consulted a sociologist along the way to discuss the sociality of a future 
art school. It’s already in the practices of art and design to generate new social 
worlds through the devices, methods and objects they create. That’s ordinary. 
But it’s increasingly evident that designers and artists need to be aware of and 
held to account for the implications of the particular versions of the social that 
are imagined, enacted and unfolded in what they do, perform and make. I think 
artists and designers, managers and civil servants are concerned to understand 
which socials their work co-constitutes. But often people just get on with making 
it, and leave the studying of it to others. Your book shows how designers and 
architects are able to do research that is inventive, rather than being objects of 
study for sociologists.
MG: I think there’s an interesting parallel to, say, psychoanalysis, where 
something similar has happened. Psychoanalysis has been in a decline for a long 
time now, but (pseudo) psychoanalytic theory has been taken up by everyday 
discourse and is used for everything. And if you look at psychoanalytical dis-
course, there’s a huge amount of frustration about the decline of the discipline 
and its expertise in the face of its actually quite incredible success. I think one 
of the main problems from the viewpoint of its inventors is that they now have 
zero control over what they invented. Ideas or theories do not come with warn-
ing labels that have to be adhered to by users.
NM: I think it’s fair to say that the wider condition is mostly one of mutual 
irrelevance. We carve up the world according to disciplines, and the prize or 
the cherry on that cake is the fiction of relative autonomy. You don’t have to 
do all this diplomacy. But this can also be taken to mean that to produce situ-
ations of mutual relevance is a challenge, a task, and a job. And I think it’s very 
important for us to keep remembering that it’s a task, and not a given. That’s one 
of the annoying things about today’s revival of the social; when you hear social 
innovation, social enterprise, social media, it sounds as if the social is already 
accomplished in those environments, but of course it isn’t. My colleague, Emma 
Uprichard, came up with this slogan, ‘Just because it’s called social, that doesn’t 
make it social’. Sociology and supposedly non-creative disciplines are more of 
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the underdog in some ways. They don’t have the resources or the legitimacy to 
make a stronger claim and say that the experts tasked with inventing computa-
tional social science, or social media, are in many ways pretty bad at sociality, 
grasping it and doing it.
AW: And, of course, there are other organisations where the social is pre-
cisely the thing that is being harnessed. Much of the fieldwork I conducted 
on designers working for a multinational semiconductor manufacturer (2010) 
invariably featured interdisciplinary working practices that included various 
mixtures of designers, cognitive and social psychologists, ergonomiscists, 
mechanical engineers, computer scientists, and even anthropologists-as-cor-
porate-ethnographers, all of whom could claim a certain expertise on and 
about the social, although some more than others. Here, I didn’t experience 
mutual irrelevance between them, which suggests that they remained absorbed 
within their own disciplinary concerns and discrete domains of experience, 
as defined by an organisation. On the contrary, they were working with one 
another on a daily basis – often unproblematically. Their concerns were not 
with the practicalities of interdisciplinary collaborations, nor were they epis-
temological in terms of the kind of knowledge they were producing. Instead, 
their interests lay in new situations and possibilities brought about by faster, 
smaller, more energy efficient microprocessors, and the implications of this for 
creating new products, new applications, new markets, and, as a corollary, how 
to go about or inform how such new ways of living are colonised. Disciplinary 
concerns were less of a problem, because the problems were elsewhere and 
more ontological, for example, ‘Where is the new market?’, not ‘Oh, you’re 
worried about this social or that social’. And that goes back to Lucy’s question 
of why it should matter. It does matter because what we see is organisations 
that are increasingly interested in people who can go in and tell them what 
the social is, how it operates, how it functions, precisely as a way to harness 
whatever knowledge practice can support an organisation’s interests. Another 
way of putting this is to ask how epistemological resources are brought to bear 
on questions of practical ontology – about what and how to bring into the 
world, and the kinds of changes such new phenomena and entities – such as 
microprocessor- based technology will bring about, not least to the imagination 
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of such organisations, a point made by Andrew Barry, Georgina Born and Gisa 
Weszkalnys (2008: 35).
MG: A lot of designers are operating and actually need to operate with an 
almost naïve belief that what they’re producing will have the intended effect. I 
think this is holding a lot of sociologists back: the fact there has been so much 
research about social science itself, showing that this belief is mistaken, and that 
it can have unintended effects. We are all taught how the era of 1950s and 60s 
planning euphoria crashed because of, among other things, a related euphoria 
about the powers of social science (see for example Scott 1998). You have to 
follow projects to really understand what is happening, and you cannot just 
think ‘Let’s put social science here and then the world will be better’. Because 
we know about this history, we have also lost our own belief that we can really 
contribute in these ways, because we already know that it won’t turn out the 
way we intended it. And I think this is a really tricky thing. I think in a way we 
need this naivety, or at least a little bit of it, to do interventionist projects at all. 
But we should also know, being STS scholars, or more broadly, social scientists, 
that it is going to turn out differently, and that it could actually go completely 
against our intentions. It appears that designers, and architects in particular, are 
just much better at forgetting how things went wrong previously, and continue 
to believe that their own grand projects will succeed. For me the solution is 
to design actual experiments rather than have specific ideas of what I want 
to achieve, in terms of outcomes. I want to set up experiments that open up 
options, that allow us to see options, to make them accountable. When I say 
experiments, I do not mean ‘being experimental’ in a fuzzy sense, but setting 
up devices that force us and participants to do things we would not do without 
the experiment, and which create situations that would not exist without these 
experimental setups.
NM: An experiment on society is often seen, in sociology, as a quite scandal-
ous way of acting on society, something that’s not ethical, but when Michael 
makes these remarks now, he’s talking about the experiment as a particular 
trick for generating accounts and accountability of social life. When John Law 
says engineering is sociology by other means because it’s all about making 
associations, that ontological claim is actually not enough. Now that we have 
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a world full of engineering scholars who say ‘Yes, we’re sociologists’, we know 
that there’s actually more ingredients, more concepts that come into play, in the 
doing of sociology, namely the accounting for, and/or articulating of, practices 
that involve technology. We need these deliberate, expressive articulations of 
practices if we are to properly appreciate how social connections and hetero-
geneous associations come about in those practices.
LK: I think sociology could make more claims for being necessary to 
creating new devices, practices and institutions, by studying a situation and 
the collective work of creating the accounts of what is or could be happening 
in that situation. Andrew Barry, many years ago, introduced me to a version 
of the quote from Marx along the lines that social scientists study the world, 
whereas the point is to change it.2 Similarly, in design research there’s a long-
standing but uncomfortable distinction between studying a situation and 
changing it, by devising courses of action to change ‘existing situations into 
preferred ones’, as Herbert Simon put it (1996: 111). Your book challenges this 
dualism in a stronger way than I’ve seen elsewhere. It recognises not only the 
need for accounting-for practices, but also the participation of those accounts 
in the creation of new practices in experimental setups. But I’m struck how, 
as a reader, while I am invited into the experiments discussed in the book, I 
cannot easily participate in them. We’re speaking of opening up possibilities, 
and yet it’s a text. Some of us need other ways or multiple ways of engaging 
with concepts. As well as the book I want the pop-out installation or the do-
it-yourself inventive toolkit. How can I access materialised or digital instances 
of its discussions, and make the insights usable for the experimental contexts 
I work in, and for others who may not come across or read this book? How 
can I perform it?
NM: We shouldn’t blame a book for being a book. It is clear that the works 
accounted for, or narrated, in Inventing the Social, have several different incarna-
tions: they exist in some cases as an exhibition, or as an experimental device, 
or an intervention, or an art installation. And we have to introduce different 
criteria of evaluation, or wear different glasses, for these different instantia-
tions. One of the things that stands out about the book, for me, is that it brings 
together an interdisciplinary set of contributors; another characteristic is its 
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intentional confusion of roles. We attempt to move away from the kinds of 
abusive relations that intellectuals in previous times initiated in terms of how 
they connected with design, for instance: ‘Now you’re going to make my text 
look nice’, or where artists say to the intellectuals ‘Now you’re going to write 
nice captions for my performance’. Where those experiments go wrong is where 
they end up as failed role reversals, the pretence to be something you’re not. 
But role confusion is a kind of success. Is Andrés Jaque doing architecture or 
sociology when he is producing his Mies van der Rohe project as a chapter? 
Is this person still just writing as a theorist, or is there actually a methodology 
being proposed?
LK: It’s disciplinary androgyny. It’s a book and more than a book. How do 
different kinds of aesthetics play out in the different contributions?
AW: I think that’s maybe one of the unanswered topics of this book, or 
one that it opens up to and invites readers to take up. To take an example from 
today, from where we are standing now, earlier we were looking into the window 
of one of the Central Saint Martin’s fashion studios, and in there was a young 
student, dressed in a very particular way, all black, but the length and the cut 
of the cloth was not that of a typical garment. This is the garment of some-
body who knows intimately about what they are wearing, and he was making 
something that wouldn’t convert into a book, that would be hard to translate 
into written accounts and books. Instantiated in that costume and the way it is 
worn is years of training to acquire a certain sensibility about a certain mode 
and fashioning of aesthetics. And I think that’s something that we as authors 
might admit, that this is stuff we find very hard to include, or to get at, namely 
experiences that escape linguistic or textual modes or that themselves demand 
experiencing rather than explanation. Having said that, books also circulate 
in this setting, and contribute to the aesthetic practices of the art students – a 
point I will return us to later.
MG: I’ve never understood the blaming of books or academic texts for 
being closed objects. For me, it is not about blaming particular forms; I think 
that’s actually nonsensical. There is a reason why we still have, and should have, 
500-page social theory books. We need them, with two thousand footnotes. 
And to assume, just because something appears as a 500-page theory book, 
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that it is closed, is wrong, because obviously it pre-exists in talks, and there are 
reviews, and people talk about it and so on and so forth. At the same time, it 
only works in the way it does because it’s this closed thing. For me, specifically 
with regard to sociology, we have to open up any default assumption that stuff 
should appear as a text. And I guess the other way around, with, say, design, I 
think we should give up the idea that the default product needs to be a three-
dimensional thing. It’s a matter of thinking about for which instance, for which 
situation, for which intervention we want to produce which kinds of materials 
and forms, and there are indeed many avenues to be explored here, once we 
leave our default assumptions behind.
NM: Our intention was precisely to invite non-professional sociologists 
into the format of the sociological text. In this book, we have multiply-trained 
contributors, some who have PhDs in sociology, some who only started reading 
sociology a few years ago and come from very different trajectories. We invited 
these people because we know, or we are confident that their practice speaks to 
this question about how the social is being invented today. And that partly has to 
do with a certain idea of how we do knowledge politics, but also with knowing 
what your competence is. When Alex speaks of this aesthetic competence, I know 
that this book can only work if it has the trust and the commitment of people 
who have that competence. But I also know that there are many who have only 
passive knowledge of that competence. So yes, it’s about the specific purpose, 
and also knowing which strengths are called for when, and who possesses them.
LK: Given that data science is big business, and computing an academic 
field and a growing policy agenda, I’m struck by how the book’s examples 
don’t engage strongly with this. Where are the missing big data masses? There’s 
obviously some computational work, but it’s closer to people’s experiences 
with devices, although the analysis reveals their interconnections with other 
worlds. Does the emphasis on particular scales and contexts discussed in the 
book matter?
NM: There’s nothing about including a business chapter in this book that I 
would find intrinsically problematic, but it would probably be about the condi-
tions under which those kinds of connections can be made to work, and what 
are the conditions under which they wouldn’t work. One thing we’re doing 
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is talking to academia and saying ‘Architects and designers are authors in our 
space that we should address as authors – not just as research subjects that we 
can interview and then anonymise’. So one of the interventions is in academic 
debates, and how they reproduce distinctions between the accredited and 
the unaccredited sociologist or social scientist. But the other intervention is 
about being ambitious across disciplines and fields about what it is that we can 
problematise. Because often when we talk about impact that kind of scaling 
down happens in another way, where it is assumed that ‘we’re not really going 
to intervene in problem framing, because that’s just going to be confusing, and 
unsettling, and it’s going to make it harder for us to demonstrate that we’re 
relevant’. I think what we’re saying is that in the labs of big digital industries, 
and in policy spaces, the social is being deployed in highly selective ways. This 
is how within Western governments social policy is recomposed as something 
else. This is how in digital industries what counts as a social community is being 
recomposed. And it is those kinds of framings that we also need to act upon in 
responding to the call to ‘invent the social’.
MG: When we did our sandbox project, we set out to explore new meth-
ods of creating disaster scenarios (Guggenheim, Kraeftner, and Kroell 2013; 
Guggenheim, Kräftner, and Kröll 2016). We set up a sandbox in which partici-
pants created worlds with abstract figures and let disasters happen. The whole 
point was to create new and radically different, participative methods to counter 
existing forms of creating risk registers. We enrolled disaster researchers to 
play in our sandbox, and we also tried to interest government experts. But it 
quickly became very obvious that there simply isn’t a straightforward way in 
which what we want to do can be in any way aligned with what these people 
are doing. We interviewed them, we played with some of them. But because 
the whole method fundamentally undermines the idea of what risk is, what a 
disaster is, and who should take decisions about these questions, it is difficult 
to convert government departments to adopt it. In the whole apparatus that is 
the government, the assumption is ‘We do it and you don’t’. Ideally, we would 
have been happy if they had said ‘Oh yes, this is much better than what we are 
doing’. But it’s not the scale of the project that prevented it. It’s the fundamental 
incongruence between our interests and theirs.
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NM: Being experimental also means that there has to be a space where 
confusion is possible. You need to allow for that possibility.
AW: There is also something about the fragility of these things which I quite 
like, the vulnerability, the temporality; but another way to understand this is 
through scale. How, for example, do devices or things necessarily scale up, if 
indeed they do they scale up? This is directly related to the question of policy 
and instrumentalisation. One example of this is discussed in the chapter I’ve 
written with Mike Michael, as well as our piece on speculative method (Wilkie 
et al. 2015), which is precisely about the failure of the rollout of sixty million 
smart monitors in the United Kingdom as a way to address climate change. Here, 
in fact, we find an ostensible solution that is being scaled up across an entire 
population, and yet reports are emerging indicating that people either can’t use 
them, don’t appreciate or comprehend the relation between consumption and 
calculation, or actually leave the lights on for longer – knowing they can do this 
with LED or low-energy bulbs. Arguably, it can’t get bigger than that. And that 
precisely is addressing the question of what happens when policy finds itself in 
a mode of operating where there are reports that it’s failing, and yet it continues 
on a particular logic and path. Another way to think about this, and another way 
to address qualms about the relevance of the practices included in this book to 
questions, arguably, of governmentality, is to situate the work being done in 
relation to what Latour (2007) describes as ‘political-1’ where new associations 
are coming into being and changing the composition of collective life. As a heu-
ristic, I find this a useful way to appreciate the importance of and need for the 
work exemplified in this book, although, and as the UK smart monitor rollout 
illustrates, there are movements back and forth across the different political 
registers where smart monitors themselves are not fixed (to encode normative 
energy behaviour) but operate also to bring about new practical relations.
LK: Christian Nold’s piece is in a similar vein, discussing the specifics of 
those material, digital, place-based community interactions that exceed the 
possibilities of the policy or programmatic question.
NM: I think there may also be some really basic confusion between inter-
vention, and what, in a sort of vulgar language, is a provocation, as opposed to 
research, right? This book is mostly concerned with research pre any specific 
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applications. That doesn’t mean that research doesn’t have any further output, 
and obviously I’m not a fan of that language at all, but I think it would be wrong 
to short-circuit it. The spaces of research are continuously expanding. There are 
the arts as a form of research, the museum as an urban laboratory, neighbour-
hoods as experimental settings. Bringing a research sensibility to social life is 
potentially relevant to these different environments where there is this moment 
of realisation ‘Oh, what we’re doing is really researching’, or ‘We’re really doing 
a social experiment’. It’s social research happening in spaces that don’t have that 
accreditation. But the test has to be our capacity to problematise. I mean for me, 
in relation to this book, it’s not so much about acting on problems, but how to 
pose the problems well. That’s the business of this book.
AW: Earlier, as we were taking the lift to get to this room, someone got 
into the lift and then stepped out at the library floor. On the top of the pile of 
books the person was carrying sat a copy of Foucault’s (1978) The History of 
Sexuality. Later, and whilst sitting in the room, I noticed someone walking by 
carrying Pelle Ehn’s and his colleagues’ Making Futures (2014). These books, 
these artefacts and their accompanying versions of the social, circulate. We’re 
in this environment, having creativity reflected back to us, and yet, at the same 
time, the social sciences – for want of a better term – circulate and get mobilised 
in all manner of ways, by students in the first case, and by staff members as well 
as the design research practitioners who wrote the book, in the case of Making 
Futures. Clearly these books have an effect outside particular disciplinary set-
tings and preoccupations. One key difference, perhaps, is that we are inviting 
others to contrive their own socials rather than use this book as a ready-made.
Note s
1 The British sociologist Nikolas Rose published a paper ‘The End of the Social’ (1996), 
while Bruno Latour (1993) adopted Margaret Thatcher’s slogan that there is ‘no such 
thing as society’.
2 The actual quote refers to philosophers: ‘The philosophers have only interpreted the 
world, in various ways; the point is to change it’ (it is thesis 11 of Karl Marx’s Theses on 
Feuerbach (1845)).
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